That’s a great question. My current (very vague) idea is that we might need to replace first order logic with something else. A theory like PA is already updateful, because it can learn that a sentence is true, so trying to build updateless reasoning on top of it might be as futile as trying to build updateless reasoning on top of probabilities. But I have no idea what an updateless replacement for first order logic could look like.
Another part of the idea (not fully explained in Scott’s post I referenced earlier) is that nonexploited bargaining (AKA bargaining away from the pareto fronteir AKA cooperating with agents with different notions of fairness) provides a model of why agents should not just take pareto improvements all the time, and may therefore be a seed of “non-Bayesian” decision theory (in so far as Bayes is about taking pareto improvements).
That’s a great question. My current (very vague) idea is that we might need to replace first order logic with something else. A theory like PA is already updateful, because it can learn that a sentence is true, so trying to build updateless reasoning on top of it might be as futile as trying to build updateless reasoning on top of probabilities. But I have no idea what an updateless replacement for first order logic could look like.
Another part of the idea (not fully explained in Scott’s post I referenced earlier) is that nonexploited bargaining (AKA bargaining away from the pareto fronteir AKA cooperating with agents with different notions of fairness) provides a model of why agents should not just take pareto improvements all the time, and may therefore be a seed of “non-Bayesian” decision theory (in so far as Bayes is about taking pareto improvements).