To elaborate, if God exists then consciousness depends on having an immaterial soul. If consciousness depends on an immaterial soul, then simulated entities can never truly be conscious. If the simulated entities aren’t really conscious they are incapable of suffering, and there’s no reason for God to intervene in the simulation.
The thought experiment is not a very effective argument against theism, as it assumes non-existence of souls, but it serves the purpose of illustrating how unthinkably horrible things can actually happen.
if God exists then consciousness depends on having an immaterial soul.
I translate that into logical notation:
(God exists) → For all X (X is conscious → X has an immaterial soul)
I don’t concede this conditional. I can imagine a universe with a personal creator, where consciousness is a material property of certain types of complex systems, but souls don’t exist.
Eliezer (I think) feels the same way about the necessity of souls as about the Judeo-Christian god. Interesting hypothesis, but too complex to have anything but a small prior. Then no supporting evidence shows up, despite millennia of looking, reducing the likelihood further.
Eliezer (I think) feels the same way about the necessity of souls as about the Judeo-Christian god. Interesting hypothesis, but too complex to have anything but a small prior. Then no supporting evidence shows up, despite millennia of looking, reducing the likelihood further.
Has Eliezer suggested that he believes that the Judeo-Christian god is an “Interesting hypothesis”? My model of him wouldn’t say that.
I think I meant “interesting” in a sarcastic tone.
Another way of putting it: “You (theists) claim a high level of belief in this hypothesis. Because so many people (including close family members) take this position, I have though about this hypothesis and find it too complex to have anything but a small prior. Then I asked myself what observations are more likely if the hypothesis is true and which would be less likely. Then I looked around and found no evidence in favor of your hypothesis.”
To elaborate, if God exists then consciousness depends on having an immaterial soul.
This is totally out of nowhere. What has God’s existence have to do with what consciousness does or does not depend on? They seem to be entirely logically independent. (This one has already been handled by hwc.)
If consciousness depends on an immaterial soul, then simulated entities can never truly be conscious.
False again, because there’s no a priori reason why simulated entities can’t have an immaterial soul. (For instance, if God exists and is omnipotent, then by definition he could cause it to be the case that (some or all) simulated entities have immaterial souls.)
If the simulated entities aren’t really conscious they are incapable of suffering
And false a third time, because it assumes that suffering depends on consciousness. A number of e.g. animal rights proponents deny this.
The leap is that the Church–Turing thesis applies to human (“sentient”) cognition. Many theists deny this.
Many theists deny this...
To elaborate, if God exists then consciousness depends on having an immaterial soul. If consciousness depends on an immaterial soul, then simulated entities can never truly be conscious. If the simulated entities aren’t really conscious they are incapable of suffering, and there’s no reason for God to intervene in the simulation.
The thought experiment is not a very effective argument against theism, as it assumes non-existence of souls, but it serves the purpose of illustrating how unthinkably horrible things can actually happen.
I translate that into logical notation:
I don’t concede this conditional. I can imagine a universe with a personal creator, where consciousness is a material property of certain types of complex systems, but souls don’t exist.
Eliezer (I think) feels the same way about the necessity of souls as about the Judeo-Christian god. Interesting hypothesis, but too complex to have anything but a small prior. Then no supporting evidence shows up, despite millennia of looking, reducing the likelihood further.
Has Eliezer suggested that he believes that the Judeo-Christian god is an “Interesting hypothesis”? My model of him wouldn’t say that.
I think I meant “interesting” in a sarcastic tone.
Another way of putting it: “You (theists) claim a high level of belief in this hypothesis. Because so many people (including close family members) take this position, I have though about this hypothesis and find it too complex to have anything but a small prior. Then I asked myself what observations are more likely if the hypothesis is true and which would be less likely. Then I looked around and found no evidence in favor of your hypothesis.”
A number of your conditionals are false.
This is totally out of nowhere. What has God’s existence have to do with what consciousness does or does not depend on? They seem to be entirely logically independent. (This one has already been handled by hwc.)
False again, because there’s no a priori reason why simulated entities can’t have an immaterial soul. (For instance, if God exists and is omnipotent, then by definition he could cause it to be the case that (some or all) simulated entities have immaterial souls.)
And false a third time, because it assumes that suffering depends on consciousness. A number of e.g. animal rights proponents deny this.