That seems like a pretty low bar for “not civilized”, which is a seriously bad characterization, and some of those are downright bizarre. It reads as though you took a laundry list of things you don’t like about the US and decided that that’s your definition of “not civilized”. Would it make any sense if I pointed out that Europe tends to have weaker freedom of speech than the US, and a higher tendency towards anti-Semitism, and higher taxes, therefore Europe is “not civilized”?
It was a bad choice of word. But it seems like you agree that there are distinct empirical clusters for Europe-like and America-like (and Japan resides somewhere between the two—like most empirical classifications it’s imperfect, but still useful).
I think the case can be made that Europe is a better place to live (and that US states that practice executions are worse than those that don’t). But in any case this is all beside the point; the fact that there is this kind of resistance to the death penalty, even if only in Europe, demonstrates that humans are not naturally utilitarian.
the fact that there is this kind of resistance to the death penalty, even if only in Europe, demonstrates that humans are not naturally utilitarian.
Or that the death penalties utilitarian merits are debatable. Or that in some societies, ‘natural’ utilitarian tendencies are subverted/modified/removed/replaced by the cultural environment.
But it seems like you agree that there are distinct empirical clusters for Europe-like and America-like
I agree that if you try to list the differences between Europe and the US, you can come up with a list. However, many of the items on the list are related to each other mostly by historical accident. Europe lacks the death penalty because once activists get a foothold in one place, that makes it easier for them to get a foothold in other culturally and geographically close places. Not because people who like high taxes necessarily have to oppose the death penalty. The state of Europe right now is very path-dependent.
the fact that there is this kind of resistance to the death penalty, even if only in Europe, demonstrates that humans are not naturally utilitarian
Or that Europe is run by an unrepresentative subset of humans.
Or that humans are not generally naturally anything to the exclusion of everything else. (Of course, in the limit, everything is utilitarian—people in Europe may get displeasure from using the death penalty the same way they get displeasure from bad-tasting food. Is someone who avoids bad tasting food for food that costs more a utilitarian, because pleasure from food taste is a form of utilon?)
Not because people who like high taxes necessarily have to oppose the death penalty.
Ok, we actually disagree then. I think that progress in the progressive sense is real, that most of today’s politics is a product of historical/technological/etc. forces and more-or-less inevitable. (If I had to guess why the US is different from Europe I’d say it’s largely an artifact of which groups of people originally settled there, and I expect the US to become more European in the future). I predict that even in legislatures far away from Europe we’d observe a correlation between support for high taxation and opposition to the death penalty, and that more generally if we did a NOMINATE-style analysis we’d find that positions on many issues were largely explained by a single axis of variation, and the list of things I mentioned would be at one end of it.
Or that humans are not generally naturally anything to the exclusion of everything else.
Sure. I’m not arguing that we’re naturally virtue ethicists or anything. But I don’t think utilitarianism is an adequate description of intuitive human morality (even American morality). Perhaps the fat man in the trolley problem is a better example; while there are no doubt many clever arguments that people are being utilitarian via some convoluted route, it’s not the result we would naturally predict utilitarian thinkers to come to.
Of course, in the limit, everything is utilitarian—people in Europe may get displeasure from using the death penalty the same way they get displeasure from bad-tasting food. Is someone who avoids bad tasting food for food that costs more a utilitarian, because pleasure from food taste is a form of utilon?
I understand utilitarian to mean someone who tries to maximize some pseudo-economically consistent objective function of the external world. If someone assigns different values to actions that have the same result but get there by different paths, or evaluates a future state differently depending on the current state of the world, or believes that the same action could have a different moral value depending solely on the internal state of the person performing it, then they’re not a utilitarian.
It was a bad choice of word. But it seems like you agree that there are distinct empirical clusters for Europe-like and America-like (and Japan resides somewhere between the two—like most empirical classifications it’s imperfect, but still useful).
I think the case can be made that Europe is a better place to live (and that US states that practice executions are worse than those that don’t). But in any case this is all beside the point; the fact that there is this kind of resistance to the death penalty, even if only in Europe, demonstrates that humans are not naturally utilitarian.
Or that the death penalties utilitarian merits are debatable. Or that in some societies, ‘natural’ utilitarian tendencies are subverted/modified/removed/replaced by the cultural environment.
I agree that if you try to list the differences between Europe and the US, you can come up with a list. However, many of the items on the list are related to each other mostly by historical accident. Europe lacks the death penalty because once activists get a foothold in one place, that makes it easier for them to get a foothold in other culturally and geographically close places. Not because people who like high taxes necessarily have to oppose the death penalty. The state of Europe right now is very path-dependent.
Or that Europe is run by an unrepresentative subset of humans.
Or that humans are not generally naturally anything to the exclusion of everything else. (Of course, in the limit, everything is utilitarian—people in Europe may get displeasure from using the death penalty the same way they get displeasure from bad-tasting food. Is someone who avoids bad tasting food for food that costs more a utilitarian, because pleasure from food taste is a form of utilon?)
Ok, we actually disagree then. I think that progress in the progressive sense is real, that most of today’s politics is a product of historical/technological/etc. forces and more-or-less inevitable. (If I had to guess why the US is different from Europe I’d say it’s largely an artifact of which groups of people originally settled there, and I expect the US to become more European in the future). I predict that even in legislatures far away from Europe we’d observe a correlation between support for high taxation and opposition to the death penalty, and that more generally if we did a NOMINATE-style analysis we’d find that positions on many issues were largely explained by a single axis of variation, and the list of things I mentioned would be at one end of it.
Sure. I’m not arguing that we’re naturally virtue ethicists or anything. But I don’t think utilitarianism is an adequate description of intuitive human morality (even American morality). Perhaps the fat man in the trolley problem is a better example; while there are no doubt many clever arguments that people are being utilitarian via some convoluted route, it’s not the result we would naturally predict utilitarian thinkers to come to.
I understand utilitarian to mean someone who tries to maximize some pseudo-economically consistent objective function of the external world. If someone assigns different values to actions that have the same result but get there by different paths, or evaluates a future state differently depending on the current state of the world, or believes that the same action could have a different moral value depending solely on the internal state of the person performing it, then they’re not a utilitarian.