Tyrion is frequently put into situations where he relies on his family’s reputation for paying debts.
It’s a real-life Newcomb-like problem—specifically a case of Parfit’s Hitchhiker—illustrating the practical benefits of being seen as the sort of agent who keeps promises. It’s not an ordinary quid-pro-quo because there is, in fact, no incentive for Tyrion to keep his end of the bargain once he gets what he wants other than to be seen as the sort of person who keeps his bargain.
The point of these scenarios is make the issue as “clean” as possible, to strip away all the unnecessary embellishments which usually only cause people to fight the hypothetical.
organically
I guess what’s inside the screenwriter’s skull is organic… :-)
But really, since the invention of writing pretty much every writer who addressed the issue pointed out the importance of one’s reputation of keeping promises. There are outright commands (e.g. Numbers 30:2 If a man … swears an oath to bind himself by a pledge, he shall not break his word. He shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth.) and innumerable stories and fables about good things which happen to those who keep their promises and bad things which happen to those who don’t.
But really, since the invention of writing pretty much every writer who addressed the issue pointed out the importance of one’s reputation of keeping promises.
I don’t disagree with what you say, but I do disagree with the connotation that things which are not original or counter intuitive are not worth pointing out.
The last time this show was quoted, it basically amounted to “try hard to win, give it everything”, which is also something that people have been saying since the beginning of writing. All quote threads are filled with things that have been said again and again in slightly different ways. Even outside of quote threads, it’s worth rephrasing things. Pretty much every Lesswrong post has been conceptually written before by someone, with a few rare exceptions.
innumerable stories and fables about good things which happen to those who keep their promises and bad things which happen to those who don’t
Yes, but usually it’s a punishment or reward issued directly from the other party, or by forces of nature...not about the practical value of going out of your way to establish reputation.
Newcomb-like problem—specifically a case of Parfit’s Hitchhiker
Parfit’s Hitchhiker is not a “Newcomb-like problem”. In fact, it’s not even obvious that it is actually a proper decision problem: the only decision maker is the driver and you can’t control their decision. You only get to decide if you can precommit.
Anyway, Google doesn’t turn any reference to Parfit’s Hitchhiker independent of LessWrong. Has this dilemma really originated from Parfit or did EY make it up?
Anyway, Google doesn’t turn any reference to Parfit’s Hitchhiker independent of LessWrong. Has this dilemma really originated from Parfit or did EY make it up?
Google points to this as the original reference. It’s paywalled, so I cannot check.
The paper also apparently mentions Kavka’s toxin puzzle, an interesting exercise in rationality and precommitment occasionally discussed on LW.
1) Individuals who make certain decisions seem to win at higher rates than individuals who do not. 2) As far as you know, the act of decision doesn’t causally effect the likelihood of a win.
These two requirements seem inconsistent.
I’d define a decision problem to be Newcomb-like if the payoff and the agent mental state (preferences, beliefs, decision procedures) are not independend conditional on the agent’s decision.
Some of the problem on the list you linked are Newcomb-like, other are committment problems, other aren’t even decision problems.
My def. isn’t inconsistent. Those who buy computers are less likely to die of malaria,
^that’s an instance of Solomon’s problem, which is considered a newcomblike problem.
It’s the same as the fact that those who one-box are more likely to get more money in Newcomb’s. A third factor (socioeconomic status, CTGA allele, agent’s mental state prior to decision) accounts for the variance.
My def. isn’t inconsistent. Those who buy computers are less likely to die of malaria,
Once you condition on all the available evidence, such as the socioeconomic status, these two events become independent. Likewise, in the Solomon’s problem, a genetic test that detects the lesion would destroy the Newcomb-like structure of the dilemma.
Anyway, Google doesn’t turn any reference to Parfit’s Hitchhiker independent of LessWrong. Has this dilemma really originated from Parfit or did EY make it up?
AFAICT Kavka’s toxin puzzle is isomorphic to it (except that in this case the billionaire’s motives are alien).
I’m always eager to upvote a Game of Thrones quote, but unfortunately I don’t see the rationality insight here beyond an ordinary quid pro quo.
Tyrion is frequently put into situations where he relies on his family’s reputation for paying debts.
It’s a real-life Newcomb-like problem—specifically a case of Parfit’s Hitchhiker—illustrating the practical benefits of being seen as the sort of agent who keeps promises. It’s not an ordinary quid-pro-quo because there is, in fact, no incentive for Tyrion to keep his end of the bargain once he gets what he wants other than to be seen as the sort of person who keeps his bargain.
Think it’s a stretch?
Ahem.
Er...right. Realistic, I should have said!
We often construct such ridiculous scenarios to illustrate this sort of thing …”You’re in a desert and a selfish pseudo-psychic drives by”? Really?
I enjoyed the fact that Parfit’s Hitchhiker came up as a pop-culture reference, in a situation that arose organically.
The point of these scenarios is make the issue as “clean” as possible, to strip away all the unnecessary embellishments which usually only cause people to fight the hypothetical.
I guess what’s inside the screenwriter’s skull is organic… :-)
But really, since the invention of writing pretty much every writer who addressed the issue pointed out the importance of one’s reputation of keeping promises. There are outright commands (e.g. Numbers 30:2 If a man … swears an oath to bind himself by a pledge, he shall not break his word. He shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth.) and innumerable stories and fables about good things which happen to those who keep their promises and bad things which happen to those who don’t.
I don’t disagree with what you say, but I do disagree with the connotation that things which are not original or counter intuitive are not worth pointing out.
The last time this show was quoted, it basically amounted to “try hard to win, give it everything”, which is also something that people have been saying since the beginning of writing. All quote threads are filled with things that have been said again and again in slightly different ways. Even outside of quote threads, it’s worth rephrasing things. Pretty much every Lesswrong post has been conceptually written before by someone, with a few rare exceptions.
Yes, but usually it’s a punishment or reward issued directly from the other party, or by forces of nature...not about the practical value of going out of your way to establish reputation.
Parfit’s Hitchhiker is not a “Newcomb-like problem”. In fact, it’s not even obvious that it is actually a proper decision problem: the only decision maker is the driver and you can’t control their decision. You only get to decide if you can precommit.
Anyway, Google doesn’t turn any reference to Parfit’s Hitchhiker independent of LessWrong. Has this dilemma really originated from Parfit or did EY make it up?
Yes, it does. Try using syntax similar to this:
Thanks!
Google points to this as the original reference. It’s paywalled, so I cannot check.
The paper also apparently mentions Kavka’s toxin puzzle, an interesting exercise in rationality and precommitment occasionally discussed on LW.
Thanks. I’ve also found this one, which is not paywalled.
It’s in Reasons and Persons
Thanks!
Then you’re defining it differently from the way I, and others, are.
My req’s for a Newcomblike problem:
1) Individuals who make certain decisions seem to win at higher rates than individuals who do not.
2) As far as you know, the act of decision doesn’t causally effect the likelihood of a win.
what where your reqs?
These two requirements seem inconsistent.
I’d define a decision problem to be Newcomb-like if the payoff and the agent mental state (preferences, beliefs, decision procedures) are not independend conditional on the agent’s decision.
Some of the problem on the list you linked are Newcomb-like, other are committment problems, other aren’t even decision problems.
My def. isn’t inconsistent. Those who buy computers are less likely to die of malaria,
^that’s an instance of Solomon’s problem, which is considered a newcomblike problem.
It’s the same as the fact that those who one-box are more likely to get more money in Newcomb’s. A third factor (socioeconomic status, CTGA allele, agent’s mental state prior to decision) accounts for the variance.
Once you condition on all the available evidence, such as the socioeconomic status, these two events become independent.
Likewise, in the Solomon’s problem, a genetic test that detects the lesion would destroy the Newcomb-like structure of the dilemma.
AFAICT Kavka’s toxin puzzle is isomorphic to it (except that in this case the billionaire’s motives are alien).
Something about the opposite of Parfit’s hitchhiker? Developing a reputation for following through on promises one could renege on.