How do you distinguish this from “If I can convince myself that the past version of said loved one would have considered this being as themselves, then I too can consider this being as them”?
You’re missing the point. That’s exactly what Ishaan is saying. We cannot make the distinction, therefore the answer to your question as it was phrased: “what makes me believe” is: “Nothing.”
If that fails, but the so-called “resurrected” being BELIEVES it has all your first order desires and values, and BELIEVES it retains a few key memories, but this “you” is no longer there to verify that it does not, how is that different?
Here you’re getting into questions about consciousness, and I don’t believe we are at the level of understanding of it to be able to give a satisfactory answer. At the very least, I’d like a unified theory of everything before attempting to attack the consciousness question. The reason I’m saying this is because a lot of people seem to try to attack consciousness using quantum theory (Elezier included) but we don’t even know if quantum theory is the fundamental theory of everything or just some approximation to a deeper theory.
You’re missing the point. That’s exactly what Ishaan is saying. We cannot make the distinction, therefore the answer to your question as it was phrased: “what makes me believe” is: “Nothing.”
Yes, confirming that this is a correct interpretation of what I was saying.
Here you’re getting into questions about consciousness, and I don’t believe we are at the level of understanding of it to be able to give a satisfactory answer. At the very least, I’d like a unified theory of everything before attempting to attack the consciousness question. The reason I’m saying this is because a lot of people seem to try to attack consciousness using quantum theory (Elezier included) but we don’t even know if quantum theory is the fundamental theory of everything or just some approximation to a deeper theory.
This, however, makes me grumpy. I don’t think we need to know physics before we understand consciousness. We merely need to pin down some definitions as to what we mean when we say conscious. Our definition should be sufficiently vague as to be applicable within a wide spectrum mathematical systems.
That is, we should be able to construct a mathematical system in which conscious beings exist even without understanding the precise mathematical architecture of our own reality, so why is physics relevant?
It’s just like “free will”...as we looked at the brain more, the answers to some of the philosophical questions became more glaringly obvious, but the solutions were there all along, accessible without any particular empirical knowledge.
I’m referring to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. I agree with you that a theory of everything might not be necessary to understand consciousness, which is why I said I’d like a unified theory of everything before attempting to attack it. The reason for this preference is twofold: 1. I’ve seen many attempts at trying to fit quantum physics and consciousness together, which makes me uneasy, and 2. I really think we will arrive at a theory of everything in the Universe before we crack the consciousness question.
That is, we should be able to construct a mathematical system in which conscious beings exist even without understanding the precise mathematical architecture of our own reality,
It makes me sad that you would say this. A bayesian brain could definitely feel conscious from the inside, but we cannot tell if it’s conscious from the outside. It’s entirely possible that we could come up with theories of, say, styles of message-passing or information processing that exist in conscious systems (like human beings) but not in unconscious ones (unconscious people or simple automatons) and use this as a meter stick for determining consciousness. But until we crack the hard problem, we will never be 100% sure that our theories are correct or not. I have a feeling that we cannot solve this problem by simply doing more of the same.
It’s just like you cannot prove the consistency of Principia Mathematica from inside the theory. You have to ‘step out’ of the box, like Godel did, and once you do you realize that the consistency of the theory cannot be proven from the inside. Similarly, I have a feeling (again, just a feeling, not supported by any rigorous argument) that to solve the hard problem we have to ‘step outside’. Which is why I’d like a unified theory of everything, because once we know how the Universe really works, it becomes much easier to do that. It was the rigorous formulation of PI itself that gave Godel the framework to work outside of it.
It makes me uneasy as well when I see people fitting together quantum physics and consciousness, but the reason it makes me uneasy is that there is no need to introduce physics into the conversation. There are those (myself included) who consider the “Hard Problem of Consciousness” more or less solved (or perhaps dissolved), so I naturally disagree that we’ll arrive at a ToE first. Indeed, I think the problem has already been posed and solved multiple times in human history, with varying degrees of rigor. The trouble is that the solution is really hard to put into words, and human intuition really tends to fight it.
It’s entirely possible that we could come up with theories of, say, styles of message-passing or information processing that exist in conscious systems (like human beings) but not in unconscious ones (unconscious people or simple automatons) and use this as a meter stick for determining consciousness. But until we crack the hard problem, we will never be 100% sure that our theories are correct or not. I have a feeling that we cannot solve this problem by simply doing more of the same.
To rephrase: “we might define a set of information processing systems under the label “conscious” but when we say “conscious” we are also talking about qualia-having, and we can’t know whether information processing systems have qualia so therefore we can’t know if they are really conscious”, is that correct?
But this statement is predicated on the assumption that a certain notion of how qualia works (personalized, totally inaccessible, separate boxes for “my qualia” and “your qualia”, the notion that some things “have qualia” and other things do not...pretty much dualist “souls” by another name) actually corresponds to something in the universe.
There’s a whole lot of implicit assumptions that we just instinctively make in this area, as a result of our instinctive attraction towards dualism. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is just the hole left behind when you remove souls as an explanation without addressing the underlying dualist assumptions.
That is, we should be able to construct a mathematical system in which conscious beings exist even without understanding the precise mathematical architecture of our own reality,
I aim to convince you of this. My argument:
If we can understand consciousness after constructing the ToE, then we should be able to understand consciousness after constructing systems which are similar enough to the ToE but do not in fact correspond to reality. If you can agree with this statement, then you might also agree that If we can understand consciousness after constructing the ToE, then there is in fact a space of mathematical systems which would provide an adequate framework to understand consciousness.
Does it not follow that we should theoretically be able to construct a mathematical system within which conscious beings could exist?
This basically is all part of the notion that we don’t need to know empirical stuff about physics to tackle this question.
To see why I find your argument unconvincing, replace ‘consciousness’ with ‘transistors’, and ‘ToE’ with ‘quantum theory’.
“If we can understand transistors after constructing quantum theory, then we should be able to understand transistors after constructing systems which are similar enough to quantum theory but do not in fact correspond to reality. If you can agree with this statement,”
I do,
“then you might also agree that If we can understand transistors after constructing quantum theory, then there is in fact a space of mathematical systems which would provide an adequate framework to understand transistors”
There is. But this says nothing, because even though people could have understood transistors before quantum theory, there would have been many competing hypotheses but no prior to help them sort out the hypotheses. Quantum physics provided a prior which allowed people to selectively narrow down hypotheses.
“Does it not follow that we should theoretically be able to construct a mathematical system within which transistors could exist?”
We could, but there would be so many mathematical systems with this property that finding the correct one would be hopeless.
“Does it not follow that we should theoretically be able to construct a mathematical system within which transistors could exist?”
We could, but there would be so many mathematical systems with this property that finding the correct one would be hopeless.
Oh okay. I previously misunderstood your argument and thought you were saying it’s impossible, but I think we both agree that it’s possible to do this for consciousness.
I guess the definition of consciousness as constructed in my own head is broad enough to exist within many different systems (certainly almost any every system that contains computers, and that seems a broad enough set). So via the definition i’m working off of, it seems practical as well as possible.
I think we agree on plausibility, but disagree on practicality. Anyway, it’s been an unexpectedly enlightening conversation; I’m sad that you got downvoted (it wasn’t me!)
I know it wasn’t you—I’m fairly certain that there is someone who systematically goes through all my posts and gives them a single downvote. From what I’ve heard this happens to a lot of people.
I see what you’re saying, and I agree with you that human intuition tends to fight these things and physics is often used when it is unnecessary. You make a lot of valid points.
But, as I’m emphasizing, neither me nor you can give a rigorous logical explanation of why either of our viewpoints are correct. Or, failing that, to even ascribe a meaningful probability or likelihood to our viewpoints.
But, as I’m emphasizing, neither me nor you can give a rigorous logical explanation of why either of our viewpoints are correct. Or, failing that, to even ascribe a meaningful probability or likelihood to our viewpoints.
Wait, why is that? The viewpoint that I have stated here is primarily that the hard problem of consciousness isn’t an empirical question in the first place, but a philosophical one. If I add in a definition of consciousness into the mix, Isn’t that a claim that could be logically proven or refuted by someone?
Additionally, neither of us have really given our definitions of consciousness, but couldn’t quite a few definitions of consciousness be refuted solely on the basis of internal inconsistency?
Here you’re getting into questions about consciousness, and I don’t believe we are at the level of understanding of it to be able to give a satisfactory answer. At the very least, I’d like a unified theory of everything before attempting to attack the consciousness question.
An idea occurs, of an Extrapolated Philosophical Disposition. If I were to ask a djinni to resurrect a loved one, I’d tell it to do it in a way I would want if I knew and understood everything there is to know about physics, neuroscience, philosophy of consciousness, etc.
a lot of people seem to try to attack consciousness using quantum theory (Elezier included)
I didn’t mean to say Elezier thought consciousness was created due to some quantum mechanism. If that’s what it seemed like I was saying, I apologize for the misunderstanding. I am referring to, for example this: http://lesswrong.com/lw/pv/the_conscious_sorites_paradox/
However the whole debate over consciousness turns out, it seems that we see pretty much what we should expect to see given decoherent physics. What’s left is a puzzle, but it’s not a physicist’s responsibility to answer.
…is what I would like to say.
But unfortunately there’s that whole thing with the squared modulus of the complex amplitude giving the apparent “probability” of “finding ourselves in a particular blob”.
As Elezier himself admitted, his interpretation of the question hinges on MWI. If the copenhagen interpretation is taken, it breaks down. Unfortunately we have no idea if MWI is the correct interpretation to take. There are other interpretations, like the Bohmian interpretation, that also lack all the nasty properties of Copenhagen but avoid many-worlds.
You’re missing the point. That’s exactly what Ishaan is saying. We cannot make the distinction, therefore the answer to your question as it was phrased: “what makes me believe” is: “Nothing.”
Here you’re getting into questions about consciousness, and I don’t believe we are at the level of understanding of it to be able to give a satisfactory answer. At the very least, I’d like a unified theory of everything before attempting to attack the consciousness question. The reason I’m saying this is because a lot of people seem to try to attack consciousness using quantum theory (Elezier included) but we don’t even know if quantum theory is the fundamental theory of everything or just some approximation to a deeper theory.
Yes, confirming that this is a correct interpretation of what I was saying.
This, however, makes me grumpy. I don’t think we need to know physics before we understand consciousness. We merely need to pin down some definitions as to what we mean when we say conscious. Our definition should be sufficiently vague as to be applicable within a wide spectrum mathematical systems.
That is, we should be able to construct a mathematical system in which conscious beings exist even without understanding the precise mathematical architecture of our own reality, so why is physics relevant?
It’s just like “free will”...as we looked at the brain more, the answers to some of the philosophical questions became more glaringly obvious, but the solutions were there all along, accessible without any particular empirical knowledge.
I’m referring to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. I agree with you that a theory of everything might not be necessary to understand consciousness, which is why I said I’d like a unified theory of everything before attempting to attack it. The reason for this preference is twofold: 1. I’ve seen many attempts at trying to fit quantum physics and consciousness together, which makes me uneasy, and 2. I really think we will arrive at a theory of everything in the Universe before we crack the consciousness question.
It makes me sad that you would say this. A bayesian brain could definitely feel conscious from the inside, but we cannot tell if it’s conscious from the outside. It’s entirely possible that we could come up with theories of, say, styles of message-passing or information processing that exist in conscious systems (like human beings) but not in unconscious ones (unconscious people or simple automatons) and use this as a meter stick for determining consciousness. But until we crack the hard problem, we will never be 100% sure that our theories are correct or not. I have a feeling that we cannot solve this problem by simply doing more of the same.
It’s just like you cannot prove the consistency of Principia Mathematica from inside the theory. You have to ‘step out’ of the box, like Godel did, and once you do you realize that the consistency of the theory cannot be proven from the inside. Similarly, I have a feeling (again, just a feeling, not supported by any rigorous argument) that to solve the hard problem we have to ‘step outside’. Which is why I’d like a unified theory of everything, because once we know how the Universe really works, it becomes much easier to do that. It was the rigorous formulation of PI itself that gave Godel the framework to work outside of it.
It makes me uneasy as well when I see people fitting together quantum physics and consciousness, but the reason it makes me uneasy is that there is no need to introduce physics into the conversation. There are those (myself included) who consider the “Hard Problem of Consciousness” more or less solved (or perhaps dissolved), so I naturally disagree that we’ll arrive at a ToE first. Indeed, I think the problem has already been posed and solved multiple times in human history, with varying degrees of rigor. The trouble is that the solution is really hard to put into words, and human intuition really tends to fight it.
To rephrase: “we might define a set of information processing systems under the label “conscious” but when we say “conscious” we are also talking about qualia-having, and we can’t know whether information processing systems have qualia so therefore we can’t know if they are really conscious”, is that correct?
But this statement is predicated on the assumption that a certain notion of how qualia works (personalized, totally inaccessible, separate boxes for “my qualia” and “your qualia”, the notion that some things “have qualia” and other things do not...pretty much dualist “souls” by another name) actually corresponds to something in the universe.
There’s a whole lot of implicit assumptions that we just instinctively make in this area, as a result of our instinctive attraction towards dualism. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is just the hole left behind when you remove souls as an explanation without addressing the underlying dualist assumptions.
I aim to convince you of this. My argument:
If we can understand consciousness after constructing the ToE, then we should be able to understand consciousness after constructing systems which are similar enough to the ToE but do not in fact correspond to reality. If you can agree with this statement, then you might also agree that If we can understand consciousness after constructing the ToE, then there is in fact a space of mathematical systems which would provide an adequate framework to understand consciousness.
Does it not follow that we should theoretically be able to construct a mathematical system within which conscious beings could exist?
This basically is all part of the notion that we don’t need to know empirical stuff about physics to tackle this question.
To see why I find your argument unconvincing, replace ‘consciousness’ with ‘transistors’, and ‘ToE’ with ‘quantum theory’.
“If we can understand transistors after constructing quantum theory, then we should be able to understand transistors after constructing systems which are similar enough to quantum theory but do not in fact correspond to reality. If you can agree with this statement,”
I do,
“then you might also agree that If we can understand transistors after constructing quantum theory, then there is in fact a space of mathematical systems which would provide an adequate framework to understand transistors”
There is. But this says nothing, because even though people could have understood transistors before quantum theory, there would have been many competing hypotheses but no prior to help them sort out the hypotheses. Quantum physics provided a prior which allowed people to selectively narrow down hypotheses.
“Does it not follow that we should theoretically be able to construct a mathematical system within which transistors could exist?”
We could, but there would be so many mathematical systems with this property that finding the correct one would be hopeless.
Oh okay. I previously misunderstood your argument and thought you were saying it’s impossible, but I think we both agree that it’s possible to do this for consciousness.
I guess the definition of consciousness as constructed in my own head is broad enough to exist within many different systems (certainly almost any every system that contains computers, and that seems a broad enough set). So via the definition i’m working off of, it seems practical as well as possible.
I think we agree on plausibility, but disagree on practicality. Anyway, it’s been an unexpectedly enlightening conversation; I’m sad that you got downvoted (it wasn’t me!)
I know it wasn’t you—I’m fairly certain that there is someone who systematically goes through all my posts and gives them a single downvote. From what I’ve heard this happens to a lot of people.
I see what you’re saying, and I agree with you that human intuition tends to fight these things and physics is often used when it is unnecessary. You make a lot of valid points.
But, as I’m emphasizing, neither me nor you can give a rigorous logical explanation of why either of our viewpoints are correct. Or, failing that, to even ascribe a meaningful probability or likelihood to our viewpoints.
Wait, why is that? The viewpoint that I have stated here is primarily that the hard problem of consciousness isn’t an empirical question in the first place, but a philosophical one. If I add in a definition of consciousness into the mix, Isn’t that a claim that could be logically proven or refuted by someone?
Additionally, neither of us have really given our definitions of consciousness, but couldn’t quite a few definitions of consciousness be refuted solely on the basis of internal inconsistency?
I hope my reply to your question above answers the question. If not, I’ll be glad to explain.
An idea occurs, of an Extrapolated Philosophical Disposition. If I were to ask a djinni to resurrect a loved one, I’d tell it to do it in a way I would want if I knew and understood everything there is to know about physics, neuroscience, philosophy of consciousness, etc.
Huh. Where did that happen?
It didn’t. EY has consistently said the opposite.
From here, among many other places:
I didn’t mean to say Elezier thought consciousness was created due to some quantum mechanism. If that’s what it seemed like I was saying, I apologize for the misunderstanding. I am referring to, for example this: http://lesswrong.com/lw/pv/the_conscious_sorites_paradox/
As Elezier himself admitted, his interpretation of the question hinges on MWI. If the copenhagen interpretation is taken, it breaks down. Unfortunately we have no idea if MWI is the correct interpretation to take. There are other interpretations, like the Bohmian interpretation, that also lack all the nasty properties of Copenhagen but avoid many-worlds.