Applying this to the real world, the theory predicts that I should expect myself at my current moment to be Kolmogorov simple. I don’t feel particularly simple, but this is different from being simple. There is only strong evidence against the theory if it is probable that simplicity is perceived, conditional on it existing.
I think it would be easy for a conscious being to not perceive it simplicity because my experience with math and science shows that humans often do not easily notice simplicity beyond a very low threshold. Some beings may be below this threshold, such as the first conscious being or the most massive conscious being, but I find it unlikely that beings of this type have a probability anywhere near that of all other conscious beings, especially considering how hard these concepts are to make precise.
Using your example of beings that observe coin tosses, simple but low-probability events may be the easiest way to specify someone, but there could also easily be a way with less complexity but less apparent to the observer. This seems likely enough that not observing high-probability events does not provide exceptionally strong evidence against the theory.
Applying this to the real world, the theory predicts that I should expect myself at my current moment to be Kolmogorov simple. I don’t feel particularly simple, but this is different from being simple. There is only strong evidence against the theory if it is probable that simplicity is perceived, conditional on it existing.
I think it would be easy for a conscious being to not perceive it simplicity because my experience with math and science shows that humans often do not easily notice simplicity beyond a very low threshold. Some beings may be below this threshold, such as the first conscious being or the most massive conscious being, but I find it unlikely that beings of this type have a probability anywhere near that of all other conscious beings, especially considering how hard these concepts are to make precise.
Using your example of beings that observe coin tosses, simple but low-probability events may be the easiest way to specify someone, but there could also easily be a way with less complexity but less apparent to the observer. This seems likely enough that not observing high-probability events does not provide exceptionally strong evidence against the theory.