“Morality is improving” is a bit underspecified, as is “science is improving.” But assuming “morality is improving” means something like “on average, people’s moral beliefs are better than they used to be” (which seems to be what you mean), you’re right of course that the question only makes sense if you have some way of identifying “better”.
But then, similar things are true of science and airplanes. A 2011 airplane isn’t “objectively better” than a 1955 airplane. It’s objectively different, certainly, but to assert that the differences are improvements is to imply a value system.
If you’re confident enough in your value system to judge airplanes based on it, what makes judging moral systems based on it any different?
Science is not airplanes, but the capability to produce airplanes. In 2011, we know how to make 1955 airplanes (as well as 2011 airplanes). In 1955, we only knew how to make 1955 airplanes. Science is advancing.
A 2011 airplane isn’t “objectively better” than a 1955 airplane.
I don’t think there is a dispute that the social purpose of an airplane is to move people a substantial distance in exchange for fuel.
Modern airplanes move more people for less fuel than 1955 airplanes. Therefore, they are objectively better than older airplanes. And that doesn’t even address speed.
If you’re confident enough in your value system to judge airplanes based on it, what makes judging moral systems based on it any different?
I’m very confident that I am more moral than Louis XIV. I suspect he would disagree. How should we decide who is right?
I could quibble about the lack of dispute—I know plenty of people who object to the environmental impact of modern planes, for example, some of whom argue that the aviation situation is worse in 2011 than it was in 1955 precisely because they value low environmental impact more than they value moving more people (or, at least, they claim to) -- but that’s really beside my point. My point is just that asserting that moving more people (faster, more comfortably, more cheaply, etc.) for less fuel is what makes airplanes better is asserting a value system. That it is ubiquitously agreed upon (supposing it were) makes it no less a value system.
How should we decide who is right?
Regardless of how we should decide, or even if there is a way that we should decide, the way we will decide is that you will evaluate moral(TimS) - moral(Louis XIV) based on your value system, and I will evaluate it based on mine. (What Louis XIV’s opinion on the matter would have been, had he ever considered it, doesn’t matter much to me, and it certainly doesn’t matter to Louis, who is dead. Does it matter to you?)
Just like you evaluate good(2011 airplanes) - good(1955 airplanes) based on your value system, and I evaluate it based on mine.
Today, everyone agrees that slavery is wrong. So wrong that attempting to implement slavery will cause you to be charged with all sorts of crimes. Yet our ancestors didn’t think slavery was wrong. Were they just idiots?
That it is ubiquitously agreed upon (supposing it were) makes it no less a value system.
I’m not going to argue that Science isn’t a value system, but it succeeds on its own terms. Even if you think that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is brilliant and insightful, Science shows that it succeeds at what it aims for.
A similar critique of morality can be found in books like Nietzche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. What is morality’s response?
I’m not going to argue that Science isn’t a value system
That’s good to know, but I didn’t claim that science was a value system. I claimed that “what makes an airplane better is carrying more people further with less fuel” is a value system. So is “what makes an airplane better is being painted bright colors”. (As far as I know, nobody holds that one.)
Science may be a value system, but it isn’t one that tells us that carrying more passengers with less fuel is better than carrying fewer passengers with more fuel, nor that having bright colors is better than having non-bright colors. Science helps us find ways to carry more passengers with less fuel, it also helps us find ways to make colors brighter.
A similar critique of morality can be found in books like Nietzche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. What is morality’s response?
Then how did they fail to notice that slavery is wrong?
That’s good to know, but I didn’t claim that science was a value system.
Science the investigative part of humanity’s attempt to control Nature. It is objectively the case that we control Nature better than we once did. I assert that there is evolutionary pressure on our attempts to control nature. Specifically, bad Science fails to control nature.
A similar critique of morality can be found in books like Nietzche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. What is morality’s response?
I don’t understand what this question is asking.
Very paraphrased Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Science makes progress via paradigm shifts.
Very paraphrased Nietzsche: Paradigm shifts have occurred in morality.
If paradigm shifts don’t seem like a radical claim about either Science or Morality, then perhaps I should write a discussion post about why the claim is extraordinary.
I appreciate your feedback. I’m struggling with whether this idea is high enough quality to make a discussion post. And my experience is that I underestimate the problem of inferential distance.
Most people underestimate inferential distance, so that’s a pretty good theory.
If it helps, I think the primary problem I’m having is that you have a habit of substituting discussion of one idea for discussion of another (e.g, “morality’s response” to Nietzsche vs. the radical/extraordinary nature of paradigm shifts, the value system that sorts airplanes vs. the “investigative part of humanity’s attempt to control Nature,” etc.) without explicitly mapping the two.
I assume it’s entirely obvious to you, for example, how you would convert an opinion about paradigm shifts in morality into a statement about morality’s response to Nietzsche and vice-versa, so from your perspective you’re simply alternating synonyms to make your writing more interesting. But it’s not obvious to me, so from my perspective each such transition is basically changing the subject completely, so each round of discussion seems only vaguely related to the round before. Eventually the conversation feels like trying to nail Jello to a tree.
Again, I don’t mean here to accuse you of changing the subject or of having incoherent ideas; for all I know your discussion has been perfectly consistent and coherent, I just lack your ability (and, evidently, atorm’s) to map the various pieces of it to one another (let alone to my own comments). So, something that might help close the inferential distance is to start over and restate your thesis using consistent and clearly defined terms.
Thank you for defining your terms. I agree that we have the same basic neural/behavioral architecture that our stone-age ancestors had, and that we arrange the world such that others suffer less harm (per capita) than our stone-age ancestors did, and that this is a good thing.
“Morality is improving” is a bit underspecified, as is “science is improving.” But assuming “morality is improving” means something like “on average, people’s moral beliefs are better than they used to be” (which seems to be what you mean), you’re right of course that the question only makes sense if you have some way of identifying “better”.
But then, similar things are true of science and airplanes. A 2011 airplane isn’t “objectively better” than a 1955 airplane. It’s objectively different, certainly, but to assert that the differences are improvements is to imply a value system.
If you’re confident enough in your value system to judge airplanes based on it, what makes judging moral systems based on it any different?
Science is not airplanes, but the capability to produce airplanes. In 2011, we know how to make 1955 airplanes (as well as 2011 airplanes). In 1955, we only knew how to make 1955 airplanes. Science is advancing.
Fair point.
I don’t think there is a dispute that the social purpose of an airplane is to move people a substantial distance in exchange for fuel.
Modern airplanes move more people for less fuel than 1955 airplanes. Therefore, they are objectively better than older airplanes. And that doesn’t even address speed.
I’m very confident that I am more moral than Louis XIV. I suspect he would disagree. How should we decide who is right?
I could quibble about the lack of dispute—I know plenty of people who object to the environmental impact of modern planes, for example, some of whom argue that the aviation situation is worse in 2011 than it was in 1955 precisely because they value low environmental impact more than they value moving more people (or, at least, they claim to) -- but that’s really beside my point. My point is just that asserting that moving more people (faster, more comfortably, more cheaply, etc.) for less fuel is what makes airplanes better is asserting a value system. That it is ubiquitously agreed upon (supposing it were) makes it no less a value system.
Regardless of how we should decide, or even if there is a way that we should decide, the way we will decide is that you will evaluate moral(TimS) - moral(Louis XIV) based on your value system, and I will evaluate it based on mine. (What Louis XIV’s opinion on the matter would have been, had he ever considered it, doesn’t matter much to me, and it certainly doesn’t matter to Louis, who is dead. Does it matter to you?)
Just like you evaluate good(2011 airplanes) - good(1955 airplanes) based on your value system, and I evaluate it based on mine.
Why in the world would we do anything else?
Today, everyone agrees that slavery is wrong. So wrong that attempting to implement slavery will cause you to be charged with all sorts of crimes. Yet our ancestors didn’t think slavery was wrong. Were they just idiots?
I’m not going to argue that Science isn’t a value system, but it succeeds on its own terms. Even if you think that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is brilliant and insightful, Science shows that it succeeds at what it aims for.
A similar critique of morality can be found in books like Nietzche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. What is morality’s response?
No.
That’s good to know, but I didn’t claim that science was a value system. I claimed that “what makes an airplane better is carrying more people further with less fuel” is a value system. So is “what makes an airplane better is being painted bright colors”. (As far as I know, nobody holds that one.)
Science may be a value system, but it isn’t one that tells us that carrying more passengers with less fuel is better than carrying fewer passengers with more fuel, nor that having bright colors is better than having non-bright colors. Science helps us find ways to carry more passengers with less fuel, it also helps us find ways to make colors brighter.
I don’t understand what this question is asking.
Then how did they fail to notice that slavery is wrong?
Science the investigative part of humanity’s attempt to control Nature. It is objectively the case that we control Nature better than we once did. I assert that there is evolutionary pressure on our attempts to control nature. Specifically, bad Science fails to control nature.
Very paraphrased Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Science makes progress via paradigm shifts. Very paraphrased Nietzsche: Paradigm shifts have occurred in morality.
If paradigm shifts don’t seem like a radical claim about either Science or Morality, then perhaps I should write a discussion post about why the claim is extraordinary.
I’m having a very hard time following your point, so if you can present it in a more systematic fashion in a discussion post, that might be best.
I think I followed the point pretty well, although I don’t know that I can explain it any better. It’s worth its own post, TimS.
I appreciate your feedback. I’m struggling with whether this idea is high enough quality to make a discussion post. And my experience is that I underestimate the problem of inferential distance.
Most people underestimate inferential distance, so that’s a pretty good theory.
If it helps, I think the primary problem I’m having is that you have a habit of substituting discussion of one idea for discussion of another (e.g, “morality’s response” to Nietzsche vs. the radical/extraordinary nature of paradigm shifts, the value system that sorts airplanes vs. the “investigative part of humanity’s attempt to control Nature,” etc.) without explicitly mapping the two.
I assume it’s entirely obvious to you, for example, how you would convert an opinion about paradigm shifts in morality into a statement about morality’s response to Nietzsche and vice-versa, so from your perspective you’re simply alternating synonyms to make your writing more interesting. But it’s not obvious to me, so from my perspective each such transition is basically changing the subject completely, so each round of discussion seems only vaguely related to the round before. Eventually the conversation feels like trying to nail Jello to a tree.
Again, I don’t mean here to accuse you of changing the subject or of having incoherent ideas; for all I know your discussion has been perfectly consistent and coherent, I just lack your ability (and, evidently, atorm’s) to map the various pieces of it to one another (let alone to my own comments). So, something that might help close the inferential distance is to start over and restate your thesis using consistent and clearly defined terms.
.
Thank you for defining your terms. I agree that we have the same basic neural/behavioral architecture that our stone-age ancestors had, and that we arrange the world such that others suffer less harm (per capita) than our stone-age ancestors did, and that this is a good thing.