There are no adults. In most places, also no trained professionals. There are only a bunch ofadaptation executors, rewarded when they are seen cutting the enemy rather than ensuring the enemy is cut, and for reinforcing the party line.
Where adults do exist, they do not have the right incentives. This causes them to mostly do things that don’t help solve the underlying problems. Existing organizations are instead focused on pleasing their donor bases and otherwise looking good. This makes them bad at generating effective solutions and at getting anything implemented.
Taken together, if widely known, this would imply that it would be impossible for the federal government to credibly commit to foreign treaties.
Although obviously disadvantageous in some ways, it does have some genuine advantages for political factions if they fear being dragged into an undesirable treaty when an opposing faction is in power. Especially if it’s a treaty that they can’t easily break later without severe consequences, such as trade deals agreed with nominal allies.
So there may be incentives to maintain the status quo, and it’s not at all clear that change would be net positive to those with such fears.
Taken together, if widely known, this would imply that it would be impossible for the federal government to credibly commit to foreign treaties
My impression is this is indeed partially true. My understanding is that United States is a symbolic-only signatory to many treaties, pretty capricious about ones it has nominally signed for real, and that an informal agreement with the US or assurances from US institutions are much less reliable than many other countries.
Taken together, if widely known, this would imply that it would be impossible for the federal government to credibly commit to foreign treaties.
Although obviously disadvantageous in some ways, it does have some genuine advantages for political factions if they fear being dragged into an undesirable treaty when an opposing faction is in power. Especially if it’s a treaty that they can’t easily break later without severe consequences, such as trade deals agreed with nominal allies.
So there may be incentives to maintain the status quo, and it’s not at all clear that change would be net positive to those with such fears.
My impression is this is indeed partially true. My understanding is that United States is a symbolic-only signatory to many treaties, pretty capricious about ones it has nominally signed for real, and that an informal agreement with the US or assurances from US institutions are much less reliable than many other countries.
A lot of trade treaties have mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlement, so it takes actual effort to get out of those treaty obligations.