The stronger someones imaginative ability is, the more their imagining an experience is actually having it, in terms of brain states....and the less it s a counterexample to anything relevant.
If the knowedge the AI gets from the colour routine is unproblematically encoded in a string of bits, why can’t it just look at the string of bits...for that matter, why can’t Mary just look at the neural spike trains of someone seing red?
why can’t Mary just look at the neural spike trains of someone seing red?
Why can’t we just eat a picture of a plate of spaghetti instead of actual spaghetti? Because a representation of some thing is not the thing itself. Am I missing something?
The banal truth here is that knowing about a thing doesn’t turn you into it.
The significant and contentious claim is that here are certain kinds of knowledge that can only be accessed by instantiating a brain state. The existence of such subjective knowledge leads to a further argument against physicalism.
The stronger someones imaginative ability is, the more their imagining an experience is actually having it, in terms of brain states....and the less it s a counterexample to anything relevant.
If the knowedge the AI gets from the colour routine is unproblematically encoded in a string of bits, why can’t it just look at the string of bits...for that matter, why can’t Mary just look at the neural spike trains of someone seing red?
Why can’t we just eat a picture of a plate of spaghetti instead of actual spaghetti? Because a representation of some thing is not the thing itself. Am I missing something?
Yes: is about a kind of knowledge.
The banal truth here is that knowing about a thing doesn’t turn you into it.
The significant and contentious claim is that here are certain kinds of knowledge that can only be accessed by instantiating a brain state. The existence of such subjective knowledge leads to a further argument against physicalism.