I don’t understand what the point of that point is.
Do you think you argung against the intended conclusion of the Knowledge Argumemt in some way? If so, you are not...the loophole you have found s quite irrelevant,
I’m disagreeing that you have a valid refutation of the KA. However, I don’t know if you even think you have, since you haven’t responded to my hints that you should clarify.
They way you’re saying this, it makes it seem like we’re both in the same boat. I have no idea what position you’re even holding.
I feel like I’m doing the same thing over and over and nothing different is happening, but I’ll quote what I said in another place in this thread and hope I was a tiny bit clearer.
I think the distinction between ‘knowing all about’ and ‘seeing’ red is captured in my box analogy. The brain state is a box. There is another box inside it, call this ‘understanding’. We call something inside the first box ‘experienced’. So the paradox hear is the two distinct states [experiencing (red) ] and [experiencing ( [understanding (red) ] ) ] are both brought under the header [knowing (red)], and this is really confusing.
I have explained elsewhere why the loophole doesnt work:-
M’s R is about what it says its about, the existence of non physical facts. Finding a loophole where Mary can instantiate the brain state without having the perceptual stimulus doesn’t address that...indeed it assumes that an instantiation of the red-seeing is necessary, which is tantamount to conceding that something subectve is going on, which is tantamount to conceding the point
Moving on to your argument:-
I think the distinction between ‘knowing all about’ and ‘seeing’ red is captured in my box analogy. The brain state is a box. There is another box inside it, call this ‘understanding’. We call something inside the first box ‘experienced’. So the paradox hear is the two distinct states [experiencing (red) ] and [experiencing ( [understanding (red) ] ) ] are both brought under the header [knowing (red)], and this is really confusing
Confusing to whom?
Let’s suppose that person is Frank Jackson.
In the knowledge Argument, Jackson credits Mary with all objective knowledge, and only objective knowledge precisely because he is trying to establish the existence of subjective knowledge .. what Mary doesnt know must be subjective, if there is something Mary doesn’t know. So the eventual point s that there s more to knowledge than objective knowledge.
So you don’t show that Jackson is wrong by agreeing with him.
(translation: the experience of seeing red is no the experience of understanding how seeing red works)
This is true, when we take those statements literally. But it’s true in the same sense a Gödel encoding of statement in PA is not literally that statement. It is just a representation, but the representation is exactly homomorphic to its referent. Mary’s representation of reality is presumed complete ex hypothesi, therefore she will understand exactly what will happen in her brain after seeing color, and that is exactly what happens.
You wouldn’t call a statement of PA that isn’t a literally a Gödel encoding of a statement (for some fixed encoding) a non-mathematical statement. For one, because that statement has a Gödel encoding by necessity. But more importantly, even though the statement technically isn’t literally a Gödel-encoding, it’s still mathematical, regardless.
Mary’s know how she will respond to learning what red is like. Mary knows how others will respond. This exhausts the space of possible predictions that could be made on behalf of this subjective knowledge, and it can be done without it.
what Mary doesnt know must be subjective, if there is something Mary doesn’t know. So the eventual point s that there s more to knowledge than objective knowledge.
Tangentially to this discussion, but I don’t think that is a wise way of labeling that knowledge.
Suppose Mary has enough information to predict her own behavior. Suppose she predicts she will do x. Could she not, upon deducing that fact, decide to not do x?
Mary has all objective knowledge, but certain facts about her own future behavior must escape her, because any certainty could trivially be negated.
Suppose Mary has enough information to predict her own behavior. Suppose she predicts she will do x. Could she not, upon deducing that fact, decide to not do x?
There are three possibilities worth disambiguating here. 1) Mary predicts that she will do X given some assumed set S1 of knowledge, memories, experiences, etc., AND S1 includes Mary’s knowledge of this prediction. 2) Mary predicts that she will do X given some assumed set S2 of knowledge, memories, experiences, etc., AND S2 does not include Mary’s knowledge of this prediction. 3) Mary predicts that she will do X independent of her knowledge, memories, experiences, etc.
Mary’s representation of reality is presumed complete ex hypothesi, therefore she will understand exactly what will happen in her brain after seeing color, and that is exactly what happens
Mary is presumed to have all objective knowedge and only objectve knowledge, Your phrasing is ambiguous and therefire doesnt address the point. When you say Mary will know what happens when she sees red, do you mean she knows how red looks subjectively, or she knows something
objective like what her behaviour will be.....further on you mention predicting her reactions,
You wouldn’t call a statement of PA that isn’t a literally a Gödel encoding of a statement (for some fixed encoding) a non-mathematical statement. For one, because that statement has a Gödel encoding by necessity. But more importantly, even though the statement technically isn’t literally a Gödel-encoding, it’s still mathematical, regardless.
Is that supposed to relate to the objective/ subjective distinction somehow?
[Mary knows] how she will respond to learning what red is like. Mary knows how others will respond. This exhausts the space of possible predictions that could be made on behalf of this subjective knowledge, and it can be done without
So? The overall point is about physicalism, and to get to ‘physicalism is false’, all you need is the existence of subjective knowledge, not its usefulness in making prediction. So again I don’t see the relevance
Suppose Mary has enough information to predict her own behavior. Suppose she predicts she will do x. Could she not, upon deducing that fact, decide to not do x?
Maybe. I don’t see the problem. There is still an unproblematic sense in which Mary has all objective knowledge, even if it doesn’t allow her to do certain things. If that was the point.
Mary is presumed to have all objective knowedge and only objectve knowledge, Your phrasing is ambiguous and therefire doesnt address the point.
The behavior of the neurons in her skull is an objective fact, and this is what I mean to referring to. Apologies for the ambiguity.
When you say Mary will know what happens when she sees red, do you mean she knows how red looks subjectively, or she knows something objective like what her behaviour will be
The latter. The former is purely experiential knowledge, and as I have repeatedly said is contained in a superset of verbal (what you call ‘objective’) knowledge, but is disjoint with the set of verbal (‘objective’) knowledge itself. This is my box metaphor.
Is that supposed to relate to the objective/ subjective distinction somehow?
Yes. Assuming the Godel encoding is fixed, [the metaphor is that] any and all statements of PA are experiential knowledge (an experience, in simple terms), non-Godel statements of PA are purely experiential knowledge; the redness of red, say, and finally the Godel statements of PA are verbal knowledge, or ‘objective knowledge’ in your terminology.
Despite not being Godel statements in the encoding, the second item in the above list is still mathematical, and redness of red is still physical.
So? The overall point is about physicalism, and to get to ‘physicalism is false’, all you need is the existence of subjective knowledge, not its usefulness in making prediction. So again I don’t see the relevance
What does this knowledge do? How do we tell the difference between someone with and without these ‘subjective experiences’? What definition of knowledge admits it as valid?
The latter. The former is purely experiential knowledge, and as I have repeatedly said is contained in a superset of verbal (what you call ’objectiive) knowledge, but is disjoint with the set of verbal (‘objective’) knowledge itself. This is my box metaphor.
You have said that according to you, stipulatively, subjective knowledge is a subset of objective knowledge. What we mean by objective knowledge is generally knowledge that can be understood at second hand, without being in a special state or having had particular experiences. You say that the subjective subset of objective knowledge is somehow opaque, so that it does not have the properties usually associated with objective knowledge..but why should anyone believe it is objective, when it lacks the usual properties, and is only asserted to be objective?
redness of red is still physical
I can’t see how that has been proven. You can’t prove that redness is physically encoded in the relevant sense just by noting that physical changes occur in brains, because
1 There’s no physical proof of physicalism
2 An assumption of physicalism is question begging
3 You need an absence of non physical proeties, states and processes, not just the presence of physical changes
4 Physicalism as a meaningful claim, and not just a stipulative label needs to pay its way in explanation...but its ability to explain subjective knowledge is just at is in question.
What does this knowledge do? How do we tell the difference between someone with and without these ‘subjective experiences’? What definition of knowledge admits it as valid
Its hard to prove the existence of subjective knowledge in an objective basis. What else would you expect.? There is a widespread belief in subjective, experiential knowledge and the evidence for it is subjective. The alternative is the sort of thing caricatured as ‘how was it for me, darling’.
If one of Mary’s predictions is, “When I see red, I will say, ’wow! I didn’t know that red looked like that!”, then the fact that she has predicted this in advance is hardly evidence that she does not learn anything by seeing red. If anything, it proves that she does.
I don’t understand what the point of that point is.
Do you think you argung against the intended conclusion of the Knowledge Argumemt in some way? If so, you are not...the loophole you have found s quite irrelevant,
I have no idea what your position even is and you are making no effort to elucidate it. I had hoped this line
Was enough to clue you in to the point of my post.
I’m disagreeing that you have a valid refutation of the KA. However, I don’t know if you even think you have, since you haven’t responded to my hints that you should clarify.
“I think you’re wrong” is not a position.
They way you’re saying this, it makes it seem like we’re both in the same boat. I have no idea what position you’re even holding.
I feel like I’m doing the same thing over and over and nothing different is happening, but I’ll quote what I said in another place in this thread and hope I was a tiny bit clearer.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/nnc/the_ai_in_marys_room/day2
I just explained the position I am holding.
I have explained elsewhere why the loophole doesnt work:-
Moving on to your argument:-
Confusing to whom?
Let’s suppose that person is Frank Jackson.
In the knowledge Argument, Jackson credits Mary with all objective knowledge, and only objective knowledge precisely because he is trying to establish the existence of subjective knowledge .. what Mary doesnt know must be subjective, if there is something Mary doesn’t know. So the eventual point s that there s more to knowledge than objective knowledge.
So you don’t show that Jackson is wrong by agreeing with him.
But I don’t know that you think Jackson is wrong,
Mary’s room seems to be arguing that,
(translation: the experience of seeing red is no the experience of understanding how seeing red works)
This is true, when we take those statements literally. But it’s true in the same sense a Gödel encoding of statement in PA is not literally that statement. It is just a representation, but the representation is exactly homomorphic to its referent. Mary’s representation of reality is presumed complete ex hypothesi, therefore she will understand exactly what will happen in her brain after seeing color, and that is exactly what happens.
You wouldn’t call a statement of PA that isn’t a literally a Gödel encoding of a statement (for some fixed encoding) a non-mathematical statement. For one, because that statement has a Gödel encoding by necessity. But more importantly, even though the statement technically isn’t literally a Gödel-encoding, it’s still mathematical, regardless.
Mary’s know how she will respond to learning what red is like. Mary knows how others will respond. This exhausts the space of possible predictions that could be made on behalf of this subjective knowledge, and it can be done without it.
Tangentially to this discussion, but I don’t think that is a wise way of labeling that knowledge.
Suppose Mary has enough information to predict her own behavior. Suppose she predicts she will do x. Could she not, upon deducing that fact, decide to not do x?
Mary has all objective knowledge, but certain facts about her own future behavior must escape her, because any certainty could trivially be negated.
There are three possibilities worth disambiguating here.
1) Mary predicts that she will do X given some assumed set S1 of knowledge, memories, experiences, etc., AND S1 includes Mary’s knowledge of this prediction.
2) Mary predicts that she will do X given some assumed set S2 of knowledge, memories, experiences, etc., AND S2 does not include Mary’s knowledge of this prediction.
3) Mary predicts that she will do X independent of her knowledge, memories, experiences, etc.
Mary is presumed to have all objective knowedge and only objectve knowledge, Your phrasing is ambiguous and therefire doesnt address the point. When you say Mary will know what happens when she sees red, do you mean she knows how red looks subjectively, or she knows something objective like what her behaviour will be.....further on you mention predicting her reactions,
Is that supposed to relate to the objective/ subjective distinction somehow?
So? The overall point is about physicalism, and to get to ‘physicalism is false’, all you need is the existence of subjective knowledge, not its usefulness in making prediction. So again I don’t see the relevance
Maybe. I don’t see the problem. There is still an unproblematic sense in which Mary has all objective knowledge, even if it doesn’t allow her to do certain things. If that was the point.
The behavior of the neurons in her skull is an objective fact, and this is what I mean to referring to. Apologies for the ambiguity.
The latter. The former is purely experiential knowledge, and as I have repeatedly said is contained in a superset of verbal (what you call ‘objective’) knowledge, but is disjoint with the set of verbal (‘objective’) knowledge itself. This is my box metaphor.
Yes. Assuming the Godel encoding is fixed, [the metaphor is that] any and all statements of PA are experiential knowledge (an experience, in simple terms), non-Godel statements of PA are purely experiential knowledge; the redness of red, say, and finally the Godel statements of PA are verbal knowledge, or ‘objective knowledge’ in your terminology.
Despite not being Godel statements in the encoding, the second item in the above list is still mathematical, and redness of red is still physical.
What does this knowledge do? How do we tell the difference between someone with and without these ‘subjective experiences’? What definition of knowledge admits it as valid?
You have said that according to you, stipulatively, subjective knowledge is a subset of objective knowledge. What we mean by objective knowledge is generally knowledge that can be understood at second hand, without being in a special state or having had particular experiences. You say that the subjective subset of objective knowledge is somehow opaque, so that it does not have the properties usually associated with objective knowledge..but why should anyone believe it is objective, when it lacks the usual properties, and is only asserted to be objective?
I can’t see how that has been proven. You can’t prove that redness is physically encoded in the relevant sense just by noting that physical changes occur in brains, because
1 There’s no physical proof of physicalism
2 An assumption of physicalism is question begging
3 You need an absence of non physical proeties, states and processes, not just the presence of physical changes
4 Physicalism as a meaningful claim, and not just a stipulative label needs to pay its way in explanation...but its ability to explain subjective knowledge is just at is in question.
Its hard to prove the existence of subjective knowledge in an objective basis. What else would you expect.? There is a widespread belief in subjective, experiential knowledge and the evidence for it is subjective. The alternative is the sort of thing caricatured as ‘how was it for me, darling’.
If one of Mary’s predictions is, “When I see red, I will say, ’wow! I didn’t know that red looked like that!”, then the fact that she has predicted this in advance is hardly evidence that she does not learn anything by seeing red. If anything, it proves that she does.
I think your post seems to have been a reply to me. I’m the one who still accepts physicalism. AncientGreek is the one who rejects it.
I realize that. A reply doesn’t necessarily have to be an argument against the person it is a reply to.