Do you think mathematical statements are true and false? Do you think mathematics has an actual territory?
It is plainly the case that people can have morally wrong preferences, and therefore
no argument against ethics that ethics are not forced on people. People will suffer if
they hold incorrect or irrational factual beliefs, and they will suffer if they have evil preferences. In both cases there is a distinction between right and wrong, and in both
cases there is an option.
I think you and others on this thread suffer from a confusion between ontology and epistemology. There can be objective truths in mathematics without having
the number 23 floating around in space. Moral objectivity likewise does not demand
the physical existence of moral objects.
There are things I don’t want done to me. I should not therefore do them to others. I can reason my way to that conclusion without the need for moral objects, and without denying that I am made of atoms.
Wait. So you don’t believe in an objective notion of morality, in the sense of a morality that would be true even if there were no people? Instead, you think of morality as, like, a set of reasonable principles a person can figure out that prevent their immediate desires from stomping on their well-being, and/or that includes in their “selfishness” a desire for the well-being of others?
Everything is non objective for some value of objective. It is doubtful that there are mathematical truths without mathematicians. But that does not make math as subjective as art.
Okay. The distinction I am drawing is: are moral facts something “out there” to be discovered, self-justifying, etc., or are they facts about people, their minds, their situations, and their relationships.
Could you answer the question for that value of objective? Or, if not, could you answer the question by ignoring the word “objective” or providing a particular value for it?
I translate that as: it’s better to talk about “moral values” than “moral facts” (moral facts being facts about what moral values are, I guess), and moral values are (approximately) reasonable principles a person can figure out that prevent their immediate desires from stomping on their well-being, and/or that includes in their “selfishness” a desire for the well-being of others.
Something like that? If not, could you translate for me instead?
I take this to mean that, other than that, you agree.
(This is the charitable reading, however. You seem to be sending strong signals that you do not wish to have a productive discussion. If this is not your intent, be careful—I expect that it is easy to interpret posts like this as sending such signals.)
If this is true, then I think the vast majority of the disagreements you’ve been having in this thread have been due to unnecessary miscommunication.
Do you think mathematical statements are true and false? Do you think mathematics has an actual territory?
Mathematics is not Platonically real. If it is we get Tegmark IV and then every instant of sensible ordered universe is evidence against it, unless we are Boltzmann brains. So, no, mathematics does not have an actual territory. It is an abstraction of physical behaviors that intelligences can use because intelligences are also physical. Mathematics works because we can perform isomorphic physical operations inside our brains.
It is plainly the case that people can have morally wrong preferences
You can say that as many times as you like, but that wont make it true.
ETA: You also still haven’t explained how a person can know that.
Mathematics is not Platonically real. If it is we get Tegmark IV and then every instant of sensible ordered universe is evidence against it, unless we are Boltzmann brains.
Only if is-real is a boolean. If it’s a number, then mathematics can be “platonically real” without us being Boltzmann brains.
As opposed to what? Subjective? What are the options? Because that helps to clarify what you mean by “objective”. Prices are created indirectly by subjective preferences and they fluctuate, but if I had to pick between calling them “subjective” or calling them “objective” I would pick “objective”, for a variety of reasons.
No; morality reduces to values that can only be defined with respect to an agent, or a set of agents plus an aggregation process. However, almost all of the optimizing agents (humans) that we know about share some values in common, which creates a limited sort of objectivity in that most of the contexts we would define morality with respect to agree qualitatively with each other, which usually allows people to get away with failing to specify the context.
It still isn’t clear what it means for a preference for murder to be “wrong”!
So far I can only infer your definition of “wrong” to be:
“Not among the correct preferences”
… but you still haven’t explained to us why you think there are correct preferences, besides to stamp your foot and say over and over again “There are obviously correct preferences” even when many people do not agree.
I see no reason to believe that there is a set of “correct” preferences to check against.
Even if there’s no such thing as objective right and wrong, they might easily be able to reason that being bloodthirsty is not in their best selfish interest.
Can people reason that bloodthirst is not a good preference to have...?
For me, now, it isn’t practical. In other circumstances it would be. It need not ever be a terminal goal but it could be an instrumental goal built in deeply.
Funny how you never quite answer the question as stated. Can you even say it is subjectively wrong?
It isn’t ‘funny’ at all. You were trying to force someone into a lose lose morality signalling position. It is appropriate to ignore such attempts and instead state what your actual position is.
Do you think mathematical statements are true and false? Do you think mathematics has an actual territory?
It is plainly the case that people can have morally wrong preferences, and therefore no argument against ethics that ethics are not forced on people. People will suffer if they hold incorrect or irrational factual beliefs, and they will suffer if they have evil preferences. In both cases there is a distinction between right and wrong, and in both cases there is an option.
I think you and others on this thread suffer from a confusion between ontology and epistemology. There can be objective truths in mathematics without having the number 23 floating around in space. Moral objectivity likewise does not demand the physical existence of moral objects.
There are things I don’t want done to me. I should not therefore do them to others. I can reason my way to that conclusion without the need for moral objects, and without denying that I am made of atoms.
Wait. So you don’t believe in an objective notion of morality, in the sense of a morality that would be true even if there were no people? Instead, you think of morality as, like, a set of reasonable principles a person can figure out that prevent their immediate desires from stomping on their well-being, and/or that includes in their “selfishness” a desire for the well-being of others?
Everything is non objective for some value of objective. It is doubtful that there are mathematical truths without mathematicians. But that does not make math as subjective as art.
Okay. The distinction I am drawing is: are moral facts something “out there” to be discovered, self-justifying, etc., or are they facts about people, their minds, their situations, and their relationships.
Could you answer the question for that value of objective? Or, if not, could you answer the question by ignoring the word “objective” or providing a particular value for it?
The second is closer, but there is still the issue of the fact-value divide.
ETA: I have a substantive pre-written article on this, but where am I going to post it with my karma...?
I translate that as: it’s better to talk about “moral values” than “moral facts” (moral facts being facts about what moral values are, I guess), and moral values are (approximately) reasonable principles a person can figure out that prevent their immediate desires from stomping on their well-being, and/or that includes in their “selfishness” a desire for the well-being of others.
Something like that? If not, could you translate for me instead?
I think the the fact that moral values apply to groups is important.
I take this to mean that, other than that, you agree.
(This is the charitable reading, however. You seem to be sending strong signals that you do not wish to have a productive discussion. If this is not your intent, be careful—I expect that it is easy to interpret posts like this as sending such signals.)
If this is true, then I think the vast majority of the disagreements you’ve been having in this thread have been due to unnecessary miscommunication.
Mathematics is not Platonically real. If it is we get Tegmark IV and then every instant of sensible ordered universe is evidence against it, unless we are Boltzmann brains. So, no, mathematics does not have an actual territory. It is an abstraction of physical behaviors that intelligences can use because intelligences are also physical. Mathematics works because we can perform isomorphic physical operations inside our brains.
You can say that as many times as you like, but that wont make it true.
ETA: You also still haven’t explained how a person can know that.
Only if is-real is a boolean. If it’s a number, then mathematics can be “platonically real” without us being Boltzmann brains.
Upvoted. That’s a good point, but also a whole other rabbit hole. Do you think morality is objective?
As opposed to what? Subjective? What are the options? Because that helps to clarify what you mean by “objective”. Prices are created indirectly by subjective preferences and they fluctuate, but if I had to pick between calling them “subjective” or calling them “objective” I would pick “objective”, for a variety of reasons.
No; morality reduces to values that can only be defined with respect to an agent, or a set of agents plus an aggregation process. However, almost all of the optimizing agents (humans) that we know about share some values in common, which creates a limited sort of objectivity in that most of the contexts we would define morality with respect to agree qualitatively with each other, which usually allows people to get away with failing to specify the context.
Upvoted. I think you could get a decent definition of the word “morality” along these lines.
A person can know that by reasoning about it.
If you think there is nothing wrong with having a preference for murder, it is about time you said so. It changes a lot.
It still isn’t clear what it means for a preference for murder to be “wrong”!
So far I can only infer your definition of “wrong” to be:
“Not among the correct preferences”
… but you still haven’t explained to us why you think there are correct preferences, besides to stamp your foot and say over and over again “There are obviously correct preferences” even when many people do not agree.
I see no reason to believe that there is a set of “correct” preferences to check against.
So you think there is nothing wrong in having a preference for murder? Yes or no?
I need to find out whether I should be arguing to specific cases from general principles or vice versa.
I do not believe there is a set of correct preferences. There is no objective right or wrong.
Funny how you never quite answer the question as stated. Can you even say it is subjectively wrong?
“Wrong” meaning what?
Would I prefer the people around me not be bloodthirsty? Yes, I would prefer that.
Can people reason that bloodthirst is not a good preference to have...?
Even if there’s no such thing as objective right and wrong, they might easily be able to reason that being bloodthirsty is not in their best selfish interest.
If there’s no right or wrong, why does that matter?
I don’t understand the question, nor why you singled out that fragment.
When you say “Even if there’s no such thing as objective right and wrong” you’re still implicitly presuming a default morality, namely ethical egoism.
Yes. Even subjective morality refutes NMJ’s nihilism.
I agree with Sewing-Machine
Being bloodthirsty would lead to results I do not prefer.
ETA: Therefore I would not choose to become bloodthirsty. This is based on existing preference.
For me, now, it isn’t practical. In other circumstances it would be. It need not ever be a terminal goal but it could be an instrumental goal built in deeply.
It isn’t ‘funny’ at all. You were trying to force someone into a lose lose morality signalling position. It is appropriate to ignore such attempts and instead state what your actual position is.
Your gambit here verges on logically rude.