I must confess I’m having trouble with that flowchart, specifically the first question about whether a moral judgment expresses a belief, and emotivism being on the “no” side. Doesn’t, “Ew, murder” express the belief that murder is icky?
To put it another way, I’m having trouble reconciling the map of what people argue about the nature of morality, with what I know of how at least my brain processes moral belief and judgment.
That is, ISTM that moral judgments at the level where emotion and motivation are expressed do not carry any factual grounding, and they motivate action or express what people “should” or “should not” do. I’m having trouble seeing how this doesn’t merge both branches of your diagram.
Of course, if the diagram is merely to illustrate what a bunch of people believe, then my immediate impression is that both groups are (partially) wrong. ;-)
(Another possibility, of course, is that these people are arguing about mind projections rather than what is actually happening in brains.)
I must confess I’m having trouble with that flowchart, specifically the first question about whether a moral judgment expresses a belief, and emotivism being on the “no” side. Doesn’t, “Ew, murder” express the belief that murder is icky?
No. The belief and that feeling and expression will be correlated but one is not the other. It isn’t especially difficult or unlikely for them to different.
It would be possible to declare a model in which the “Ew, murder” reaction is defined as an expression of belief. But it isn’t a natural one and would not fit with the meaning of natural language.
The belief and that feeling and expression will be correlated but one is not the other.
That depends on how you define “belief”. My definition is that a “belief” is a representation in your brain that you use to make predictions or judgments about reality. The emotion experienced in response to thinking of the prohibited or “icky” behavior is the direct functional expression of that belief.
It would be possible to declare a model in which the “Ew, murder” reaction is defined as an expression of belief. But it isn’t a natural one and would not fit with the meaning of natural language.
I have noticed that sometimes people on LW use the term “alief” to refer to such beliefs, but I don’t consider that a natural usage. In natural usage, people refer to intellectual vs. emotional beliefs, rather than artificially limiting the term “belief” to only include verbal symbolism and abstract propositions.
That depends on how you define “belief”. My definition is that a “belief” is a representation in your brain that you use to make predictions or judgments about reality. The emotion experienced in response to thinking of the prohibited or “icky” behavior is the direct functional expression of that belief.
The definition as you actually write it here isn’t bad. The conclusion just doesn’t directly follow the way you say it does unless you modify that definition with some extra bits to make the world a simpler place.
Another way to grok the distinction: Imagine that you were testifying at a murder trial, and somebody asked if you if you had killed your mother with a lawnmower. You reply “Lawnmower!” with a disgusted tone.
Now, the prosecutor asks, “Do you mean to claim that lawnmower is X, or that the thought of killing somebody with a lawnmower is disgusting?”
And you could rightly reply, “It may be the case that I believe that lawnmower is X, or that the thought of killing somebody with a lawnmower is disgusting, but I have claimed no such things merely by saying ‘Lawnmower!’”
“It may be the case that I believe that lawnmower is X, or that the thought of killing somebody with a lawnmower is disgusting, but I have claimed no such things merely by saying ‘Lawnmower!’”
You’re speaking of claims in language; I’m speaking of brain function.
Functionally, I have observed that the emotions behind such statements are an integral portion of the “belief”, and that verbal descriptions of belief such as “murder is bad” or “you shouldn’t murder” are attempts to explain or justify the feeling. (In practice, the things I work with are less morally relevant than murder, but the process is the same.)
(See also your note that people continue to justify their judgments on the basis of confabulated consequences even when the situation has been specifically constructed to remove them as a consideration.)
Beliefs can be wrong, but that doesn’t make them non-beliefs.
Any belief of the form “X is Y” (especially where Y is a judgment of goodness or badness) is likely either an instance of the mind projection fallacy, or a simple by-definition tautology.
Again, however, this doesn’t make it not-a-belief, it’s just a mistaken or poorly-understood belief. (For example, expansion to “I find murder to be icky” trivially fixes the error.)
I must confess I’m having trouble with that flowchart, specifically the first question about whether a moral judgment expresses a belief, and emotivism being on the “no” side. Doesn’t, “Ew, murder” express the belief that murder is icky?
To put it another way, I’m having trouble reconciling the map of what people argue about the nature of morality, with what I know of how at least my brain processes moral belief and judgment.
That is, ISTM that moral judgments at the level where emotion and motivation are expressed do not carry any factual grounding, and they motivate action or express what people “should” or “should not” do. I’m having trouble seeing how this doesn’t merge both branches of your diagram.
Of course, if the diagram is merely to illustrate what a bunch of people believe, then my immediate impression is that both groups are (partially) wrong. ;-)
(Another possibility, of course, is that these people are arguing about mind projections rather than what is actually happening in brains.)
No. The belief and that feeling and expression will be correlated but one is not the other. It isn’t especially difficult or unlikely for them to different.
It would be possible to declare a model in which the “Ew, murder” reaction is defined as an expression of belief. But it isn’t a natural one and would not fit with the meaning of natural language.
That depends on how you define “belief”. My definition is that a “belief” is a representation in your brain that you use to make predictions or judgments about reality. The emotion experienced in response to thinking of the prohibited or “icky” behavior is the direct functional expression of that belief.
I have noticed that sometimes people on LW use the term “alief” to refer to such beliefs, but I don’t consider that a natural usage. In natural usage, people refer to intellectual vs. emotional beliefs, rather than artificially limiting the term “belief” to only include verbal symbolism and abstract propositions.
The definition as you actually write it here isn’t bad. The conclusion just doesn’t directly follow the way you say it does unless you modify that definition with some extra bits to make the world a simpler place.
wedrifid is correct.
Another way to grok the distinction: Imagine that you were testifying at a murder trial, and somebody asked if you if you had killed your mother with a lawnmower. You reply “Lawnmower!” with a disgusted tone.
Now, the prosecutor asks, “Do you mean to claim that lawnmower is X, or that the thought of killing somebody with a lawnmower is disgusting?”
And you could rightly reply, “It may be the case that I believe that lawnmower is X, or that the thought of killing somebody with a lawnmower is disgusting, but I have claimed no such things merely by saying ‘Lawnmower!’”
You’re speaking of claims in language; I’m speaking of brain function.
Functionally, I have observed that the emotions behind such statements are an integral portion of the “belief”, and that verbal descriptions of belief such as “murder is bad” or “you shouldn’t murder” are attempts to explain or justify the feeling. (In practice, the things I work with are less morally relevant than murder, but the process is the same.)
(See also your note that people continue to justify their judgments on the basis of confabulated consequences even when the situation has been specifically constructed to remove them as a consideration.)
I don’t think that’s a belief. What factual questions would distinguish a world where murder is icky from one where murder is not icky?
Beliefs can be wrong, but that doesn’t make them non-beliefs.
Any belief of the form “X is Y” (especially where Y is a judgment of goodness or badness) is likely either an instance of the mind projection fallacy, or a simple by-definition tautology.
Again, however, this doesn’t make it not-a-belief, it’s just a mistaken or poorly-understood belief. (For example, expansion to “I find murder to be icky” trivially fixes the error.)