I’m not sure I understand this. Are you objecting to my use of the word ‘idealized’, on the grounds that preferences and facts are different things and uncertainty is about facts? I would disagree with that. Someone might have two conflicting but very strong preferences. For example, someone might be opposed to homosexuality based on a feeling of disgust but also have a strong feeling that people should have some sort of right to self-determination. Upon sufficient thought, they may decide that the latter outweighs the former and may stop feeling disgust at homosexuals as a result of that introspection. I believe that this situation is one that occurs regularly among humans.
If you are confused about facts in the world then you are talking about epistemic rationality, why would one invoke ‘morality’ in this context?
I’m not sure I understand this. Are you objecting to my use of the word ‘idealized’, on the grounds that preferences and facts are different things and uncertainty is about facts? I would disagree with that. Someone might have two conflicting but very strong preferences. For example, someone might be opposed to homosexuality based on a feeling of disgust but also have a strong feeling that people should have some sort of right to self-determination. Upon sufficient thought, they may decide that the latter outweighs the former and may stop feeling disgust at homosexuals as a result of that introspection. I believe that this situation is one that occurs regularly among humans.