If you found an objective basis for saying what you should prefer, and it said you should prefer something different from what you actually do prefer, what would you do?
Follow morality.
Okay, you’re making a distinction between amoral preference and moral preference. This distinction is obviously important to you. What makes it important?
One way to illustrate this distinction is using Eliezer’s “murder pill”. If you were offered a pill that would reverse and/or eliminate a preference would you take it (possibly the offer includes paying you)? If the preference is something like preferring vanilla to chocolate ice cream, the answer is probably yes. If the preference is for people not to be murdered the answer is probably no.
One of the reasons this distinction is important is that because of the way human brains are designed, thinking about your preferences can cause them to change. Furthermore, this phenomenon is more likely to occur with high level moral preferences, then with low level amoral preferences.
One of the reasons this distinction is important is that because of the way human brains are designed, thinking about your preferences can cause them to change. Furthermore, this phenomenon is more likely to occur with high level moral preferences, then with low level amoral preferences.
If that’s a definition of morality, then morality is a subset of psychology, which probably isn’t what you wanted.
Now if the thoughts people had about moral preferences that make them change were actually empirically meaningful and consistent with observation, rather than verbal manipulation consisting of undefinable terms that can’t be nailed down even with multiple days of Q&A, that would be worthwhile and not just a statement about psychology. But if we had such statements to make about morality, we would have been making them all this time and there would be clarity about what we’re talking about, which hasn’t happened.
One of the reasons this distinction is important is that because of the way human brains are designed, thinking about your preferences can cause them to change. Furthermore, this phenomenon is more likely to occur with high level moral preferences, then with low level amoral preferences.
If that’s a definition of morality, then morality is a subset of psychology, which probably isn’t what you wanted.
That’s not a definition of morality but an explanation of one reason why the “murder pill” distinction is important.
...the way human brains are designed, thinking about your preferences can cause them to change.
If that’s a definition of morality, then morality is a subset of psychology, which probably isn’t what you wanted.
If that’s a valid argument, then logic, mathematics, etc are branches of psychology.
Now if the thoughts people had about moral preferences that make them change were actually empirically meaningful and consistent with observation, rather than verbal manipulation consisting of undefinable terms that can’t be nailed down
Are you saying there has never been any valid moral discourse or persuasion?
If that’s a definition of morality, then morality is a subset of psychology, which probably isn’t what you wanted.
If that’s a valid argument, then logic, mathematics, etc are branches of psychology.
There’s a difference between changing your mind because a discussion lead you to bound your rationality differently, and changing your mind because of suggestability and other forms of sloppy thinking. Logic and mathematics is the former, if done right. I haven’t seen much non-sloppy thinking on the subject of changing preferences.
I suppose there could be such a thing—Joe designed an elegant high-throughput gas chamber, he wants to show the design to his friends, someone tells Joe that this could be used for mass murder, Joe hadn’t thought that the design might actually be used, so he hides his design somewhere so it won’t be used. But that’s changing Joe’s belief about whether sharing his design is likely to cause mass murder, not changing Joe’s preference about whether he wants mass murder to happen.
Are you saying there has never been any valid moral discourse or persuasion?
No, I’m saying that morality is a useless concept and that what you’re calling moral discourse is some mixture of (valid change of beliefs based on reflection and presentation of evidence) and invalid emotional manipulation based on sloppy thinking involving, among other things, undefined and undefinable terms.
But that’s changing Joe’s belief about whether sharing his design is likely to cause mass murder, not changing Joe’s preference about whether he wants mass murder to happen.
But there are other stories where the preference itself changes. “If you approve of womens rights, you should approve of Gay rights”.
No, I’m saying that morality is a useless concept and that what you’re calling moral discourse is some mixture of (valid change of beliefs based on reflection and presentation of evidence) and invalid emotional manipulation based on sloppy thinking involving, among other things, undefined and undefinable terms.
Everything is a mixture of the invalid and the valid. Why throw somethin out instead of doing it better?
“If you approve of womens rights, you should approve of Gay rights”.
IMO we should have gay rights because gays want them, not because moral suasion was used successfully on people opposed to gay rights. Even if your argument above worked, I can’t envision a plausible reasoning system in which the argument is valid. Can you offer one? Otherwise, it only worked because the listener was confused, and we’re back to morality being a special case of psychology again.
Everything is a mixture of the invalid and the valid. Why throw somethin out instead of doing it better?
Because I don’t know how to do moral arguments better. So far as I can tell, they always seems to wind up either being wrong, or not being moral arguments.
Follow morality.
One way to illustrate this distinction is using Eliezer’s “murder pill”. If you were offered a pill that would reverse and/or eliminate a preference would you take it (possibly the offer includes paying you)? If the preference is something like preferring vanilla to chocolate ice cream, the answer is probably yes. If the preference is for people not to be murdered the answer is probably no.
One of the reasons this distinction is important is that because of the way human brains are designed, thinking about your preferences can cause them to change. Furthermore, this phenomenon is more likely to occur with high level moral preferences, then with low level amoral preferences.
If that’s a definition of morality, then morality is a subset of psychology, which probably isn’t what you wanted.
Now if the thoughts people had about moral preferences that make them change were actually empirically meaningful and consistent with observation, rather than verbal manipulation consisting of undefinable terms that can’t be nailed down even with multiple days of Q&A, that would be worthwhile and not just a statement about psychology. But if we had such statements to make about morality, we would have been making them all this time and there would be clarity about what we’re talking about, which hasn’t happened.
That’s not a definition of morality but an explanation of one reason why the “murder pill” distinction is important.
If that’s a valid argument, then logic, mathematics, etc are branches of psychology.
Are you saying there has never been any valid moral discourse or persuasion?
There’s a difference between changing your mind because a discussion lead you to bound your rationality differently, and changing your mind because of suggestability and other forms of sloppy thinking. Logic and mathematics is the former, if done right. I haven’t seen much non-sloppy thinking on the subject of changing preferences.
I suppose there could be such a thing—Joe designed an elegant high-throughput gas chamber, he wants to show the design to his friends, someone tells Joe that this could be used for mass murder, Joe hadn’t thought that the design might actually be used, so he hides his design somewhere so it won’t be used. But that’s changing Joe’s belief about whether sharing his design is likely to cause mass murder, not changing Joe’s preference about whether he wants mass murder to happen.
No, I’m saying that morality is a useless concept and that what you’re calling moral discourse is some mixture of (valid change of beliefs based on reflection and presentation of evidence) and invalid emotional manipulation based on sloppy thinking involving, among other things, undefined and undefinable terms.
But there are other stories where the preference itself changes. “If you approve of womens rights, you should approve of Gay rights”.
Everything is a mixture of the invalid and the valid. Why throw somethin out instead of doing it better?
IMO we should have gay rights because gays want them, not because moral suasion was used successfully on people opposed to gay rights. Even if your argument above worked, I can’t envision a plausible reasoning system in which the argument is valid. Can you offer one? Otherwise, it only worked because the listener was confused, and we’re back to morality being a special case of psychology again.
Because I don’t know how to do moral arguments better. So far as I can tell, they always seems to wind up either being wrong, or not being moral arguments.
They are not going to arrive without overcoming opposition somehow.
Does that mean your “because gays/women want them” isn’t valid? Why offer it then?
Because you reject them?