The subtleties in defining “I” are pushed into the subtleties of defining events X and Y with respect to Clippy and Stapley respectively.
Defining events seems much easier than defining identity.
Such as, say, replacing all other agents that provide utilon-contributing elements with subagents of the barriered agent, thus making its own impact equal to the impact of all utilon-contributing agents.
I believe this setup wouldn’t have this problem. That’s the beauty of using X rather than “non-existence” or something similar, it’s “non-created” (essentially), so it has no problems with events happening after its death that it can have an impact on.
Defining events seems much easier than defining identity.
But events X and Y are specifically regarding the activation of Clippy and Stapley, so a definition of identity would need to be included in order to prove the barrier to acausal trade that p’ and s’ are claimed to have. Unless the event you speak of is something like “the button labeled ‘release AI’ is pressed,” but there is a greater-than-epsilon probability that the button will itself fail. Not sure if that provides any significant penalty to the utility function.
Unless the event you speak of is something like “the button labeled ‘release AI’ is pressed,”
Pretty much that, yes. More like “the button press fails to turn on the AI (an exceedingly unlikely event, so doesn’t affect utility calculations much, but can still be conditioned on).
Defining events seems much easier than defining identity.
I believe this setup wouldn’t have this problem. That’s the beauty of using X rather than “non-existence” or something similar, it’s “non-created” (essentially), so it has no problems with events happening after its death that it can have an impact on.
But events X and Y are specifically regarding the activation of Clippy and Stapley, so a definition of identity would need to be included in order to prove the barrier to acausal trade that p’ and s’ are claimed to have. Unless the event you speak of is something like “the button labeled ‘release AI’ is pressed,” but there is a greater-than-epsilon probability that the button will itself fail. Not sure if that provides any significant penalty to the utility function.
Pretty much that, yes. More like “the button press fails to turn on the AI (an exceedingly unlikely event, so doesn’t affect utility calculations much, but can still be conditioned on).