A portion of the discounting that’s due to unpredictability does not change with your subjective runspeed. If you’re dividing utilons between present you, and you after a million years in cryofreeze, you should use a large discount, due to the likelihood that your plant or your civilization will not survive a million years of cryofreeze, or that the future world will be hostile or undesirable.
I think we’re talking about pure time preference here. Turning risk of death into a discount rate rather than treating it using probabilities and timelines (ordinary risk analysis) introduces weird distortions, and doesn’t give a steady discount rate.
But maybe discount rate is just a way of estimating all of the risks associated with time passing. Is there any discounting left if you remove all risk analysis from discounting?
Time discounting is something that evolution taught us to do; so we don’t know for certain why we do it.
Certainly time discounting is something that evolution taught us to do. However, it is adjusting for more than risks. $100 now is worth strictly more than $100 later, because now I can do a strict superset of what I can do with it later (namely, spend it on anything between now and then), as well as hold on to it and turn it into $100 later.
$100 now is worth strictly more than $100 later, because now I can do a strict superset of what I can do with it later (namely, spend it on anything between now and then), as well as hold on to it and turn it into $100 later.
There could be Schellingesque reasons to wish to lack money during a certain time. For example, suppose you can have a debt forgiven iff you can prove that you have no money at a certain time; then you don’t want to have money at that time, but you would still benefit from acquiring the money later.
Yes, time discounting isn’t just about risk, so that was a bit silly of me. I would have an advantage in chess if I could make all my moves before you made any of yours.
A portion of the discounting that’s due to unpredictability does not change with your subjective runspeed. If you’re dividing utilons between present you, and you after a million years in cryofreeze, you should use a large discount, due to the likelihood that your plant or your civilization will not survive a million years of cryofreeze, or that the future world will be hostile or undesirable.
I think we’re talking about pure time preference here. Turning risk of death into a discount rate rather than treating it using probabilities and timelines (ordinary risk analysis) introduces weird distortions, and doesn’t give a steady discount rate.
But maybe discount rate is just a way of estimating all of the risks associated with time passing. Is there any discounting left if you remove all risk analysis from discounting?
Time discounting is something that evolution taught us to do; so we don’t know for certain why we do it.
Certainly time discounting is something that evolution taught us to do. However, it is adjusting for more than risks. $100 now is worth strictly more than $100 later, because now I can do a strict superset of what I can do with it later (namely, spend it on anything between now and then), as well as hold on to it and turn it into $100 later.
There could be Schellingesque reasons to wish to lack money during a certain time. For example, suppose you can have a debt forgiven iff you can prove that you have no money at a certain time; then you don’t want to have money at that time, but you would still benefit from acquiring the money later.
Yes, time discounting isn’t just about risk, so that was a bit silly of me. I would have an advantage in chess if I could make all my moves before you made any of yours.