I think that, at least according to the breakdown Churchland gave (which may not accurately reflect what the brain is doing all the time, but at least he tried), object permanence belongs more to the transition from feature-governed concepts to causal-role concepts. In fact, it is arguably one of the first causal-role concepts a child learns: appearances-of-thingies (feature-governed concepts) are caused by actual thingies (causal-role concepts for the same objective domains), which are more permanent than the appearances-of-thingies.
Hmm. I would think that generalizing from “mommy disappeared than came back”, “teddy disappeared than came back” to “things that disappear tend to come back” and then deducing that “I don’t see my blankie, but it is out there” very much counts as second level.
It’s “second level” in the sense of being recursive causal learning. It’s not “Second Level” in Churchland’s sense, of taking multiple preexisting theories and finding a way to reduce one to another.
I think that, at least according to the breakdown Churchland gave (which may not accurately reflect what the brain is doing all the time, but at least he tried), object permanence belongs more to the transition from feature-governed concepts to causal-role concepts. In fact, it is arguably one of the first causal-role concepts a child learns: appearances-of-thingies (feature-governed concepts) are caused by actual thingies (causal-role concepts for the same objective domains), which are more permanent than the appearances-of-thingies.
Hmm. I would think that generalizing from “mommy disappeared than came back”, “teddy disappeared than came back” to “things that disappear tend to come back” and then deducing that “I don’t see my blankie, but it is out there” very much counts as second level.
It’s “second level” in the sense of being recursive causal learning. It’s not “Second Level” in Churchland’s sense, of taking multiple preexisting theories and finding a way to reduce one to another.