The ethical problem is to minimize the value she destroys.
Yes.
And the fact that value depends on scarcity is a fundamental economic principle.
No. You’re claiming that Bella should place a higher value on members of scarce species than on members of more common species. But she could instead assign value to other entities based on their intelligence, or in inverse proportion to their tastiness, or by any other standard. Economics doesn’t have anything normative to say about ethics.
Economics doesn’t have anything normative to say about ethics.
But the descriptive part of economics definitely pairs up with ethic’s normative statements. It seems like if wolves are more valued by others than deer, the statement “destroy as little of what other people value as you can” needs to have an answer of the economic question “how much do other people value my options?” to function properly.
I disagree with PhilGoetz that wolves are valuable due solely to their scarcity- I think that some things, like smallpox or mosquitoes, should be endangered or extinct—but I think it’s pretty trivial to put together the argument that killing a wolf for pleasure is much, much more wrong than killing a deer for pleasure.
We’re talking past each other by using differing definitions of “value”. Economic value is affected by scarcity (and other factors).
But I have been talking about ethical value—the thing that classical utilitarians talk about when they say that happiness is valuable. A classical utilitarian doesn’t care about whether wolves are common or scarce; they care about how the relative scarcity of wolves makes people feel.
Put another way, I’ve been talking about terminal values, which are not in any way fungible. I think you’ve been talking about instrumental values, which are. Is that at all right?
Yes.
No. You’re claiming that Bella should place a higher value on members of scarce species than on members of more common species. But she could instead assign value to other entities based on their intelligence, or in inverse proportion to their tastiness, or by any other standard. Economics doesn’t have anything normative to say about ethics.
But the descriptive part of economics definitely pairs up with ethic’s normative statements. It seems like if wolves are more valued by others than deer, the statement “destroy as little of what other people value as you can” needs to have an answer of the economic question “how much do other people value my options?” to function properly.
I disagree with PhilGoetz that wolves are valuable due solely to their scarcity- I think that some things, like smallpox or mosquitoes, should be endangered or extinct—but I think it’s pretty trivial to put together the argument that killing a wolf for pleasure is much, much more wrong than killing a deer for pleasure.
Not completely fundamental, but derived very quickly from the fundamentals, hundreds of years ago.
Value depends on scarcity. If you don’t agree with this, I’m not going to continue this conversation.
Economics is the study of value decisions, and so is ethics.
We’re talking past each other by using differing definitions of “value”. Economic value is affected by scarcity (and other factors).
But I have been talking about ethical value—the thing that classical utilitarians talk about when they say that happiness is valuable. A classical utilitarian doesn’t care about whether wolves are common or scarce; they care about how the relative scarcity of wolves makes people feel.
Put another way, I’ve been talking about terminal values, which are not in any way fungible. I think you’ve been talking about instrumental values, which are. Is that at all right?