The dictionary says you’re right; apparently the standard definition of ‘cheating’ is that it refers to deceptive behavior. I’d been using it to refer to not abiding by agreed-upon rules, either explicitly or in spirit (e.g. munchkinism). I think this is a more accurate definition, given that there are some games where deception is an expected part of the game, and deception is not considered cheating in those cases (e.g. Diplomacy). In the real world, there are no agreed-upon rules to break (I never agreed not to murder anyone...), so ‘cheating’ doesn’t apply.
Well if I say: “I will build a hot-air balloon” then it’s reasonable to interpret that as agreeing to the rule “I have to build a hot-air balloon”, so if I don’t, I’m cheating.
And then it’s reasonable to extend that to other kinds of statements, like “I built a hot-air balloon”
Speech in Diplomacy, it seems, is not quite real speech. The default position is that speech is true.
Well if I say: “I will build a hot-air balloon” then it’s reasonable to interpret that as agreeing to the rule “I have to build a hot-air balloon”, so if I don’t, I’m cheating.
That doesn’t seem reasonable to me, actually. I interpret it as ‘I intend to build a hot-air balloon’, which is much weaker evidence about future world-states even if it’s true. (It’s also stronger evidence about current world-states.)
The default position is that speech is true.
This strikes me as naive. In my experience, most people don’t lie without a reason to do so, but also most people will lie when they do have such a reason, and such reasons are fairly common. Our society is built on that assumption, in some ways, even—it’s practically required that one make up an excuse to leave a conversation with an annoying person rather than tell them that you don’t want to talk to them, for example.
Well if I say: “I will build a hot-air balloon” then it’s reasonable to interpret that as agreeing to the rule “I have to build a hot-air balloon”, so if I don’t, I’m cheating.
It doesn’t, because rule contravention is not the sole sufficient condition of cheating. Cheating involved 1) breaking rules that 2) others are following for 3) advantage whilst 4) disguising the fact.
It seems reasonable to me to describe laws as “rules that the government acts as if all citizens have agreed to abide by”, at least for values of ‘acts as if’ that apply to the judicial system. The government acting that way results in a system that works reasonably well as far as I can tell, and the fact that the government acts that way makes it generally reasonable to act as if one has agreed to follow those rules. But that’s not the same as actually agreeing to follow those rules, and the most rational way of handling the situation is to keep that in mind and actually do a cost/benefit analysis when something illegal seems like it might be worthwhile anyway—and, such a cost/benefit analysis should take all the results of the action into account, including e.g. the possibility of the laws being changed to restrict further behavior of that type, or the possibility of getting a problematically bad reputation, or more subtle issues.
Does this C/B analysis include anything at all that doesn’t impact proximally or distally on the person doing the analysis? Eg: “I could get away with this scot free, but it would hurt someone. Although not anyone I particularly care about”.
The point was that the convicted person did not agree to the rules.
I don’t think Bernie Madoff was making a principled protest against the inquities of the financial regulators: he was quite happy for other people to abide the rules. (Reliant on that: if everyone cheats, cheaters have no edge). I chose him
as an example, rather than, eg Mandela for a reason.
Also, not all people convicted in a court of law actually did the thing they were convicted of.
I know. I hoped I could take all the side-conditions about fair trials etc as read.
This is an atypical definition of “cheating”.
Hm. *checks a dictionary*
The dictionary says you’re right; apparently the standard definition of ‘cheating’ is that it refers to deceptive behavior. I’d been using it to refer to not abiding by agreed-upon rules, either explicitly or in spirit (e.g. munchkinism). I think this is a more accurate definition, given that there are some games where deception is an expected part of the game, and deception is not considered cheating in those cases (e.g. Diplomacy). In the real world, there are no agreed-upon rules to break (I never agreed not to murder anyone...), so ‘cheating’ doesn’t apply.
Well if I say: “I will build a hot-air balloon” then it’s reasonable to interpret that as agreeing to the rule “I have to build a hot-air balloon”, so if I don’t, I’m cheating.
And then it’s reasonable to extend that to other kinds of statements, like “I built a hot-air balloon”
Speech in Diplomacy, it seems, is not quite real speech. The default position is that speech is true.
That doesn’t seem reasonable to me, actually. I interpret it as ‘I intend to build a hot-air balloon’, which is much weaker evidence about future world-states even if it’s true. (It’s also stronger evidence about current world-states.)
This strikes me as naive. In my experience, most people don’t lie without a reason to do so, but also most people will lie when they do have such a reason, and such reasons are fairly common. Our society is built on that assumption, in some ways, even—it’s practically required that one make up an excuse to leave a conversation with an annoying person rather than tell them that you don’t want to talk to them, for example.
It doesn’t, because rule contravention is not the sole sufficient condition of cheating. Cheating involved 1) breaking rules that 2) others are following for 3) advantage whilst 4) disguising the fact.
Anyone who is convicted in a court of law has failed to abide by agreed-on rules
The point was that the convicted person did not agree to the rules. That some other people agreed on them is irrelevant to Adelene’s point.
Also, not all people convicted in a court of law actually did the thing they were convicted of.
Yes, exactly this.
It seems reasonable to me to describe laws as “rules that the government acts as if all citizens have agreed to abide by”, at least for values of ‘acts as if’ that apply to the judicial system. The government acting that way results in a system that works reasonably well as far as I can tell, and the fact that the government acts that way makes it generally reasonable to act as if one has agreed to follow those rules. But that’s not the same as actually agreeing to follow those rules, and the most rational way of handling the situation is to keep that in mind and actually do a cost/benefit analysis when something illegal seems like it might be worthwhile anyway—and, such a cost/benefit analysis should take all the results of the action into account, including e.g. the possibility of the laws being changed to restrict further behavior of that type, or the possibility of getting a problematically bad reputation, or more subtle issues.
I don’t think Bernie Madoff was making a principled protest against the inquities of the financial regulators: he was quite happy for other people to abide the rules. (Reliant on that: if everyone cheats, cheaters have no edge). I chose him as an example, rather than, eg Mandela for a reason.
I know. I hoped I could take all the side-conditions about fair trials etc as read.