My impression is that (without even delving into any meta-level IR theory debates) Democrats are more hawkish on Russia while Republicans are more hawkish on China. So while obviously neither parties are kum-ba-yah and both ultimately represent US interests, it still makes sense to expect each party to be less receptive to the idea of ending any potential arms race against the country they consider an existential threat to US interests if left unchecked, so the party that is more hawkish on a primarily military superpower would be worse on nuclear x-risk, and the party that is more hawkish on a primarily economic superpower would be worse on AI x-risk and environmental x-risk. (Negotiating arms control agreements with the enemy superpower right during its period of liberalization and collapse or facilitating a deal between multiple US allies with the clear goal of serving as a counterweight to the purported enemy superpower seems entirely irrelevant here.)
My impression is that (without even delving into any meta-level IR theory debates) Democrats are more hawkish on Russia while Republicans are more hawkish on China. So while obviously neither parties are kum-ba-yah and both ultimately represent US interests, it still makes sense to expect each party to be less receptive to the idea of ending any potential arms race against the country they consider an existential threat to US interests if left unchecked, so the party that is more hawkish on a primarily military superpower would be worse on nuclear x-risk, and the party that is more hawkish on a primarily economic superpower would be worse on AI x-risk and environmental x-risk. (Negotiating arms control agreements with the enemy superpower right during its period of liberalization and collapse or facilitating a deal between multiple US allies with the clear goal of serving as a counterweight to the purported enemy superpower seems entirely irrelevant here.)