I think your disapproval of animal charities is based on circular logic, or at least an unproven premise.
You seem to be saying that animal causes are unworthy recipients of human effort because animals aren’t humans. However, people care about animals because of the emotional effects of animals. They care about people because of the emotional effects of people. I don’t think it’s proven that people only like animals because the animals are super-stimuli.
I could be mistaken, but I think that a more abstract utilitarian approach grounds out in some sort of increased enjoyment of life, or else it’s an effort to assume a universe-eye’s view of what’s ultimately valuable. I’m inclined to trust the former more.
What’s your line of argument for supporting charities that help people?
I usually value humans much more than I value animals. Given a choice between saving a human or N non-human animals, N would normally have to be very large before I would even think twice about it. Similar values are enshrined in law in most countries.
Similar values are enshrined in law in most countries.
To the extent that the law accurately represents the values of the people it governs charities are not necessary. Vales enshrined in law are by necessity irrelevant.
(Noting by way of pre-emption that I do not require that laws should fully represent the values of the people.)
I do not agree. If the law says that killing a human is much worse than killing a dog, that is probably a reflection of the views of citizens on the topic.
If the law says that killing a human is much worse than killing a dog, that is probably a reflection of the views of citizens on the topic.
And yet this is not contrary to my point. Charity operates, only needs to operate, on areas that laws do not already create a solution for. If there was a law specifying that dying kids get trips to Disneyland and visits by popstars then there wouldn’t be a “Make A Wish Foundation”.
You said the law was “irrelevant”—but there’s a sense in which we can see consensus human values about animals by looking at what the law dictates as punishment for their maltreatment. That is what I was talking about. It seems to me that the law has something to say about the issue of the value of animals relative to humans.
For the most part, animals are given relatively few rights under the law. There are exceptions for some rare ones. Animals are routinely massacred in huge numbers by humans—including some smart mammals like pigs and dolphins. That is a broad reflection how relatively-valuable humans are considered to be.
If the law says that killing a human is much worse than killing a dog, that is probably a reflection of the views of citizens on the topic.
And once it’s enshrined in law, it no longer matters whether citizens think killing a human is worse or better than killing a dog. I think that is what wedrifid was noting.
You seem to be saying that animal causes are unworthy recipients of human effort because animals aren’t humans. However, people care about animals because of the emotional effects of animals. They care about people because of the emotional effects of people. I don’t think it’s proven that people only like animals because the animals are super-stimuli.
You may be interested in Alan Dawrst’s essays on animal suffering and animal suffering prevention.
I think your disapproval of animal charities is based on circular logic, or at least an unproven premise.
You seem to be saying that animal causes are unworthy recipients of human effort because animals aren’t humans. However, people care about animals because of the emotional effects of animals. They care about people because of the emotional effects of people. I don’t think it’s proven that people only like animals because the animals are super-stimuli.
I could be mistaken, but I think that a more abstract utilitarian approach grounds out in some sort of increased enjoyment of life, or else it’s an effort to assume a universe-eye’s view of what’s ultimately valuable. I’m inclined to trust the former more.
What’s your line of argument for supporting charities that help people?
I usually value humans much more than I value animals. Given a choice between saving a human or N non-human animals, N would normally have to be very large before I would even think twice about it. Similar values are enshrined in law in most countries.
To the extent that the law accurately represents the values of the people it governs charities are not necessary. Vales enshrined in law are by necessity irrelevant.
(Noting by way of pre-emption that I do not require that laws should fully represent the values of the people.)
I do not agree. If the law says that killing a human is much worse than killing a dog, that is probably a reflection of the views of citizens on the topic.
And yet this is not contrary to my point. Charity operates, only needs to operate, on areas that laws do not already create a solution for. If there was a law specifying that dying kids get trips to Disneyland and visits by popstars then there wouldn’t be a “Make A Wish Foundation”.
You said the law was “irrelevant”—but there’s a sense in which we can see consensus human values about animals by looking at what the law dictates as punishment for their maltreatment. That is what I was talking about. It seems to me that the law has something to say about the issue of the value of animals relative to humans.
For the most part, animals are given relatively few rights under the law. There are exceptions for some rare ones. Animals are routinely massacred in huge numbers by humans—including some smart mammals like pigs and dolphins. That is a broad reflection how relatively-valuable humans are considered to be.
And once it’s enshrined in law, it no longer matters whether citizens think killing a human is worse or better than killing a dog. I think that is what wedrifid was noting.
You may be interested in Alan Dawrst’s essays on animal suffering and animal suffering prevention.