I wouldn’t use this situation as evidence for any outside conclusions.
It is evidence for said conclusions. Do you mean, perhaps, that it isn’t evidence that is strong enough to draw confident conclusions on its own?
Right or wrong, the belief that it’s right to suppress discussion of the topic entails also believing that it’s wrong to participate in that discussion or to introduce certain kinds of evidence. So while you may believe that it was wrong to censor, you should also expect a high probability of unknown unknowns that would mess up your reasoning if you tried to take inferential steps from that conclusion to somewhere else.
To follow from the reasoning the embedded conclusion must be ‘you should expect a higher probability’. The extent to which David should expect higher probability of unknown unknowns is dependent on the deference David gives to the judgement of the conscientious non-participants when it comes to the particular kind of risk assessment and decision making—ie. probably less than Jim does.
(With those two corrections in place the argument is reasonable.)
It is evidence for said conclusions. Do you mean, perhaps, that it isn’t evidence that is strong enough to draw confident conclusions on its own?
To follow from the reasoning the embedded conclusion must be ‘you should expect a higher probability’. The extent to which David should expect higher probability of unknown unknowns is dependent on the deference David gives to the judgement of the conscientious non-participants when it comes to the particular kind of risk assessment and decision making—ie. probably less than Jim does.
(With those two corrections in place the argument is reasonable.)