Maybe, given the credibility he has accumulated on all these other topics, you should be willing to trust him on the one issue on which he is asserting this authority and on which it is clear that if he is right, it would be bad to discuss his reasoning.
The well known (and empirically verified) weakness in experts of the human variety is that they tend to be systematically overconfident when it comes to judgements that fall outside their area of exceptional performance—particularly when the topic is one just outside the fringes.
When it comes to blogging about theoretical issues of rationality Eliezer is undeniably brilliant. Yet his credibility specifically when it comes to responding to risks is rather less outstanding. In my observation he reacts emotionally and starts making rookie mistakes of rational thought and action. To the point when I’ve very nearly responded ‘Go read the sequences!’ before remembering that he was the flipping author and so should already know better.
Also important is the fact that elements of the decision are about people, not game theory. Eliezer hopefully doesn’t claim to be an expert when it comes to predicting or eliciting optimal reactions in others.
Was it not clear that I do not assign particular credence to Eliezer when it comes to judging risks? I thought I expressed that with considerable emphasis.
I’m aware that you disagree with my conclusions—and perhaps even my premises—but I can assure you that I’m speaking directly to the topic.
The well known (and empirically verified) weakness in experts of the human variety is that they tend to be systematically overconfident when it comes to judgements that fall outside their area of exceptional performance—particularly when the topic is one just outside the fringes.
When it comes to blogging about theoretical issues of rationality Eliezer is undeniably brilliant. Yet his credibility specifically when it comes to responding to risks is rather less outstanding. In my observation he reacts emotionally and starts making rookie mistakes of rational thought and action. To the point when I’ve very nearly responded ‘Go read the sequences!’ before remembering that he was the flipping author and so should already know better.
Also important is the fact that elements of the decision are about people, not game theory. Eliezer hopefully doesn’t claim to be an expert when it comes to predicting or eliciting optimal reactions in others.
We were talking about his credibility in judging whether this idea is a risk, and that is within his area of expertise.
Was it not clear that I do not assign particular credence to Eliezer when it comes to judging risks? I thought I expressed that with considerable emphasis.
I’m aware that you disagree with my conclusions—and perhaps even my premises—but I can assure you that I’m speaking directly to the topic.