But it isn’t sensible as a hypothesis, because if you didn’t have that special category already built into your brain, you would have no reason to single out human brains as being, not only the only substance in all the world that currently has these miraculous qualia, but to also be the only substance that ever will have them.
Obviously, regarding a system as complex as the human brain as “the only substance in all the world that currently has these miraculous qualia” is an unlikely hypothesis. Nevertheless, subjective experience could be instantiated in a simpler physical system as a result of brain activity. There is plenty of precident for biological lifeforms tapping into “exotic” physics for some of their adaptive functions, and subjective experience might be no different.
And what’s your extraordinary evidence for that extraordinary claim?
It’s not an extraordinary claim. As a physicalist, if I’m going to take subjective experience seriously as anything other than what some algorithms (or minds) like to talk about, then it’s reasonable to suppose that the physical substrate matters.
As a physicalist, if I’m going to take subjective experience seriously as anything other than what some algorithms (or minds) like to talk about, then it’s reasonable to suppose that the physical substrate matters.
In a way that produces no distinguishable physical effect?
You seem to be hypothesizing the existence of an invisible dragon. Why? Explain to me how you came to select this hypothesis, out of all similarly complex possible hypotheses.
Like, for example, let’s say you grab a philosopher out of the past who insists that women don’t have men’s reasoning power because, you know, they’re not men, and that surely must be some physical reason why this is so!
Wouldn’t you want to know why he hypothesizes this? What his evidence is? Why he insists that, even if a woman were—hypothetically speaking, in his view—to make the same statements or draw the same conclusions as a man, from the same inputs as a man… then somehow, she still wouldn’t “really” be reasoning like a man, because she has female “qualia” instead of male “qualia”?
Pretty soon, you’d have to come to the conclusion that he’s arguing from the bottom line: trying to provide argumentative support for a conclusion he already had before he started, rather than simply investigating what truth there was to be found.
(Especially if he has nothing in the way of physical evidence for the existence of these “qualia” things… but appears to have just seized on them as a way to justify the already-existing intuitions.)
Obviously, regarding a system as complex as the human brain as “the only substance in all the world that currently has these miraculous qualia” is an unlikely hypothesis. Nevertheless, subjective experience could be instantiated in a simpler physical system as a result of brain activity. There is plenty of precident for biological lifeforms tapping into “exotic” physics for some of their adaptive functions, and subjective experience might be no different.
It’s not an extraordinary claim. As a physicalist, if I’m going to take subjective experience seriously as anything other than what some algorithms (or minds) like to talk about, then it’s reasonable to suppose that the physical substrate matters.
In a way that produces no distinguishable physical effect?
You seem to be hypothesizing the existence of an invisible dragon. Why? Explain to me how you came to select this hypothesis, out of all similarly complex possible hypotheses.
Like, for example, let’s say you grab a philosopher out of the past who insists that women don’t have men’s reasoning power because, you know, they’re not men, and that surely must be some physical reason why this is so!
Wouldn’t you want to know why he hypothesizes this? What his evidence is? Why he insists that, even if a woman were—hypothetically speaking, in his view—to make the same statements or draw the same conclusions as a man, from the same inputs as a man… then somehow, she still wouldn’t “really” be reasoning like a man, because she has female “qualia” instead of male “qualia”?
Pretty soon, you’d have to come to the conclusion that he’s arguing from the bottom line: trying to provide argumentative support for a conclusion he already had before he started, rather than simply investigating what truth there was to be found.
(Especially if he has nothing in the way of physical evidence for the existence of these “qualia” things… but appears to have just seized on them as a way to justify the already-existing intuitions.)
Whatever. How about the arguments of qualiaphiles who don’t think simulations will necessarily lack qualia?