Hmm. My comment is the most highly upvoted response to your survey at the moment, and the second highest upvoted one is by XiXiDu expressing basically the same position as mine, but I don’t see it on your list. Here’s a summary: we don’t yet have enough insight to choose any specific answer or even to know if we’re asking the right questions. We’re facing an unsolved scientific problem. The wisdom of crowds doesn’t apply here. If no one has yet discovered Maxwell’s equations or Watson and Crick’s double helix, no amount of surveying can lead you to the right answer. You have to do, like, actual math and physics and biology and stuff.
I agree with this, but would like to add that it’s actually one step worse: most of the interesting experiments one can do with regard to consciousness have results that, for various reasons, cannot be transferred between observers. The quantum immortality hypothesis is one example—if someone else does an experiment, you don’t get to see the result. But the problem is more general; you also don’t get to see the results of experiments that other entities perform to test observer symmetry, or the subjective results of self-copying and merging. So the only information we can have is prior probabilities, which are not very informative, with no experimental data. Perhaps after a dozen one-way trips through cryopreservation, nested simulations, afterlives, etc., I’ll have an answer to how subjective experience works; but no one will ever find an answer in this universe, or convey an answer back to it, so the question has little point here.
I don’t like statements like “we can never know” this or that. For example, you can convince everyone that quantum immortality works by killing them along with yourself. (This shouldn’t pose any risk if you’ve already convinced yourself :-) Paul Almond has proposed that this can solve the Fermi paradox: we don’t see alien civilizations because they have learned to solve complex computational problems by civilization-level quantum suicide, and thus disappeared from our view.
It seems probable to me that if we think a little harder, we can figure out a way to investigate observer-dependent statements scientifically.
We’re facing an unsolved scientific problem. You can’t solve it by survey.
Interesting, particularly in light of the recent “What is analytic philosophy, that we should be mindful of it?” discussions. It almost seems that dfranke, taking the philosopher’s role, should respond: “We are facing an unsolved philosophical problem. You can’t contribute to the solution without taking a position.”
I agree, and furthermore this is a true statement regardless of whether you classify the problem as philosophical or scientific. You can’t do science without picking some hypotheses to test.
I agree, and furthermore this is a true statement regardless of whether you classify the problem as philosophical or scientific. You can’t do science without picking some hypotheses to test.
That’s not strictly speaking true. First of all, this doesn’t quite match what Perplexed said since Perplexed was talking about taking a position. I can decide to test a hypothesis without taking a position on it. Second of all, a lot of good science is just “let’s see what happens if I do this.” A lot of early chemistry was just sticking together various substances and seeing what happened. Similarly, a lot of the early work with electricity was just systematically seeing what could and could not conduct. It was only later that patterns any more complicated than “metals conduct” developed. (Priestly’s The History and Present State of Electricity gives a detailed account of the early research into electricity by someone who was deeply involved in it. The archaic language is sometimes difficult to read but overall the book is surprisingly readable and interesting for something that he wrote in the mid 1700s.)
Those early experimenters with electricity were still taking a position whether they knew it or not: namely, that “will this conduct?” is a productive question to ask—that if p is the subjective probability that it will, then p\(1-p)* is a sufficiently large value that the experiment is worth their time.
Ok. Yes, this connects to the theory-laden nature of observation and experimentation. But that’s distinct from having any substantial hypotheses about the nature of electricity which would be closer to the sort of thing that would be analogous to what Perplexed was talking about. (It is possible that I’m misinterpreting the statement’s intention.)
Perplexed intended to contrast science—where it is not respectable to take a position in advance of evidence (pace Karl P.) - with philosophy—where it is the taking and defending of positions which drives the whole process. Last philosopher left standing wins. You can’t win if you don’t take a stand.
Perplexed intended to contrast science—where it is not respectable to take a position in advance of evidence (pace Karl P.) - with philosophy—where it is the taking and defending of positions which drives the whole process
Thanks for clarifying. Is that true though? If so, I’d suggest that that might be a problem about how we do philosophy more than anything else. If I don’t have evidence or good arguments either way on a philosophical question I shouldn’t take a stand on it. I should just acknowledge the weak arguments for or against the relevant positions.
There are no specifically philosophical truths, only specifically philosophical questions. Philosophy is the precursor to science; its job is to help us state our hypotheses clearly enough that we can test them scientifically. ETA: For example, if you want to determine how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, it’s philosophy’s job to either clarify or reject as nonsensical the concept of an angel, and then in the former case to hand off to science the problem of tracking down some angels to participate in a pin-dancing study.
I didn’t list this position because it’s out of scope for the topic I’m addressing. I’m not trying to address every position on the simulation hypothesis; I’m trying to address computationalist positions. If you think we are completely in the dark on the matter, you can’t be endorsing computationalists, who claim to know something.
Hmm. My comment is the most highly upvoted response to your survey at the moment, and the second highest upvoted one is by XiXiDu expressing basically the same position as mine, but I don’t see it on your list. Here’s a summary: we don’t yet have enough insight to choose any specific answer or even to know if we’re asking the right questions. We’re facing an unsolved scientific problem. The wisdom of crowds doesn’t apply here. If no one has yet discovered Maxwell’s equations or Watson and Crick’s double helix, no amount of surveying can lead you to the right answer. You have to do, like, actual math and physics and biology and stuff.
I agree with this, but would like to add that it’s actually one step worse: most of the interesting experiments one can do with regard to consciousness have results that, for various reasons, cannot be transferred between observers. The quantum immortality hypothesis is one example—if someone else does an experiment, you don’t get to see the result. But the problem is more general; you also don’t get to see the results of experiments that other entities perform to test observer symmetry, or the subjective results of self-copying and merging. So the only information we can have is prior probabilities, which are not very informative, with no experimental data. Perhaps after a dozen one-way trips through cryopreservation, nested simulations, afterlives, etc., I’ll have an answer to how subjective experience works; but no one will ever find an answer in this universe, or convey an answer back to it, so the question has little point here.
I don’t like statements like “we can never know” this or that. For example, you can convince everyone that quantum immortality works by killing them along with yourself. (This shouldn’t pose any risk if you’ve already convinced yourself :-) Paul Almond has proposed that this can solve the Fermi paradox: we don’t see alien civilizations because they have learned to solve complex computational problems by civilization-level quantum suicide, and thus disappeared from our view.
It seems probable to me that if we think a little harder, we can figure out a way to investigate observer-dependent statements scientifically.
Interesting, particularly in light of the recent “What is analytic philosophy, that we should be mindful of it?” discussions. It almost seems that dfranke, taking the philosopher’s role, should respond: “We are facing an unsolved philosophical problem. You can’t contribute to the solution without taking a position.”
I agree, and furthermore this is a true statement regardless of whether you classify the problem as philosophical or scientific. You can’t do science without picking some hypotheses to test.
That’s not strictly speaking true. First of all, this doesn’t quite match what Perplexed said since Perplexed was talking about taking a position. I can decide to test a hypothesis without taking a position on it. Second of all, a lot of good science is just “let’s see what happens if I do this.” A lot of early chemistry was just sticking together various substances and seeing what happened. Similarly, a lot of the early work with electricity was just systematically seeing what could and could not conduct. It was only later that patterns any more complicated than “metals conduct” developed. (Priestly’s The History and Present State of Electricity gives a detailed account of the early research into electricity by someone who was deeply involved in it. The archaic language is sometimes difficult to read but overall the book is surprisingly readable and interesting for something that he wrote in the mid 1700s.)
Those early experimenters with electricity were still taking a position whether they knew it or not: namely, that “will this conduct?” is a productive question to ask—that if p is the subjective probability that it will, then p\(1-p)* is a sufficiently large value that the experiment is worth their time.
Ok. Yes, this connects to the theory-laden nature of observation and experimentation. But that’s distinct from having any substantial hypotheses about the nature of electricity which would be closer to the sort of thing that would be analogous to what Perplexed was talking about. (It is possible that I’m misinterpreting the statement’s intention.)
Perplexed intended to contrast science—where it is not respectable to take a position in advance of evidence (pace Karl P.) - with philosophy—where it is the taking and defending of positions which drives the whole process. Last philosopher left standing wins. You can’t win if you don’t take a stand.
Thanks for clarifying. Is that true though? If so, I’d suggest that that might be a problem about how we do philosophy more than anything else. If I don’t have evidence or good arguments either way on a philosophical question I shouldn’t take a stand on it. I should just acknowledge the weak arguments for or against the relevant positions.
There are no specifically philosophical truths, only specifically philosophical questions. Philosophy is the precursor to science; its job is to help us state our hypotheses clearly enough that we can test them scientifically. ETA: For example, if you want to determine how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, it’s philosophy’s job to either clarify or reject as nonsensical the concept of an angel, and then in the former case to hand off to science the problem of tracking down some angels to participate in a pin-dancing study.
I didn’t list this position because it’s out of scope for the topic I’m addressing. I’m not trying to address every position on the simulation hypothesis; I’m trying to address computationalist positions. If you think we are completely in the dark on the matter, you can’t be endorsing computationalists, who claim to know something.