Why, if it’s a complete simulation of those “same physical processes”?
For the same reason that a complete simulation of a plane, down to the quark level,
still won’t fly.
You’re missing the privileged hypothesis here. The hypothesis you’re privileging is, “>consciousness or qualia are physical side-effects of the brain’s operation”… a >proposition for which no evidence exists, first of all.
That’s vaguely phrased. There may be no direct evidence that qualia are
epiphenomenal side effects, but there is plenty of evidence that they covary
with brain operation.
And conversely, if they do feed back into your brain’s operation (as they would
have to in order for you to perceive them!), well, then a simulation which lacks this > element will diverge in behavior from a real human, and thereby make apparent
what is missing from the simulation.
It is perfectly possible for qualia to be causally effective in brains, and to be missing
from simulations, and for the simulation to be behaviourally identical. It For instance,
transistors are causally effective in electronic computers. But any electronic computer
can be rebuilt as a behaviourally identical optical, mechanical, hydrualic (etc) computer.
For the same reason that a complete simulation of a plane, down to the quark level, still won’t fly.
That’s vaguely phrased. There may be no direct evidence that qualia are epiphenomenal side effects, but there is plenty of evidence that they covary with brain operation.
It is perfectly possible for qualia to be causally effective in brains, and to be missing from simulations, and for the simulation to be behaviourally identical. It For instance, transistors are causally effective in electronic computers. But any electronic computer can be rebuilt as a behaviourally identical optical, mechanical, hydrualic (etc) computer.