Why, if it’s a complete simulation of those “same physical processes”?
Because I understand the word “simulation” to mean an algorithm which can answer questions about the states of the thing it simulates; not something which actually performs those same processes. The simulation of an Boeing can’t actually fly actual people to actual America. Why should the simulation of a brain actually experience actual qualia?
The confusion doesn’t lie with me about this—nobody, not even you, has ANY problem understanding why the simulation of a physical phenomenon (e.g. gravity, flight, fire, weather patterns) is different to the physical phenomenon itself. And yet many people have trouble understanding why the simulation of a mental phenomenon may be different to the mental phenomenon itself.
In other words, you’re simply making another zombie-world argument.
Not so. The zombie-world argument is about an atom-for-atom identical to our world reality whose people nonetheless don’t experience qualia, even though they talk about them.
A simulation of a thing isn’t atom-for-atom identical to the thing it simulates. It might compute every single atom, so that it produces answers which an outside observer can somehow use their own cognitive processes to map its responses onto the relevant thing. But the map isn’t the territory.
Unless, again, Tegmark IV—keep in mind that my own position is NOT actually “No qualia in simulation” but rather “Tegmark IV or no qualia in a simulation”.
That some mysterious thing exists which has no effects
I certainly believe qualia have an effect, including the fact I’m talking about them right now. Same as mass, gravity, sound waves, radiation, etc… I treat them as a physical phenomenon, which can be reproduced by machines, but only simulated and not reproduced in a Turing machine.
Because I understand the word “simulation” to mean an algorithm which can answer questions about the states of the thing it simulates; not something which actually performs those same processes.
Yes, generally speaking. But certain kinds of simulation necessarily perform that which they simulate. For example, a perfect simulation of a scientific calculator necessarily is a scientific calculator, because in reporting what a scientific calculator would show as the answer, it necessarily itself shows that same answer.
The confusion doesn’t lie with me about this—nobody, not even you, has ANY problem understanding why the simulation of a physical phenomenon (e.g. gravity, flight, fire, weather patterns) is different to the physical phenomenon itself. And yet many people have trouble understanding why the simulation of a mental phenomenon may be different to the mental phenomenon itself.
Let’s re-word that last bit:
And yet many people have trouble understanding why the simulation of a scientific calculator may be different to the scientific calculator itself.
Certainly a Turing machine can be anything which is strictly defined by the return of an abstract output after the manipulation/transformation of a symbolic map it receives as input/initial state—so, a Turing machine can be a simulator, a calculator, a chess playing program, etc, etc.
The confusion doesn’t lie with me about this—nobody, not even you, has ANY problem understanding why the simulation of a physical phenomenon (e.g. gravity, flight, fire, weather patterns) is different to the physical phenomenon itself.
But first, you have to demonstrate that this “qualia” thing is physical, which you haven’t done. When you can show qualia are physical in this same way, you might have a case.
But at this point, you’re still arguing the purely-theoretical possibility of a very-privileged hypothesis.
my own position is NOT actually “No qualia in simulation” but rather “Tegmark IV or no qualia in a simulation”.
And of those alternatives, Tegmark is by far the simpler hypothesis: it doesn’t require privileging a complex carving out of categories to support it.
Meanwhile, the only thing “no qualia in simulation” offers as a selling point is that it appeals to human intuition… which should make it a suspicious alternative, indeed, where science is concerned.
(After all, the history of science seems to be a never-ending march of finding out ways the world doesn’t really work like our intuitions and biases say they do.)
Meanwhile, the only thing “no qualia in simulation” offers as a selling point is that it appeals to human intuition...
Actually, it might appeal to the intuition in the abstract as we talk about it now, but if someone were really watching a simulation of a person—and better, interacting with it—then, given a perfect simulation it would very difficult for them to believe anything but that the simulated person was real, conscious, and had genuine emotions.
Because I understand the word “simulation” to mean an algorithm which can answer questions about the states of the thing it simulates; not something which actually performs those same processes. The simulation of an Boeing can’t actually fly actual people to actual America. Why should the simulation of a brain actually experience actual qualia?
The problem with this argument is that an external observer cannot tell apart the output of a simulated mind from the output of a real actual brain, other than by looking at its substrate. Thus, the simulated mind is sort of like a zombie: it will talk about its own subjective experience, but the only real basis to that claim will be a portion of its algorithm.
I think it can still be argued that subjective experience is physically “real”, on Occam’s razor grounds: but it’s not an easy claim to make.
Because I understand the word “simulation” to mean an algorithm which can answer questions about the states of the thing it simulates; not something which actually performs those same processes. The simulation of an Boeing can’t actually fly actual people to actual America. Why should the simulation of a brain actually experience actual qualia?
The confusion doesn’t lie with me about this—nobody, not even you, has ANY problem understanding why the simulation of a physical phenomenon (e.g. gravity, flight, fire, weather patterns) is different to the physical phenomenon itself. And yet many people have trouble understanding why the simulation of a mental phenomenon may be different to the mental phenomenon itself.
Not so. The zombie-world argument is about an atom-for-atom identical to our world reality whose people nonetheless don’t experience qualia, even though they talk about them.
A simulation of a thing isn’t atom-for-atom identical to the thing it simulates. It might compute every single atom, so that it produces answers which an outside observer can somehow use their own cognitive processes to map its responses onto the relevant thing. But the map isn’t the territory.
Unless, again, Tegmark IV—keep in mind that my own position is NOT actually “No qualia in simulation” but rather “Tegmark IV or no qualia in a simulation”.
I certainly believe qualia have an effect, including the fact I’m talking about them right now. Same as mass, gravity, sound waves, radiation, etc… I treat them as a physical phenomenon, which can be reproduced by machines, but only simulated and not reproduced in a Turing machine.
Yes, generally speaking. But certain kinds of simulation necessarily perform that which they simulate. For example, a perfect simulation of a scientific calculator necessarily is a scientific calculator, because in reporting what a scientific calculator would show as the answer, it necessarily itself shows that same answer.
Let’s re-word that last bit:
See above.
Certainly a Turing machine can be anything which is strictly defined by the return of an abstract output after the manipulation/transformation of a symbolic map it receives as input/initial state—so, a Turing machine can be a simulator, a calculator, a chess playing program, etc, etc.
Are mental phenomena are like calculations, or like physical event and processes? That is the question. You don’t seem to have answered it.
But first, you have to demonstrate that this “qualia” thing is physical, which you haven’t done. When you can show qualia are physical in this same way, you might have a case.
But at this point, you’re still arguing the purely-theoretical possibility of a very-privileged hypothesis.
And of those alternatives, Tegmark is by far the simpler hypothesis: it doesn’t require privileging a complex carving out of categories to support it.
Meanwhile, the only thing “no qualia in simulation” offers as a selling point is that it appeals to human intuition… which should make it a suspicious alternative, indeed, where science is concerned.
(After all, the history of science seems to be a never-ending march of finding out ways the world doesn’t really work like our intuitions and biases say they do.)
Actually, it might appeal to the intuition in the abstract as we talk about it now, but if someone were really watching a simulation of a person—and better, interacting with it—then, given a perfect simulation it would very difficult for them to believe anything but that the simulated person was real, conscious, and had genuine emotions.
“no qualia in simulations” requires qualia to be physical. “Tegmark IV” requires mathematical constructs to be physical.
I’m not at all sure which is the simplest hypothesis. Tegmark IV does have the benefit of explaining a larger chunk of reality though.
The problem with this argument is that an external observer cannot tell apart the output of a simulated mind from the output of a real actual brain, other than by looking at its substrate. Thus, the simulated mind is sort of like a zombie: it will talk about its own subjective experience, but the only real basis to that claim will be a portion of its algorithm.
I think it can still be argued that subjective experience is physically “real”, on Occam’s razor grounds: but it’s not an easy claim to make.