Let B be the set of beliefs that are consensus among the LW community. Let b be any arbitrary belief. Let Pr(b) be the probability that b is true. Let (b|B) denote the event that b is a member of B.
I argue that Pr(b|B) (Probability that b is true given that b is a member of B) is greater than 0.5; how is that hubris?
If Lesswrongers are ignorant on a particular field, then I don’t expect a consensus to form. Sure, we may have some wrong beliefs that are consensus, but the fraction of right beliefs that are consensus is greater than 1⁄2 (of total beliefs that are consensus).
Let B be the set of beliefs that are consensus among the LW community. Let b be any arbitrary belief. Let Pr(b) be the probability that b is true. Let (b|B) denote the event that b is a member of B.
I argue that Pr(b|B) (Probability that b is true given that b is a member of B) is greater than 0.5; how is that hubris?
If Lesswrongers are ignorant on a particular field, then I don’t expect a consensus to form. Sure, we may have some wrong beliefs that are consensus, but the fraction of right beliefs that are consensus is greater than 1⁄2 (of total beliefs that are consensus).