Mathematically, if the truth is orthogonal to the level of local agreement, local agreement cannot constitute Bayesian evidence for the veracity of the proposition. If we’re taking local agreement as Bayesian evidence for the veracity of the proposition, we’re assuming the veracity of the proposition and local agreement are not linearly independent, which would violate orthogonality.
An outcome is Bayesian evidence for a proposition, if the outcome is more likely to occur if the proposition is true, than vice versa.
Based on that understanding of Bayesian evidence, I argue that Lesswrong consensus on a proposition is Bayesian evidence for that proposition. Lesswrongers have better than average epistemic hygiene, and pursue true beliefs. You expect the average lesswronger to have a higher percentage of true beliefs than a lay person. Furthermore if a belief is consensus among the Lesswrong community, then it is more likely to be true. (A single Lesswronger may have some false beliefs), but the set of false beliefs that would be shared by the overwhelming majority of Lesswrongers would be very small.
An outcome is Bayesian evidence for a proposition, if the outcome is more likely to occur if the proposition is true, than vice versa.
That assumes that there is a statistical correlation between the two, no? If the two are orthogonal to each other, they’re statistically uncorrelated, by definition.
The local agreement (on Lesswrong) on a proposition is not independent of the veracity of the proposition. To claim otherwise is to claim that Lesswrongers form their beliefs through a process that is no better than random guessing. That’s a very strong claim to make, and extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
“The local agreement (on Lesswrong) on a proposition is not independent of the veracity of the proposition.”
Sure, and that is equally true of indefinitely many other populations in the world and the whole population as well. It would take an argument to establish that LW local agreement is better than any particular one of those populations.
Mathematically, if the truth is orthogonal to the level of local agreement, local agreement cannot constitute Bayesian evidence for the veracity of the proposition. If we’re taking local agreement as Bayesian evidence for the veracity of the proposition, we’re assuming the veracity of the proposition and local agreement are not linearly independent, which would violate orthogonality.
Either I don’t know what Bayesian evidence is, or you don’t.
My understanding is:
Based on that understanding of Bayesian evidence, I argue that Lesswrong consensus on a proposition is Bayesian evidence for that proposition. Lesswrongers have better than average epistemic hygiene, and pursue true beliefs. You expect the average lesswronger to have a higher percentage of true beliefs than a lay person. Furthermore if a belief is consensus among the Lesswrong community, then it is more likely to be true. (A single Lesswronger may have some false beliefs), but the set of false beliefs that would be shared by the overwhelming majority of Lesswrongers would be very small.
That assumes that there is a statistical correlation between the two, no? If the two are orthogonal to each other, they’re statistically uncorrelated, by definition.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/nz/arguing_by_definition/
The local agreement (on Lesswrong) on a proposition is not independent of the veracity of the proposition. To claim otherwise is to claim that Lesswrongers form their beliefs through a process that is no better than random guessing. That’s a very strong claim to make, and extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
“The local agreement (on Lesswrong) on a proposition is not independent of the veracity of the proposition.”
Sure, and that is equally true of indefinitely many other populations in the world and the whole population as well. It would take an argument to establish that LW local agreement is better than any particular one of those populations.
Then we are in agreement.
As for Lesswrong vs the general population, I point to the difference in epistemic hygiene between the two groups.