The main premise of the article is that directing one’s attention to a sensory input can make one better at processing this input (where “better” may mean “higher resolution and/or sensitivity”) by “growing” the associated area of the cortex.
However, the article does not give a clear reason for the assumption that the same principle should apply to higher-level mental behaviors not directly related to sensory inputs—e.g. playing chess.
(I’m not familiar with the relevant science, so I’m just voicing my doubt.)
I would say that the effect is most likely very relevant for higher-level skills, for the following reasons:
The effect has been shown for motor planning, for estimation of timing, and for several other plastic features. Thus, it isn’t limited to sensory processing alone.
If we assume a “worst case scenario” in which the higher-level networks are themselves exempt from this effect, we still have to expect an indirect improvement. The reason for this is relatively simple: higher-level mental behaviors are based on metanetworks that interconnect subnetworks which certainly are subject to attentional modulation.
I would say that transferability of the effect would depend on how transferable the trained skill is itself. If you train yourself to be really good at the go/no-go task where a red dot appears on the screen, you’ll get good at it, and it won’t make a difference anywhere else in your life—no matter how much attention you paid while training. If you train yourself to enunciate words better (which is predominantly motor training, and the attention effect has been shown to make a huge difference), this could transfer into many other higher-level behaviors which can be improved by speaking clearly.
Similar indirect improvements would also apply in case of music (tone discernment training is attention-dependent) and chess (spatial combinatorial thinking is dependent on attention-trainable circuitry).
So, in the worst case, this is still highly applicable, by choosing your training targets wisely.
Finally, there is no reason to assume the above worst case scenario. I don’t know of any studies that examined the effects of attention on higher-level skills—most likely because studies would be incredibly difficult to do (there is no possible control group, since you can’t have someone learn chess while not paying attention to it). But the molecular systems involved here seem to be pretty universal. Specifically, the effect has been shown to be dependent on acetylcholine release, and on the detection of this neurotransmitter by muscarinic receptors—which are present in many neurons within the higher-order associative and planning areas of the brain.
For a molecular pathway overview, see, for instance, Conner et al. in Neuron, Vol. 38, 819–829, 2003.
Therefore, the null hypothesis based on the data we currently have is that we should see this effect in higher-level skills directly, as well as indirectly.
I think this comment deserves to be included into the article, with minimal edits, somewhere between the end of the section I and the beginning of the section II.
I don’t think it means much that the molecular systems involved are universal. The fact that wires are transferring electrons in two different computers doesn’t mean the computers are programmed the same way.
The concept being described in the article sounds very similar to deliberate practice, which I think might be described as keeping what you are trying to practice at conscious level instead of going on autopilot.
Many of those studies are actually based on chess, so if this describes how deliberate practice changes the brain, it should also map to higher level activities.
Of course, I’m not terribly familiar with all of the relevant science either.
A possible caveat:
The main premise of the article is that directing one’s attention to a sensory input can make one better at processing this input (where “better” may mean “higher resolution and/or sensitivity”) by “growing” the associated area of the cortex.
However, the article does not give a clear reason for the assumption that the same principle should apply to higher-level mental behaviors not directly related to sensory inputs—e.g. playing chess.
(I’m not familiar with the relevant science, so I’m just voicing my doubt.)
An excellent question.
I would say that the effect is most likely very relevant for higher-level skills, for the following reasons:
The effect has been shown for motor planning, for estimation of timing, and for several other plastic features. Thus, it isn’t limited to sensory processing alone.
If we assume a “worst case scenario” in which the higher-level networks are themselves exempt from this effect, we still have to expect an indirect improvement. The reason for this is relatively simple: higher-level mental behaviors are based on metanetworks that interconnect subnetworks which certainly are subject to attentional modulation.
I would say that transferability of the effect would depend on how transferable the trained skill is itself. If you train yourself to be really good at the go/no-go task where a red dot appears on the screen, you’ll get good at it, and it won’t make a difference anywhere else in your life—no matter how much attention you paid while training. If you train yourself to enunciate words better (which is predominantly motor training, and the attention effect has been shown to make a huge difference), this could transfer into many other higher-level behaviors which can be improved by speaking clearly.
Similar indirect improvements would also apply in case of music (tone discernment training is attention-dependent) and chess (spatial combinatorial thinking is dependent on attention-trainable circuitry).
So, in the worst case, this is still highly applicable, by choosing your training targets wisely.
Finally, there is no reason to assume the above worst case scenario. I don’t know of any studies that examined the effects of attention on higher-level skills—most likely because studies would be incredibly difficult to do (there is no possible control group, since you can’t have someone learn chess while not paying attention to it). But the molecular systems involved here seem to be pretty universal. Specifically, the effect has been shown to be dependent on acetylcholine release, and on the detection of this neurotransmitter by muscarinic receptors—which are present in many neurons within the higher-order associative and planning areas of the brain.
For a molecular pathway overview, see, for instance, Conner et al. in Neuron, Vol. 38, 819–829, 2003.
Therefore, the null hypothesis based on the data we currently have is that we should see this effect in higher-level skills directly, as well as indirectly.
I think this comment deserves to be included into the article, with minimal edits, somewhere between the end of the section I and the beginning of the section II.
I don’t think it means much that the molecular systems involved are universal. The fact that wires are transferring electrons in two different computers doesn’t mean the computers are programmed the same way.
The concept being described in the article sounds very similar to deliberate practice, which I think might be described as keeping what you are trying to practice at conscious level instead of going on autopilot.
Many of those studies are actually based on chess, so if this describes how deliberate practice changes the brain, it should also map to higher level activities.
Of course, I’m not terribly familiar with all of the relevant science either.
On deliberate practice:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practice_%28learning_method%29#Deliberate_practice
http://www.gwern.net/docs/1993-ericsson-deliberatepractice.pdf
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/5317066/cambridge-expertise.pdf