See somervta’s comment above. But, I disagree with them on their second point.
If, in response to “If I’m (not) going to be outcompeted by simulated brains, I desire to (not) believe...”, I asked you “Am I going to be outcompeted by simulated brains?” you probably wouldn’t say “yes” or “no”. There’s no territory to match up with the map, i.e. your belief of whether or not we’ll be outcompeted.
I don’t know… Maybe people define territory differently, to include events that haven’t happened and things that don’t exist yet?
You can say something like “if I am going to be outcompeted by simulated brains in X% of Everett branches”, which is part of the territory (if you accept many-worlds), but is not verifiable. I agree that it’s better to stick with testable statements, especially if introducing people to the Litany of Tarski, so we will be more careful with this for next year’s Solstice.
See somervta’s comment above. But, I disagree with them on their second point.
If, in response to “If I’m (not) going to be outcompeted by simulated brains, I desire to (not) believe...”, I asked you “Am I going to be outcompeted by simulated brains?” you probably wouldn’t say “yes” or “no”. There’s no territory to match up with the map, i.e. your belief of whether or not we’ll be outcompeted.
I don’t know… Maybe people define territory differently, to include events that haven’t happened and things that don’t exist yet?
Yep! Check out the B-theory of time.
You can say something like “if I am going to be outcompeted by simulated brains in X% of Everett branches”, which is part of the territory (if you accept many-worlds), but is not verifiable. I agree that it’s better to stick with testable statements, especially if introducing people to the Litany of Tarski, so we will be more careful with this for next year’s Solstice.