Notably, hypothesizing the other parts doesn’t seem to make sense from an evolutionary POV, as it is reasonable to assume that the ability to have “urges” must logically precede the ability to make predictions about the urges, vs. the urges themselves encoding predictions about the outside world. If we have evolved an urge to do something, it is because evolution already “thinks” it’s probably a good idea to do the thing, and/or a bad idea not to, so another mechanism that merely recapitulates this logic would be kind of redundant.
A hypothesis that I’ve been considering, is whether the shift to become more social might have caused a second layer of motivation to evolve. Less social animals animals can act purely based on physical considerations like the need to eat or avoid a predator, but for humans every action has potential social implications, so needs to also be evaluated in that light. There are some interesting anecdotes like Helen Keller’s account suggesting that she only developed a self after learning language. The description of her old state of being sounds like there was just the urge, which was then immediately acted upon; and that this mode of operation then became irreversibly altered:
Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. [...] I cannot hope to describe adequately that unconscious, yet conscious time of nothingness. I did not know that I knew aught, or that I lived or acted or desired. I had neither will nor intellect. I was carried along to objects and acts by a certain blind natural impetus. I had a mind which caused me to feel anger, satisfaction, desire. These two facts led those about me to suppose that I willed and thought. [...] I never viewed anything beforehand or chose it. [...] My inner life, then, was a blank without past, present, or future, without hope or anticipation, without wonder or joy or faith. [...]
I remember, also through touch, that I had a power of association. I felt tactual jars like the stamp of a foot, the opening of a window or its closing, the slam of a door. After repeatedly smelling rain and feeling the discomfort of wetness, I acted like those about me: I ran to shut the window. But that was not thought in any sense. It was the same kind of association that makes animals take shelter from the rain. From the same instinct of aping others, I folded the clothes that came from the laundry, and put mine away, fed the turkeys, sewed bead-eyes on my doll’s face, and did many other things of which I have the tactual remembrance. When I wanted anything I liked,—ice-cream, for instance, of which I was very fond,—I had a delicious taste on my tongue (which, by the way, I never have now), and in my hand I felt the turning of the freezer. I made the sign, and my mother knew I wanted ice-cream. I “thought” and desired in my fingers. [...]
I thought only of objects, and only objects I wanted. It was the turning of the freezer on a larger scale. When I learned the meaning of “I” and “me” and found that I was something, I began to think. Then consciousness first existed for me. Thus it was not the sense of touch that brought me knowledge. It was the awakening of my soul that first rendered my senses their value, their cognizance of objects, names, qualities, and properties. Thought made me conscious of love, joy, and all the emotions. I was eager to know, then to understand, afterward to reflect on what I knew and understood, and the blind impetus, which had before driven me hither and thither at the dictates of my sensations, vanished forever.
Would also make sense in light of the observation that the sense of self may disappear when doing purely physical activities (you fall back to the original set of systems which doesn’t need to think about the self), the PRISM model of consciousness as a conflict-solver, the way that physical and social reasoning seem to be pretty distinct, and a kind of a semi-modular approach (you have the old primarily physical system, and then the new one that can integrate social considerations on top of the old system’s suggestions just added on top). If you squint, the stuff about simulacra also feels kinda relevant, as an entirely new set of implications that diverge from physical reality and need to be thought about on their own terms.
I wouldn’t be very surprised if this hypothesis turned out to be false, but at least there’s suggestive evidence.
A hypothesis that I’ve been considering, is whether the shift to become more social might have caused a second layer of motivation to evolve. Less social animals animals can act purely based on physical considerations like the need to eat or avoid a predator, but for humans every action has potential social implications, so needs to also be evaluated in that light. There are some interesting anecdotes like Helen Keller’s account suggesting that she only developed a self after learning language. The description of her old state of being sounds like there was just the urge, which was then immediately acted upon; and that this mode of operation then became irreversibly altered:
Would also make sense in light of the observation that the sense of self may disappear when doing purely physical activities (you fall back to the original set of systems which doesn’t need to think about the self), the PRISM model of consciousness as a conflict-solver, the way that physical and social reasoning seem to be pretty distinct, and a kind of a semi-modular approach (you have the old primarily physical system, and then the new one that can integrate social considerations on top of the old system’s suggestions just added on top). If you squint, the stuff about simulacra also feels kinda relevant, as an entirely new set of implications that diverge from physical reality and need to be thought about on their own terms.
I wouldn’t be very surprised if this hypothesis turned out to be false, but at least there’s suggestive evidence.