Unknown, it seems like what you are doing is making a distinction between a particular action being obligatory—you do not feel like you “ought” to torture someone—and its outcome being preferable—you feel like it would be better, all other things being equal, if you did torture the person.
Is that correct? If it isn’t, I have trouble seeing why the g64 variant of the problem wouldn’t overcome your hesitation to torture. Or are you simply stating a deontological side-constraint—I will never torture, period, not even to save the lives of my family or the whole human race?
In any event, what a lot of people mean when asked what they “should do” or what they “ought to do” is “what am I obligated to do?” I think this disambiguation helps, because it seems as if you are now making a distinction between TORTURE being morally required (which you do not seem to believe) and its being morally virtuous (which you do seem to believe).
Unknown, it seems like what you are doing is making a distinction between a particular action being obligatory—you do not feel like you “ought” to torture someone—and its outcome being preferable—you feel like it would be better, all other things being equal, if you did torture the person.
Is that correct? If it isn’t, I have trouble seeing why the g64 variant of the problem wouldn’t overcome your hesitation to torture. Or are you simply stating a deontological side-constraint—I will never torture, period, not even to save the lives of my family or the whole human race?
In any event, what a lot of people mean when asked what they “should do” or what they “ought to do” is “what am I obligated to do?” I think this disambiguation helps, because it seems as if you are now making a distinction between TORTURE being morally required (which you do not seem to believe) and its being morally virtuous (which you do seem to believe).
Is that about right?