I agree that this is happening to some degree, but I think it is at least plausibly more of a symptom of the adoption of dumber / more insane / more extreme object-level beliefs (which itself might be an effect of some other cultural or technological phenomenon, e.g. social media, cost disease, safetyism), rather than a cause.
Or, put another way: while the examples of democratic backsliding described here are alarming, it would possibly be even more disconcerting, or at least very strange, if people and factions in power continued to adopt more and more insane and extreme object-level behaviors and beliefs without damaging their legitimacy or having any other negative knock-on effects.
A possible implication is that, to improve democratic legitimacy, we should focus on fostering the adoption of saner object-level beliefs and positive-sum policies that lead to noticeably good outcomes. Do enough of that (via ordinary activism within the existing system), and maybe democracy will naturally heal itself.
The kind of object-level positive-sum change I have in mind, and how to go about it, is what Balsa Research is working on, I think:
Low-hanging improvement is often as simple as not restricting supply and not subsidizing demand. A sample: Reforming NEPA, the NRC, zoning and the FDA including a right to try for drugs, pandemic preparedness, repealing protectionist policies (Jones Act, Dredge Act, ‘made in America’, etc), ending qualified immunity and civil forfeiture, legalizing marijuana, avoiding 100%+ marginal tax rates, increasing high-skill immigration, fixing student loans, and NGDP level targeting by the Federal Reserve. The civil service and procurement urgently need reform.
There is far more hope for improvement than almost anyone realizes. Lobbying when done right is remarkably cheap and effective. Secret congress can be productive. Many marginal improvements are highly valuable, with no substantial downsides and compounding benefits.
It seems like anger against the exact kind of neoliberal technocracy you propose was a major source of energy for the 2016 Trump campaign, as well as the highly contentious Sanders campaigns.
The policy proposals I quoted are probably heavily mood-affiliated with candidates or policy wonks that both Trump and Bernie supporters wouldn’t like, yes. But I don’t think either campaign was fueled specifically by anger against specific proposals to repeal the Jones act or NEPA or anything else Balsa lists as low-hanging fruit.
There was some anger at specific policy proposals, e.g. Trans-Pacific Partnership. But the TPP isn’t actually in the list above, since (for precisely this reason) it’s not exactly low-hanging fruit. So I think your choice of the word “exact” is a bit too strong; it’s more like anger against this general flavor of neoliberal technocracy was a driver of some reactionary campaigns on the left and right.
By “more insane and extreme object-level behaviors and beliefs” of people and factions in power, I am mainly referring to beliefs of mainstream U.S politicians and political beliefs, on both / all sides of the political spectrum.
e.g. COVID restrictions which aren’t based on any actual model of the world, tariffs, immigration policy, environmental policy, a general preference for talking about (or legislating on) culture war things which are usually more symbolic or mood-affiliation than actual policy choices. A few examples which were initiated by high-level elected officials or received significant / outsize attention from them or mainstream media:
Whatever is going on with local San Francisco politics (and probably local governments more generally)
And the point is that, regardless of your views on any of these specific things (or the underlying policy issues or culture war topics for which these examples are often proxies for), if these are the topics your elected officials and mainstream media are spending their time and energy arguing about, something has gone seriously wrong, and it shouldn’t be surprising that the system itself is losing democratic legitimacy as a result.
I don’t see how things like crazy culture war politics or COVID reactions lead to a breakdown in democratic norms unless those crazy beliefs imply shifts in strategy. The bud light boycott seems plausibly good; it teaches Republicans that they have alternative tools of influence.
It’s less about specific issues, and more like a sense that the general sanity waterline has been perceptibly trending downwards in mainstream politics for decades. Politicians and institutions in general are less effective, less trustworthy, less coherent, etc. than they were in the relatively recent past (I claim, but this seems to be a fairly common sentiment among both rats and non-rats of various political stripes).
And then I’m further saying that if I’m right about my claim that the general sanity waterline has fallen, then a decline in democratic legitimacy is justified, or at least expected, in the sense that less sane institutions will be trusted and respected less, because they are in fact less trustworthy and less deserving of respect. Or, in more rationalist-y terms, a model of institutions and politicians as less trustworthy and less legitimate will be both more predictively accurate and more instrumentally useful than a model in which they are relatively more trusted and treated as legitimate democratic actors.
If you disagree, is is your disagreement more with the first claim (the sanity waterline in mainstream politics has generally been falling), or the second (this explains at least a significant part of the democratic backsliding that we’ve seen)?
I agree that this is happening to some degree, but I think it is at least plausibly more of a symptom of the adoption of dumber / more insane / more extreme object-level beliefs (which itself might be an effect of some other cultural or technological phenomenon, e.g. social media, cost disease, safetyism), rather than a cause.
Or, put another way: while the examples of democratic backsliding described here are alarming, it would possibly be even more disconcerting, or at least very strange, if people and factions in power continued to adopt more and more insane and extreme object-level behaviors and beliefs without damaging their legitimacy or having any other negative knock-on effects.
A possible implication is that, to improve democratic legitimacy, we should focus on fostering the adoption of saner object-level beliefs and positive-sum policies that lead to noticeably good outcomes. Do enough of that (via ordinary activism within the existing system), and maybe democracy will naturally heal itself.
The kind of object-level positive-sum change I have in mind, and how to go about it, is what Balsa Research is working on, I think:
It seems like anger against the exact kind of neoliberal technocracy you propose was a major source of energy for the 2016 Trump campaign, as well as the highly contentious Sanders campaigns.
The policy proposals I quoted are probably heavily mood-affiliated with candidates or policy wonks that both Trump and Bernie supporters wouldn’t like, yes. But I don’t think either campaign was fueled specifically by anger against specific proposals to repeal the Jones act or NEPA or anything else Balsa lists as low-hanging fruit.
There was some anger at specific policy proposals, e.g. Trans-Pacific Partnership. But the TPP isn’t actually in the list above, since (for precisely this reason) it’s not exactly low-hanging fruit. So I think your choice of the word “exact” is a bit too strong; it’s more like anger against this general flavor of neoliberal technocracy was a driver of some reactionary campaigns on the left and right.
What object-level beliefs did you have in mind?
By “more insane and extreme object-level behaviors and beliefs” of people and factions in power, I am mainly referring to beliefs of mainstream U.S politicians and political beliefs, on both / all sides of the political spectrum.
e.g. COVID restrictions which aren’t based on any actual model of the world, tariffs, immigration policy, environmental policy, a general preference for talking about (or legislating on) culture war things which are usually more symbolic or mood-affiliation than actual policy choices. A few examples which were initiated by high-level elected officials or received significant / outsize attention from them or mainstream media:
$2000 / mo retroactive covid stimulus checks, Grand Theft Education
U.S.-Mexico border wall
Some kind of controversy / boycott over a beer sponsorship
State governor feuding with Disney World
Whatever is going on with local San Francisco politics (and probably local governments more generally)
And the point is that, regardless of your views on any of these specific things (or the underlying policy issues or culture war topics for which these examples are often proxies for), if these are the topics your elected officials and mainstream media are spending their time and energy arguing about, something has gone seriously wrong, and it shouldn’t be surprising that the system itself is losing democratic legitimacy as a result.
I don’t see how things like crazy culture war politics or COVID reactions lead to a breakdown in democratic norms unless those crazy beliefs imply shifts in strategy. The bud light boycott seems plausibly good; it teaches Republicans that they have alternative tools of influence.
It’s less about specific issues, and more like a sense that the general sanity waterline has been perceptibly trending downwards in mainstream politics for decades. Politicians and institutions in general are less effective, less trustworthy, less coherent, etc. than they were in the relatively recent past (I claim, but this seems to be a fairly common sentiment among both rats and non-rats of various political stripes).
And then I’m further saying that if I’m right about my claim that the general sanity waterline has fallen, then a decline in democratic legitimacy is justified, or at least expected, in the sense that less sane institutions will be trusted and respected less, because they are in fact less trustworthy and less deserving of respect. Or, in more rationalist-y terms, a model of institutions and politicians as less trustworthy and less legitimate will be both more predictively accurate and more instrumentally useful than a model in which they are relatively more trusted and treated as legitimate democratic actors.
If you disagree, is is your disagreement more with the first claim (the sanity waterline in mainstream politics has generally been falling), or the second (this explains at least a significant part of the democratic backsliding that we’ve seen)?