For example, if a piece of evidence E is such that:
I ought to, in response to it, update my confidence in some belief B by some amount A, but
I in fact update my confidence in B by A2, and updating by A2 gets me further from justified confidence than I started out, then to the extent that I value justified confidence in propositions I was better off without E.
Incidentally, this is also what I understood RowanE to be referring to as well.
But it’s only bad because you made the mistake of updating by A2. I often notice a different problem of people to always argue A=0 and then present alternative belief C with no evidence. On some issues, we can’t get a great A, but if the best evidence available points to B we should still assume it’s B.
Often none.
For example, if a piece of evidence E is such that:
I ought to, in response to it, update my confidence in some belief B by some amount A, but
I in fact update my confidence in B by A2,
and updating by A2 gets me further from justified confidence than I started out, then to the extent that I value justified confidence in propositions I was better off without E.
Incidentally, this is also what I understood RowanE to be referring to as well.
But it’s only bad because you made the mistake of updating by A2. I often notice a different problem of people to always argue A=0 and then present alternative belief C with no evidence. On some issues, we can’t get a great A, but if the best evidence available points to B we should still assume it’s B.
Agreed.
Agreed.
Yes, I notice that too, and I agree both that it’s a problem, and that it’s a different problem.