This is true, but as it is different from other fights about when to talk about it, the point stands.
Which point? As I understand it, Jack gave a large number of plausible reasons why she might respond the way she did. I selected the two most self-destructive and criticized them. It’s still true that they’re plausible reasons, and so in that sense “the point stands,” but they aren’t reasons that should be cultivated.
I’m not too interested in apportioning blame
Then it’s not clear to me why you’re posting in this tree? If you go up to the root, taryneast posted blaming the man for being lazy; then Silas posted about blaming the woman for being uncommunicative; then TimS posted about blaming the man for being domineering; then I posted blaming the woman for being unhelpful/dishonest; then Jack posted blaming the man for not understanding women; then I posted blaming Alice for not understanding her audience.
Perhaps you’re trying to move from ‘blame’ towards ‘consequences,’ and sure, I support that move. But I don’t think the comment tree as is will move very easily.
Which point?
she may not want to get into a fight about when they talk about it
Jack’s point is that among the plausible reasons to want to avoid the subject is a desire to not have the fight associated with the subject. That her strategy involves picking a different fight doesn’t take away from the point that she has plausible fight related reasons for not talking.
Then it’s not clear to me why you’re posting in this tree?
Weeding is part of gardening.
But really, Silas posted about the man not being to blame for lack of communication, so I can stand behind that. I also thought it a description of fact without necessarily involving blame when you described the woman as putting the man in a no-win situation. So I didn’t read that as you blaming her. I read your next sentence as blaming her, but on a different topic, as “out-and-out lie” implies a lot of judgement. I may or may not agree with Jack’s next comment, depending on what he meant by “lie”. She communicated poorly on the crystal-to-mud clarity scale, using a literal falsehood that had a relatively high likelihood of conveying the truth, for a literal falsehood. I don’t see any moral problem with that as such.
So I find myself agreeing with whoever is defending a character, it gives me a coherent side in each sub-part of the argument.
I think you have some formatting errors with the start of your comment.
Jack’s point is that among the plausible reasons to want to avoid the subject is a desire to not have the fight associated with the subject. That her strategy involves picking a different fight doesn’t take away from the point that she has plausible fight related reasons for not talking.
I see how Alice’s strategy is different; I don’t see how the subject of the fight is different. In example 1, Bob says “let’s talk now” and Alice responds with a subtextual “no.” In example 2, Bob says “let’s talk now” and Alice responds with a textual “no, how about later?” Is that enough for you to call it a different fight?
To be clear my main point was just: “Alice is not lying”. She may well be uncooperative and self-destructive but she is not lying. Whether or not she is being uncooperative or self-destructive is not obvious to me from the skeleton dialog. It would be dependent on details we don’t have—though I think it is likely her chosen path is not ideal. I think the man is being a bit dense and uncooperative by the end but he is not obviously in the wrong. Please interpret my comments as disagreement with precisely what you said not as support for TimS’s comment or signifying that I blame or care about blaming one party or the other.
So, hypothetical: if we were both standing outside under the clear blue sky and I said to you “The sky is green” you would say I was not lying? Assume we are speaking English, that both of us have working color vision, etc.
I’d be trying to figure out from your tone, body language, facial expressions etc what was going on. Is pedanterrific just being weird? Has he gone crazy? Have I gone crazy? Is he trying to performatively illustrate a position on the unknowability of qualia? You’ve made it sort of difficult by providing an example of an obviously false statement wherein there is no other information about what you’re doing—but I certainly don’t feel compelled to call it a lie.
I guess where you and I differ is that I don’t consider those mutually exclusive. If I’m stating something which I know to not be true, I’m lying. I may also be doing other things (e.g. stating a prearranged signal like “the eagle has landed”), but all that—“being weird”, “performatively illustrating a position” etc. - doesn’t mean I’m not lying.
I, for one, understand that the definition of lying you are choosing to use here is simply “making false statements.” It does not make sense to argue over what definition is “correct.” I do want to be sure you are aware that many people understand lying to be “intending to deceive,” particularly when things are morally charged, and you would be wise to taboo “lie” when this is relevant.
As a matter of curiosity: pursuant to your particular definition of lying as you were using it above, would you call making a true statement with the intent that it deceive and the knowledge that it is likely to do so “a lie” or “not a lie”?
It does not make sense to argue over what definition is “correct.”
I certainly hope that’s not what it looked like I was doing.
I do want to be sure you are aware
Oh, I am. I was just curious about Jack’s specific definition.
As a matter of curiosity: pursuant to your particular definition of lying as you were using it above, would you call making a true statement with the intent that it deceive and the knowledge that it is likely to do so “a lie” or “not a lie”?
In point of fact, I would call that a “deception”, not a “lie”. So, [a statement made with intent to deceive] = a “deception”, and [a statement of something that is known to be false] = a “lie”. So the two qualities are independent of each other. (Incidentally, [a statement of something that is false, but thought to be correct] would be a “mistake”.)
I wonder whether the legal system considers “making a true statement with the intent to deceive” perjury?
I certainly hope that’s not what it looked like I was doing.
It looked like what was generally happening—I’m not interested in meting out blame for it.
I do want to be sure you are aware
Oh, I am. I was just curious about Jack’s specific definition.
Good.
As a matter of curiosity: pursuant to your particular definition of lying as you were using it above, would you call making a true statement with the intent that it deceive and the knowledge that it is likely to do so “a lie” or “not a lie”?
In point of fact, I would call that a “deception”, not a “lie”. So, [a statement made with intent to deceive] = a “deception”, and [a statement of something that is known to be false] = a “lie”. So the two qualities are independent of each other. (Incidentally, [a statement of something that is false, but thought to be correct] would be a “mistake”.)
Alright, interesting. FWIW, I can go either way on that one.
I wonder whether the legal system considers “making a true statement with the intent to deceive” perjury?
To some extent, wouldn’t this amount to most defenses when the accused is guilty? This seems like a bad idea, unfortunately.
I wonder whether the legal system considers “making a true statement with the intent to deceive” perjury?
To some extent, wouldn’t this amount to most defenses when the accused is guilty? This seems like a bad idea, unfortunately.
You lost me. (Pleading “Not Guilty” when you are guilty isn’t perjury because it’s not under oath, but I don’t see what that has to do with “making a true statement with the intent to deceive”.)
Also, you only need the > at the beginning of each paragraph.
Generally, statements made in the defense would be made with the intent that people draw the conclusion that the defendant is, in fact, not guilty. A guilty defendant could then not legally testify at all.
Also, you only need the > at the beginning of each paragraph.
The third element of a perjury offense is proof of specific intent, that is, that the defendant made the false statement with knowledge of its falsity, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory.
Though I suppose this wouldn’t protect someone from prosecution for sarcasm.
Yeah. I mean—usage sometimes differs. I don’t want to make this exactly a definition debate. But look at how Vaniver used the word:
Alice saying “nothing is wrong” rather than “let’s not talk about it now” is an out-and-out lie. It’s not clear that Bob inferring that Alice is repeatedly lying would reflect better on Bob.
That usage suggests to me a meaning of liar that implies deceit (though Vaniver later said he didn’t mean to imply that).
I do think it would be a social/linguistic error to respond to weirdness, joking hyperbole, or sarcasm with with “Liar!” or similar variant in a sincere tone.
I do think it would be a social/linguistic error to respond to weirdness, joking hyperbole, or sarcasm with with “Liar!” or similar variant in a sincere tone.
Generally I prefer “Get thee behind me, Prince of Lies!” or possibly “You should be a statistician!” if I’m feeling particularly vindictive.
Okay. So, what word do you use to describe the act of “stating things which you know to not be true”? Or does your variant of English not have a word for that act?
I don’t see how that is supposed to matter. But because I’m curious, some hypothetical situations:
My motivation was to find out how my interlocutor would describe my statement.
Assume that you don’t and can’t know my motivation, as is commonly the case in the real world.
It was due to a random causeless quantum fluctuation, similar in theory to the idea of a ‘Boltzmann brain’, which acted on my neurons in a such a way as to output that statement and make me rationalize it as my idea.
meaning which can be thought of as the conjunction of two claims: (1) facts about what expressions mean are to be explained, or analyzed, in terms of facts about what speakers mean by utterances of them, and (2) facts about what speakers mean by their utterances can be explained in terms of their intentions.
Propositional theories of meaning fail precisely because they have a great deal of trouble accounting for situations where our words don’t match our intentions.
It’s not good enough to just be a consequentialist rather than a virtue ethicist. You have to be a conequentialist for the right reasons or it doesn’t count.
Intentions are physical facts about brains. If you care about those particular physical facts, then you can be a consequentialist who cares about intentions.
Often, some of the physical facts that determine whether a certain word applies to a certain situation happen to be physical facts that fall under the heading of “intentions”.
It’s just… if “intention always matters” when choosing which word to use to describe someone else’s actions, you spend an inordinate amount of time not knowing how to describe something while you gather data on the other agent’s intentions, data which may not ever be definitive. That seems to rather miss the point of language.
When an actor says, “I am Hamlet, prince of Denmark” is he lying?
Well he’s certainly not telling the truth, and he’s (probably) not honestly mistaken, so sure.
If yes, then why is there a negative connotation in the word lying?
I’m not exactly sure I’m qualified to answer that, but if I had to speculate… because it’s easier to accidentally mislead people by assuming they know you’re not telling the truth than the opposite, and because it’s valuable to society to pretend rigorous truth-telling is more laudable than it really is (i.e. “honest” has an unreservedly positive connotation, despite the fact that there are common social situations in which it is terribly impolite to actually be honest). Does that make sense?
This sounds vaguely like the idea once prevalent in legal proceedings that actors were not trustworthy as witnesses because their skill acting in plays showed that they could commit perjury undetected by the jury.
That theory is no longer accepted in law. And I think the modern understanding—that actors are no more or less likely to be dishonest than any other citizen—is the more rational position. Is society’s modern view wrong?
Uh… well first of all, I don’t see what any of those things have to do with each other. To put my objections in some kind of order:
The idea that actors’ skill at lying is a reason to distrust their testimony is ridiculous. Juries, and people in general, are much worse lie detectors than they believe themselves to be. The bar is set so low that probably only really, unusually bad liars are ever caught by that method.
That said, experience and skill at acting probably does generalize into skill at other forms of lying—that seems intuitively true, and it’s certainly been the case in my experience, so I have no reason to doubt it.
The unrelated claim of whether actors are equally likely to be dishonest as anyone else is also a terrible indicator of their reliability under oath. Presumably people who perjure themselves have a compelling reason, such that a constitutional tendency toward honesty wouldn’t do what the threat of jailtime did not.
That said, I have no idea whether actors are more, equally or less likely to be dishonest than the general population. I’m not sure how you’d go about testing that hypothesis, either.
Which point? As I understand it, Jack gave a large number of plausible reasons why she might respond the way she did. I selected the two most self-destructive and criticized them. It’s still true that they’re plausible reasons, and so in that sense “the point stands,” but they aren’t reasons that should be cultivated.
Then it’s not clear to me why you’re posting in this tree? If you go up to the root, taryneast posted blaming the man for being lazy; then Silas posted about blaming the woman for being uncommunicative; then TimS posted about blaming the man for being domineering; then I posted blaming the woman for being unhelpful/dishonest; then Jack posted blaming the man for not understanding women; then I posted blaming Alice for not understanding her audience.
Perhaps you’re trying to move from ‘blame’ towards ‘consequences,’ and sure, I support that move. But I don’t think the comment tree as is will move very easily.
Weeding is part of gardening.
But really, Silas posted about the man not being to blame for lack of communication, so I can stand behind that. I also thought it a description of fact without necessarily involving blame when you described the woman as putting the man in a no-win situation. So I didn’t read that as you blaming her. I read your next sentence as blaming her, but on a different topic, as “out-and-out lie” implies a lot of judgement. I may or may not agree with Jack’s next comment, depending on what he meant by “lie”. She communicated poorly on the crystal-to-mud clarity scale, using a literal falsehood that had a relatively high likelihood of conveying the truth, for a literal falsehood. I don’t see any moral problem with that as such.
So I find myself agreeing with whoever is defending a character, it gives me a coherent side in each sub-part of the argument.
I think you have some formatting errors with the start of your comment.
I see how Alice’s strategy is different; I don’t see how the subject of the fight is different. In example 1, Bob says “let’s talk now” and Alice responds with a subtextual “no.” In example 2, Bob says “let’s talk now” and Alice responds with a textual “no, how about later?” Is that enough for you to call it a different fight?
To be clear my main point was just: “Alice is not lying”. She may well be uncooperative and self-destructive but she is not lying. Whether or not she is being uncooperative or self-destructive is not obvious to me from the skeleton dialog. It would be dependent on details we don’t have—though I think it is likely her chosen path is not ideal. I think the man is being a bit dense and uncooperative by the end but he is not obviously in the wrong. Please interpret my comments as disagreement with precisely what you said not as support for TimS’s comment or signifying that I blame or care about blaming one party or the other.
Have you tabooed “definition” without tabooing arguments from definition?
Heh. Almost. I’ve replaced definition with conventional speaker-meaning and am arguing from conventional speaker-meaning.
So, hypothetical: if we were both standing outside under the clear blue sky and I said to you “The sky is green” you would say I was not lying? Assume we are speaking English, that both of us have working color vision, etc.
I’d be trying to figure out from your tone, body language, facial expressions etc what was going on. Is pedanterrific just being weird? Has he gone crazy? Have I gone crazy? Is he trying to performatively illustrate a position on the unknowability of qualia? You’ve made it sort of difficult by providing an example of an obviously false statement wherein there is no other information about what you’re doing—but I certainly don’t feel compelled to call it a lie.
Consider sarcasm.
I guess where you and I differ is that I don’t consider those mutually exclusive. If I’m stating something which I know to not be true, I’m lying. I may also be doing other things (e.g. stating a prearranged signal like “the eagle has landed”), but all that—“being weird”, “performatively illustrating a position” etc. - doesn’t mean I’m not lying.
I, for one, understand that the definition of lying you are choosing to use here is simply “making false statements.” It does not make sense to argue over what definition is “correct.” I do want to be sure you are aware that many people understand lying to be “intending to deceive,” particularly when things are morally charged, and you would be wise to taboo “lie” when this is relevant.
As a matter of curiosity: pursuant to your particular definition of lying as you were using it above, would you call making a true statement with the intent that it deceive and the knowledge that it is likely to do so “a lie” or “not a lie”?
I certainly hope that’s not what it looked like I was doing.
Oh, I am. I was just curious about Jack’s specific definition.
In point of fact, I would call that a “deception”, not a “lie”. So, [a statement made with intent to deceive] = a “deception”, and [a statement of something that is known to be false] = a “lie”. So the two qualities are independent of each other. (Incidentally, [a statement of something that is false, but thought to be correct] would be a “mistake”.)
I wonder whether the legal system considers “making a true statement with the intent to deceive” perjury?
It looked like what was generally happening—I’m not interested in meting out blame for it.
Good.
Alright, interesting. FWIW, I can go either way on that one.
To some extent, wouldn’t this amount to most defenses when the accused is guilty? This seems like a bad idea, unfortunately.
You lost me. (Pleading “Not Guilty” when you are guilty isn’t perjury because it’s not under oath, but I don’t see what that has to do with “making a true statement with the intent to deceive”.)
Also, you only need the > at the beginning of each paragraph.
Generally, statements made in the defense would be made with the intent that people draw the conclusion that the defendant is, in fact, not guilty. A guilty defendant could then not legally testify at all.
Gracias.
Well, there’s a reason people plead the Fifth.
Y de nada.
Googles …
Though I suppose this wouldn’t protect someone from prosecution for sarcasm.
You wanted the previous page. Yes, for perjury, the statement must actually be false.
Oh, you’re totally right. I misread the parent.
No worries.
For what it’s worth, I’m not actually sure what I was going for there.
Edit: Yeah, that was probably it.
I assumed “curiosity”
Yeah. I mean—usage sometimes differs. I don’t want to make this exactly a definition debate. But look at how Vaniver used the word:
That usage suggests to me a meaning of liar that implies deceit (though Vaniver later said he didn’t mean to imply that).
I do think it would be a social/linguistic error to respond to weirdness, joking hyperbole, or sarcasm with with “Liar!” or similar variant in a sincere tone.
Generally I prefer “Get thee behind me, Prince of Lies!” or possibly “You should be a statistician!” if I’m feeling particularly vindictive.
But I get your point.
Do you intend to persuade your interlocutor that the sky is in fact green? If not, then you are not lying.
Okay. So, what word do you use to describe the act of “stating things which you know to not be true”? Or does your variant of English not have a word for that act?
Such an act has different names in different contexts. In your scenario, what motivated your statement that the sky is green?
Alternatively, if you need to sum up the action in any context, the phrase “stating things which you know to not be true” suffices...
It does, doesn’t it? Fancy that.
I don’t see how that is supposed to matter. But because I’m curious, some hypothetical situations:
My motivation was to find out how my interlocutor would describe my statement.
Assume that you don’t and can’t know my motivation, as is commonly the case in the real world.
It was due to a random causeless quantum fluctuation, similar in theory to the idea of a ‘Boltzmann brain’, which acted on my neurons in a such a way as to output that statement and make me rationalize it as my idea.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/#GriPro
Propositional theories of meaning fail precisely because they have a great deal of trouble accounting for situations where our words don’t match our intentions.
Intention always matters.
What does it say about me that my first instinctive response was “I’m a consequentialist, not a virtue ethicist.”
It’s not good enough to just be a consequentialist rather than a virtue ethicist. You have to be a conequentialist for the right reasons or it doesn’t count.
Intentions are physical facts about brains. If you care about those particular physical facts, then you can be a consequentialist who cares about intentions.
Often, some of the physical facts that determine whether a certain word applies to a certain situation happen to be physical facts that fall under the heading of “intentions”.
It’s just… if “intention always matters” when choosing which word to use to describe someone else’s actions, you spend an inordinate amount of time not knowing how to describe something while you gather data on the other agent’s intentions, data which may not ever be definitive. That seems to rather miss the point of language.
When an actor says, “I am Hamlet, prince of Denmark” is he lying?
If yes, then why is there a negative connotation in the word lying?
Well he’s certainly not telling the truth, and he’s (probably) not honestly mistaken, so sure.
I’m not exactly sure I’m qualified to answer that, but if I had to speculate… because it’s easier to accidentally mislead people by assuming they know you’re not telling the truth than the opposite, and because it’s valuable to society to pretend rigorous truth-telling is more laudable than it really is (i.e. “honest” has an unreservedly positive connotation, despite the fact that there are common social situations in which it is terribly impolite to actually be honest). Does that make sense?
Role playing can hardly be considered lying, as the latter usually implies an intent to deceive.
I am aware that this is the common understanding, yes. Apparently my definition is rather idiosyncratic.
This sounds vaguely like the idea once prevalent in legal proceedings that actors were not trustworthy as witnesses because their skill acting in plays showed that they could commit perjury undetected by the jury.
That theory is no longer accepted in law. And I think the modern understanding—that actors are no more or less likely to be dishonest than any other citizen—is the more rational position. Is society’s modern view wrong?
Uh… well first of all, I don’t see what any of those things have to do with each other. To put my objections in some kind of order:
The idea that actors’ skill at lying is a reason to distrust their testimony is ridiculous. Juries, and people in general, are much worse lie detectors than they believe themselves to be. The bar is set so low that probably only really, unusually bad liars are ever caught by that method.
That said, experience and skill at acting probably does generalize into skill at other forms of lying—that seems intuitively true, and it’s certainly been the case in my experience, so I have no reason to doubt it.
The unrelated claim of whether actors are equally likely to be dishonest as anyone else is also a terrible indicator of their reliability under oath. Presumably people who perjure themselves have a compelling reason, such that a constitutional tendency toward honesty wouldn’t do what the threat of jailtime did not.
That said, I have no idea whether actors are more, equally or less likely to be dishonest than the general population. I’m not sure how you’d go about testing that hypothesis, either.
Does that about clear it up?