To what degree can we make inferences about the outside of the simulation from what we observe inside it?
If we fully rely on the simulation argument, we can assume that we have cognitive processes remotely similar to the cognitive processes of some assumed ancestors of simulation runners.
Not much.
If we don’t—all bets are off.
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To what degree can we make inferences about the outside of the simulation from what we observe inside it?
If we fully rely on the simulation argument, we can assume that we have cognitive processes remotely similar to the cognitive processes of some assumed ancestors of simulation runners.
Not much.
If we don’t—all bets are off.