I initially rankled at your suggestions on how I should vote, but ultimately I agree. I’ve never taken the simulation hypothesis seriously, but it’s still an interesting argument.
Our actual history is less exciting to me than I expect from a game or a work of fiction. This is only relevant to the extent that we insist on making predictions as if the likely simulators are psychologically like us. I can’t even begin to justify the prior (on what kinds of who are likely to be making what kinds of simulation) that would support that, especially with the “given that (something like) us exists” anthropic teaser.
Further, there’s a lot more waste (per entertainment value) than I’d expect. There seem to be precise simulation everywhere, where it’s not needed. I don’t feel important or entertaining, yet I’m computationally expensive. This matters if we presume that the simulators have limited computational resources (why we should expect that, I have no idea—again, completely shaky ground—it seems to me only by laziness that we keep insisting that the containing universe is anything like ours). Still, if I consider simulation at all, I discount entertainment as the purpose.
I consider simulations of universes like ours psychologically plausible for creators like us only as far as the containing universe has vast resources, and the creators like us are incredibly bored and refuse self-modification. I’m skeptical that people like us will ever be able to simulate universes like ours using a universe like ours. I suspect either the simulators or their universe are far different from us or ours. What should I expect now?
I really have to wonder how people can justify any prior at all on the type of universe we’re in, other than the trivial “it must be one that can sustain our existence, and consistent with whatever else we can observe now—and MAYBE the physical laws in operation now were always in operation”.
I initially rankled at your suggestions on how I should vote, but ultimately I agree. I’ve never taken the simulation hypothesis seriously, but it’s still an interesting argument.
Our actual history is less exciting to me than I expect from a game or a work of fiction. This is only relevant to the extent that we insist on making predictions as if the likely simulators are psychologically like us. I can’t even begin to justify the prior (on what kinds of who are likely to be making what kinds of simulation) that would support that, especially with the “given that (something like) us exists” anthropic teaser.
Further, there’s a lot more waste (per entertainment value) than I’d expect. There seem to be precise simulation everywhere, where it’s not needed. I don’t feel important or entertaining, yet I’m computationally expensive. This matters if we presume that the simulators have limited computational resources (why we should expect that, I have no idea—again, completely shaky ground—it seems to me only by laziness that we keep insisting that the containing universe is anything like ours). Still, if I consider simulation at all, I discount entertainment as the purpose.
I consider simulations of universes like ours psychologically plausible for creators like us only as far as the containing universe has vast resources, and the creators like us are incredibly bored and refuse self-modification. I’m skeptical that people like us will ever be able to simulate universes like ours using a universe like ours. I suspect either the simulators or their universe are far different from us or ours. What should I expect now?
I really have to wonder how people can justify any prior at all on the type of universe we’re in, other than the trivial “it must be one that can sustain our existence, and consistent with whatever else we can observe now—and MAYBE the physical laws in operation now were always in operation”.