Counterargument 3(b) is the most convincing of these to me.
If my decision theory is predicated on some kind of continuity in states of the universe, and my decision is based on some discontinuity in the state of the universe, my decision theory can’t handle this.
This is troubling, but to try to make it more formal: if I believe something like “all mathematically possible universes exist” then promising to “change universes to UN(N)” is a meaningless statement. Perhaps the wager should be rephrased as “increase the measure of universes of higher utility”?
Counterargument 3(b) is the most convincing of these to me.
If my decision theory is predicated on some kind of continuity in states of the universe, and my decision is based on some discontinuity in the state of the universe, my decision theory can’t handle this.
This is troubling, but to try to make it more formal: if I believe something like “all mathematically possible universes exist” then promising to “change universes to UN(N)” is a meaningless statement. Perhaps the wager should be rephrased as “increase the measure of universes of higher utility”?