Yes. I mean that, when your choice is different from what standard (or for some cases, timeless) decision theory calculates for the same prior beliefs and outcome->utility mapping, you’re losing utility. I can’t tell if you think that this theory does have different outcomes, or if you think that this is “just” a simplification that gives the same outcomes.
From Manfred’s comments (with which I agree), it looks like yes, you lose utility by failing to buy a bet that has positive EV. You lose half as much if you flip a coin, because sometimes the coin is right...
Yes. I mean that, when your choice is different from what standard (or for some cases, timeless) decision theory calculates for the same prior beliefs and outcome->utility mapping, you’re losing utility. I can’t tell if you think that this theory does have different outcomes, or if you think that this is “just” a simplification that gives the same outcomes.
I replied to Manfred with the Ellsberg example having 31 instead of 30 red balls. Does that count as different? If so, do I lose utility?
From Manfred’s comments (with which I agree), it looks like yes, you lose utility by failing to buy a bet that has positive EV. You lose half as much if you flip a coin, because sometimes the coin is right...