After all, some of the most extreme poverty in American history took place around the beginning of the 20th century, when American capitalism was at its most laissez faire.
I’m prepared to be convinced of this, but that link doesn’t demonstrate this, or much at all really. It argues that history textbooks overemphasize the tilted income distribution relative to the economic growth that took place, but the only arguments it offers against the magnitude of the distribution skew being as great as the textbooks claim are strictly theoretical.
The notion that people simply would not immigrate if conditions were so poor, unless conditions were even worse where they already lived, is a supposition unworthy of the author of The Myth of the Rational Voter; people don’t act as if they were rational agents operating on complete information now, and information availability was much lower then. Plus, once you’re stuck in a system of wage slavery, it’s extremely difficult to get out, unlike the work that people were emigrating from in the first place.
It’s easy to avoid paying workers near the marginal productivity they generate if there’s enough competition willing to take lowball compensation so that they can be the ones to get the job (and plenty of competition willing to do so when many families need to mobilize all their possible working force to stay above water.) Unionization can result in many negative side effects, and often produces ludicrously perverse incentives, but at the same time do not forget, with the dramatic improvements in compensation and working conditions they generated at the time for huge numbers of workers, how many industries stayed in business.
The whole thing barely even tries to refute the notion that conditions were that bad, it just complains about history textbooks focusing more on those conditions than the productivity gains generated by industrialization. The closest thing it offers to an empirical argument throughout is when the author claims that he finds one figure hard to believe, and that one historian offered him one he found more reasonable. What research did he do to determine which figure was more likely to be correct?
I am entirely willing to adjust my estimate of how bad conditions were at that time based on well researched empirical data. As for the notion that history textbooks emphasize the ills too much relative to the gains, well, my own discussed both at length, and I think it’s appropriate that they should do such, because the historical record demonstrates both that industrialization has significant benefits, and that the conditions caused by its unregulated state can be substantially improved upon with certain effective regulations. Both points are important, and often discarded for ideological or theoretical reasons without empirical basis.
Well, the initial claim that “some of the most extreme poverty in American history took place around the beginning of the 20th century” sounds strange to me on its face. Do you think there was more extreme poverty at the beginning of the XX century or at the beginning of the XIX century, for example?
The notion that people simply would not immigrate if conditions were so poor
Is more plausible than you give it credit for. People used to immigrate by extended families, whole clans, and the way it worked was that some family members would move over, get a foothold, and then bring over the rest. There certainly was communication (post worked pretty well) and people already on the ground had first-hand knowledge of the conditions they would bring their entire family into. They mostly did bring their families.
The whole thing barely even tries to refute the notion that conditions were that bad
No one so far defined what do “bad conditions” mean, what are the relevant metrics, and what can you compare them to to establish the context.
Well, the initial claim that “some of the most extreme poverty in American history took place around the beginning of the 20th century” sounds strange to me on its face. Do you think there was more extreme poverty at the beginning of the XX century or at the beginning of the XIX century, for example?
Depends what metrics you use, but I am willing to bet that more people (and a greater proportion of people) at the beginning of the 20th century were living in conditions where they had less space, less access to food, more exposure to toxic and unsafe conditions, and less opportunity to move to a different environment.
Is more plausible than you give it credit for. People used to immigrate by extended families, whole clans, and the way it worked was that some family members would move over, get a foothold, and then bring over the rest. There certainly was communication (post worked pretty well) and people already on the ground had first-hand knowledge of the conditions they would bring their entire family into. They mostly did bring their families.
Many did, but then, many did not.
If a worker finds success, they’re a lot more likely to encourage family or village members to come over than if they do not. If we suppose that one in five initial immigrants has a positive experience, and immigrants who have positive experiences on average encourage eight more people to come over, then we will have a scenario where most immigrants are encouraged to come over by someone who had positive experiences, but most do not have positive experiences (am I claiming that these are the correct figures or something close to them? No, but they illustrate why I don’t think the argument proves much.)
No one so far defined what do “bad conditions” mean, what are the relevant metrics, and what can you compare them to to establish the context.
In the context of the comment, I am referring to the conditions being as bad as the textbooks Caplan is complaining about said they were, along whatever metrics they used. From his critique it’s hard to know what they even asserted since he’s arguing against them on ideological rather than empirical grounds.
Certainly so. Your metrics, for example, look biased towards hunter-gatherer tribes :-)
Many did, but then, many did not.
This looks like an empirical question. I bet there are studies with data. I am also too lazy to go, google them up, read them, and figure out the answer :-D
This is actually a common misconception.
I’m prepared to be convinced of this, but that link doesn’t demonstrate this, or much at all really. It argues that history textbooks overemphasize the tilted income distribution relative to the economic growth that took place, but the only arguments it offers against the magnitude of the distribution skew being as great as the textbooks claim are strictly theoretical.
The notion that people simply would not immigrate if conditions were so poor, unless conditions were even worse where they already lived, is a supposition unworthy of the author of The Myth of the Rational Voter; people don’t act as if they were rational agents operating on complete information now, and information availability was much lower then. Plus, once you’re stuck in a system of wage slavery, it’s extremely difficult to get out, unlike the work that people were emigrating from in the first place.
It’s easy to avoid paying workers near the marginal productivity they generate if there’s enough competition willing to take lowball compensation so that they can be the ones to get the job (and plenty of competition willing to do so when many families need to mobilize all their possible working force to stay above water.) Unionization can result in many negative side effects, and often produces ludicrously perverse incentives, but at the same time do not forget, with the dramatic improvements in compensation and working conditions they generated at the time for huge numbers of workers, how many industries stayed in business.
The whole thing barely even tries to refute the notion that conditions were that bad, it just complains about history textbooks focusing more on those conditions than the productivity gains generated by industrialization. The closest thing it offers to an empirical argument throughout is when the author claims that he finds one figure hard to believe, and that one historian offered him one he found more reasonable. What research did he do to determine which figure was more likely to be correct?
I am entirely willing to adjust my estimate of how bad conditions were at that time based on well researched empirical data. As for the notion that history textbooks emphasize the ills too much relative to the gains, well, my own discussed both at length, and I think it’s appropriate that they should do such, because the historical record demonstrates both that industrialization has significant benefits, and that the conditions caused by its unregulated state can be substantially improved upon with certain effective regulations. Both points are important, and often discarded for ideological or theoretical reasons without empirical basis.
Well, the initial claim that “some of the most extreme poverty in American history took place around the beginning of the 20th century” sounds strange to me on its face. Do you think there was more extreme poverty at the beginning of the XX century or at the beginning of the XIX century, for example?
Is more plausible than you give it credit for. People used to immigrate by extended families, whole clans, and the way it worked was that some family members would move over, get a foothold, and then bring over the rest. There certainly was communication (post worked pretty well) and people already on the ground had first-hand knowledge of the conditions they would bring their entire family into. They mostly did bring their families.
No one so far defined what do “bad conditions” mean, what are the relevant metrics, and what can you compare them to to establish the context.
Depends what metrics you use, but I am willing to bet that more people (and a greater proportion of people) at the beginning of the 20th century were living in conditions where they had less space, less access to food, more exposure to toxic and unsafe conditions, and less opportunity to move to a different environment.
Many did, but then, many did not.
If a worker finds success, they’re a lot more likely to encourage family or village members to come over than if they do not. If we suppose that one in five initial immigrants has a positive experience, and immigrants who have positive experiences on average encourage eight more people to come over, then we will have a scenario where most immigrants are encouraged to come over by someone who had positive experiences, but most do not have positive experiences (am I claiming that these are the correct figures or something close to them? No, but they illustrate why I don’t think the argument proves much.)
In the context of the comment, I am referring to the conditions being as bad as the textbooks Caplan is complaining about said they were, along whatever metrics they used. From his critique it’s hard to know what they even asserted since he’s arguing against them on ideological rather than empirical grounds.
Certainly so. Your metrics, for example, look biased towards hunter-gatherer tribes :-)
This looks like an empirical question. I bet there are studies with data. I am also too lazy to go, google them up, read them, and figure out the answer :-D