Thanks for the link, that was an excellent exposition and defense of compatibilism. Here is one particularly strong paragraph:
If we are interested in whether somebody has free will, it is some kind of ability that we want to assess, and you can’t assess any ability by “replaying the tape.”… This is as true of the abilities of automobiles as of people. Suppose I am driving along at 60 MPH and am asked if my car can also go 80 MPH. Yes, I reply, but not in precisely the same conditions; I have to press harder on the accelerator. In fact, I add, it can also go 40 MPH, but not with conditions precisely as they are. Replay the tape till eternity, and it will never go 40MPH in just these conditions. So if you want to know whether some rapist/murderer was “free not to rape and murder,” don’t distract yourself with fantasies about determinism and rewinding the tape; rely on the sorts of observations and tests that everyday folk use to confirm and disconfirm their verdicts about who could have done otherwise and who couldn’t.
rely on the sorts of observations and tests that everyday folk use to confirm and disconfirm their verdicts about who could have done otherwise and who couldn’t.
It is common for incompatibilists to say that their conception of free will (as requiring the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same conditions) matches everybody’s intuitions and that compatibilism is a philosopher’s trick based on changing the definition. Dennett is arguing that, contrary to this, what actual people in actual circumstances do when they want to know if someone was “free to do otherwise” is never to think about global determinism; rather, as compatibilism requires, they think about whether that person (or relevantly similar people) actually does/do different when placed under very similar (but not precisely identical) conditions.
they think about whether that person (or relevantly similar people) actually does/do different when placed under very similar (but not precisely identical) conditions.
I think the key is consideration people “in similar, but not exactly identical, circumstance”. It’s how the person compares to hypothetical others. Free will is a concept used to sort people for blame based on intention.
Daniel Dennett quote to share, on an argument in Sam Harris’ book Free Will;
From: http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/reflections-on-free-will#sthash.5OqzuVcX.dpuf
Just thought that was pretty damn funny.
That’s known as Strawman Has A Point (Warning: TVTropes).
Thanks for the link, that was an excellent exposition and defense of compatibilism. Here is one particularly strong paragraph:
Isn’t that begging the question?
It is common for incompatibilists to say that their conception of free will (as requiring the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same conditions) matches everybody’s intuitions and that compatibilism is a philosopher’s trick based on changing the definition. Dennett is arguing that, contrary to this, what actual people in actual circumstances do when they want to know if someone was “free to do otherwise” is never to think about global determinism; rather, as compatibilism requires, they think about whether that person (or relevantly similar people) actually does/do different when placed under very similar (but not precisely identical) conditions.
I think the key is consideration people “in similar, but not exactly identical, circumstance”. It’s how the person compares to hypothetical others. Free will is a concept used to sort people for blame based on intention.