Sure. The way it helps is for personal moral indeterminacy—when I want to make a decision, but am aware that, strictly speaking, my values are undefined, I should still do what seems right. A more direct approach to the problem would be Eliezer’s point about type 1 and type 2 calculators.
That seems to imply that you should not bother doing what is right in favour of selfish preferences so long as personal preferences are clear. Surely that is the wrong way round: if there is an objective morality then you morally!should follow it unless it fails to specify an action.
Sure. The way it helps is for personal moral indeterminacy—when I want to make a decision, but am aware that, strictly speaking, my values are undefined, I should still do what seems right. A more direct approach to the problem would be Eliezer’s point about type 1 and type 2 calculators.
That seems to imply that you should not bother doing what is right in favour of selfish preferences so long as personal preferences are clear. Surely that is the wrong way round: if there is an objective morality then you morally!should follow it unless it fails to specify an action.