Mostly irrelevant to the OP, a question: how implausible do you see a claim that dualism is false (there’s nothing irreducible in material models of our minds) and (at the same time) qualia (or phenomena as in constructs from qualia) are ontologically basic? (and, ergo, materialism i.e. material model is not ontologically basic).
I don’t know. Probably very low, certainly less than 1%.
Asserting that qualia are ontologically basic appears to be assuming that an aspect of mind is ontologically basic, i.e. dualism. So it’s only not having done the logical chain myself that would let me set a a probability (a statement of my uncertainty) on it at all, rather than just saying “contradiction”.
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I don’t know. Probably very low, certainly less than 1%.
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Asserting that qualia are ontologically basic appears to be assuming that an aspect of mind is ontologically basic, i.e. dualism. So it’s only not having done the logical chain myself that would let me set a a probability (a statement of my uncertainty) on it at all, rather than just saying “contradiction”.
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