But if we’re already committed to the reductionist understanding of free will in the first place, what does this intuition that Charles and Alex are somehow “less free” really mean?
Glib answer: it means your intuition is faulty.
More serious answer: make a testable prediction. What does it look like when someone is “less free”, given the reinterpretation of “free will” as “a planning algorithm based on a ‘normal’ preference ranking of outcomes”? We may just be hiding the question inside the word ‘normal’ there, but let’s run with it.
Here’s an example prediction: someone who’s “less free” is not susceptible to persuasion. In a standard H. sapiens, strong social pressure can dramatically reorganize a preference ranking. However, I wouldn’t expect persuasion to have much effect in these tumor cases.
My prediction has some obvious holes in it. For example, cryonics advocates defy majority opinion because they’re convinced that they’re correct and the issue is that important. What I’m trying to convey is the technique—if you think a category boundary exists, but you’re not sure precisely where to draw it, put your finger on the page and try to feel the contours of the problem.
Persuasion susceptibility is important. The English-derived common law defines “free will” in terms of rational behavioral control and knowledge of right and wrong. These tumor sufferers clearly have diminished rational control over their behavior.
In a separate comment, FAWS mentions “mental preference calculation the person is at least tangentially aware of, what sorts of factors appear in that calculation, and how much influence particular factors have on the outcome.” That is another way of specifying rationality as required in the law.
Glib answer: it means your intuition is faulty.
More serious answer: make a testable prediction. What does it look like when someone is “less free”, given the reinterpretation of “free will” as “a planning algorithm based on a ‘normal’ preference ranking of outcomes”? We may just be hiding the question inside the word ‘normal’ there, but let’s run with it.
Here’s an example prediction: someone who’s “less free” is not susceptible to persuasion. In a standard H. sapiens, strong social pressure can dramatically reorganize a preference ranking. However, I wouldn’t expect persuasion to have much effect in these tumor cases.
My prediction has some obvious holes in it. For example, cryonics advocates defy majority opinion because they’re convinced that they’re correct and the issue is that important. What I’m trying to convey is the technique—if you think a category boundary exists, but you’re not sure precisely where to draw it, put your finger on the page and try to feel the contours of the problem.
Persuasion susceptibility is important. The English-derived common law defines “free will” in terms of rational behavioral control and knowledge of right and wrong. These tumor sufferers clearly have diminished rational control over their behavior.
In a separate comment, FAWS mentions “mental preference calculation the person is at least tangentially aware of, what sorts of factors appear in that calculation, and how much influence particular factors have on the outcome.” That is another way of specifying rationality as required in the law.