I think being epistemically rational entails learning the mathematical part of QM first and reading through the QM sequence afterwards. Before you can seriously attack the problem of interpretation of QM, you needn’t necessarily know the experiments and hard data and evidence for QM, but you must know the mathematical structure of the theory, because that’s the thing what you are going to interpret!
Be sure you operationally understand QM under the collapse interpretation, that is, you should know how to calculate probability distribution of observed results in series of subsequent measurements of different observables and you should understand the standard jargon. You will probably have to learn Hamiltonian mechanics in the course (if you don’t know it already); it is not strictly necessary for the collapse-related questions, but most textbooks assume familiarity with it from the beginning, and besides, broader and more general understanding of QM is probably a better goal than understanding only the aspects which EY had decided to write about. I suggest starting with the collapse interpretation because it is the easiest one to understand for a person accustomed only to classical mechanics. The downside is obvious., but, on the other hand, from what you’ve written I don’t get the impression that you could be easily biased in favour of quantum collapse theories.
Your attitude towards the problem is apparently healthy, so let me just point out few (some of them perhaps obvious) things:
Interpretation of a particular scientific theory is important for professionals working on the cutting-edge research (mainly because although different interpretations may be precisely equivalent in their experimental predictions, they may be profoundly different in their ability to inspire new ideas). For the non-professionals learning such things may serve to satisfy their intellectual curiosity, but it is certainly not the hallmark of general rationality. (I recall Yudkowsky has written that MWI is actually not an interpretation but rather a full theory distinct from the Copenhagen interpretation, but the arguments for that were, as far as I remember, mostly semantical. Even if we agreed upon MWI being a theory it would still not change the fact that one’s opinion about it isn’t that much correlated with one’s rationality.)
In comparison to the other sequences, there aren’t many rationality-related insights in the QM sequence.
The sequence doesn’t give a faithful account of the alternatives to MWI. The matter is presented as if there was practically one alternative to MWI—wave-function realism with objective collapse (i.e. “there is an ontologically fundamental observer-independent thing, the wave function, which discontinuously changes upon measurement”). This is even not a true description of the Copenhagen interpretation, which is more of a positivist “here is the mathematical formalism you need for your calculations and who cares about ontology”. Of course, even under other sequence posts people regularly accuse Yudkowsky of distorting the conventional philosophical positions to make his own look better, but nowhere this is as apparent as in the QM sequence. (This may be my own bias, though, because I am originally a physicist and therefore, when reading the sequences, I had been more informed about QM than, say, about philosophical zombies, and thus had been better equipped to spot the problems).
The sequence lacks the level of formality I would consider suitable. When speaking about Many Worlds, one should for example try to define precisely what constitutes a “world” in the technical sense. I don’t remember seeing such definitions in the sequence (although it’s quite a long time since I have read it and my memories may be faulty; I suggest you judge for yourself).
Quite surprisingly the approach taken in the QM sequence seems to contradict some of the EY’s positions expressed elsewhere. Namely there is a recognisable realist stance without enough emphasise on the map/territory distinction. Although “probability is in the mind” is a central thesis to many EY’s posts, “wave function is in the mind” is not considered a viable alternative. Somewhat similar maxim “shut up and calculate”, again defended elsewhere in the Sequences, is rejected for the quantum-mechanical context in a quite rantish post. But again, I may be missing some subtleties in EY’s positions.
Another thing which is not properly addressed is the fact that in among all physical observables time plays a special role in quantum theory (being the only observable which can’t be represented by an operator) while it is perfectly on par with position coordinates in general relativity. There are attempts to strip time of its unique role, mostly pursued by people trying to quantise general relativity, but it is not clear how MWI could survive such a change. On a related note, since quantum measurement is apparently not time-reversal symmetric, contrary all other microscopic dynamical laws, there is the possibility that quantum measurement is in fact an essentially macroscopic emergent process whose irreversibility has the same origin as the irreversibility of thermodynamical evolution. I don’t remember seeing a discussion about this in the QM sequence; granted, this is a hard question, but at least the possibility of the non-fundamental nature of collapse (or world-splitting, if you prefer) should be noted.
I remember few people commenting about the QM sequence as being the worst of the Sequences, an opinion I agree with, mostly for the reasons given above.
I think being epistemically rational entails learning the mathematical part of QM first and reading through the QM sequence afterwards. Before you can seriously attack the problem of interpretation of QM, you needn’t necessarily know the experiments and hard data and evidence for QM, but you must know the mathematical structure of the theory, because that’s the thing what you are going to interpret!
See, I might think that, but many LWers (including SI staff) responded to that considering it ridiculous that one should have to understand the equations to have a meaningful opinion on the topic. So we’re at odds with consensus here.
I understood that, nevertheless I used his snarky remark as a context in which to disclaim one possible misinterpretation of my original comment.
;) I suspected that, nevertheless I used your clarification as a context in which to frame the interjection in question as somewhat more in the direction of petty than incisive—my impression being that the snarkiness did not accurately represent the positions of people who have disagreed with David in the past.
I think being epistemically rational entails learning the mathematical part of QM first and reading through the QM sequence afterwards. Before you can seriously attack the problem of interpretation of QM, you needn’t necessarily know the experiments and hard data and evidence for QM, but you must know the mathematical structure of the theory, because that’s the thing what you are going to interpret!
Be sure you operationally understand QM under the collapse interpretation, that is, you should know how to calculate probability distribution of observed results in series of subsequent measurements of different observables and you should understand the standard jargon. You will probably have to learn Hamiltonian mechanics in the course (if you don’t know it already); it is not strictly necessary for the collapse-related questions, but most textbooks assume familiarity with it from the beginning, and besides, broader and more general understanding of QM is probably a better goal than understanding only the aspects which EY had decided to write about. I suggest starting with the collapse interpretation because it is the easiest one to understand for a person accustomed only to classical mechanics. The downside is obvious., but, on the other hand, from what you’ve written I don’t get the impression that you could be easily biased in favour of quantum collapse theories.
Your attitude towards the problem is apparently healthy, so let me just point out few (some of them perhaps obvious) things:
Interpretation of a particular scientific theory is important for professionals working on the cutting-edge research (mainly because although different interpretations may be precisely equivalent in their experimental predictions, they may be profoundly different in their ability to inspire new ideas). For the non-professionals learning such things may serve to satisfy their intellectual curiosity, but it is certainly not the hallmark of general rationality. (I recall Yudkowsky has written that MWI is actually not an interpretation but rather a full theory distinct from the Copenhagen interpretation, but the arguments for that were, as far as I remember, mostly semantical. Even if we agreed upon MWI being a theory it would still not change the fact that one’s opinion about it isn’t that much correlated with one’s rationality.)
In comparison to the other sequences, there aren’t many rationality-related insights in the QM sequence.
The sequence doesn’t give a faithful account of the alternatives to MWI. The matter is presented as if there was practically one alternative to MWI—wave-function realism with objective collapse (i.e. “there is an ontologically fundamental observer-independent thing, the wave function, which discontinuously changes upon measurement”). This is even not a true description of the Copenhagen interpretation, which is more of a positivist “here is the mathematical formalism you need for your calculations and who cares about ontology”. Of course, even under other sequence posts people regularly accuse Yudkowsky of distorting the conventional philosophical positions to make his own look better, but nowhere this is as apparent as in the QM sequence. (This may be my own bias, though, because I am originally a physicist and therefore, when reading the sequences, I had been more informed about QM than, say, about philosophical zombies, and thus had been better equipped to spot the problems).
The sequence lacks the level of formality I would consider suitable. When speaking about Many Worlds, one should for example try to define precisely what constitutes a “world” in the technical sense. I don’t remember seeing such definitions in the sequence (although it’s quite a long time since I have read it and my memories may be faulty; I suggest you judge for yourself).
Quite surprisingly the approach taken in the QM sequence seems to contradict some of the EY’s positions expressed elsewhere. Namely there is a recognisable realist stance without enough emphasise on the map/territory distinction. Although “probability is in the mind” is a central thesis to many EY’s posts, “wave function is in the mind” is not considered a viable alternative. Somewhat similar maxim “shut up and calculate”, again defended elsewhere in the Sequences, is rejected for the quantum-mechanical context in a quite rantish post. But again, I may be missing some subtleties in EY’s positions.
Another thing which is not properly addressed is the fact that in among all physical observables time plays a special role in quantum theory (being the only observable which can’t be represented by an operator) while it is perfectly on par with position coordinates in general relativity. There are attempts to strip time of its unique role, mostly pursued by people trying to quantise general relativity, but it is not clear how MWI could survive such a change. On a related note, since quantum measurement is apparently not time-reversal symmetric, contrary all other microscopic dynamical laws, there is the possibility that quantum measurement is in fact an essentially macroscopic emergent process whose irreversibility has the same origin as the irreversibility of thermodynamical evolution. I don’t remember seeing a discussion about this in the QM sequence; granted, this is a hard question, but at least the possibility of the non-fundamental nature of collapse (or world-splitting, if you prefer) should be noted.
I remember few people commenting about the QM sequence as being the worst of the Sequences, an opinion I agree with, mostly for the reasons given above.
See, I might think that, but many LWers (including SI staff) responded to that considering it ridiculous that one should have to understand the equations to have a meaningful opinion on the topic. So we’re at odds with consensus here.
I don’t claim representing consensus in the parent comment.
David wasn’t trying to imply otherwise. He was making use of your comment as a context in which to snark about past disagreements he has had.
I understood that, nevertheless I used his snarky remark as a context in which to disclaim one possible misinterpretation of my original comment.
;) I suspected that, nevertheless I used your clarification as a context in which to frame the interjection in question as somewhat more in the direction of petty than incisive—my impression being that the snarkiness did not accurately represent the positions of people who have disagreed with David in the past.