But I disagree, I think the opportunity costs for Eastern Europe and East Asian in particular are pretty high.
Eh, I think that you and I would have some disagreement due to harder-to-articulate terminal values here, regardless of a little variation in numbers.
I can confidently say that you’re dead wrong on Chiang, though. All contemporary accounts, such as those of Western liasons, say that he was very good at holding on to power via manipulation and intrigue yet very, very bad at using it for anything. He literally took bribes in plain view and spend them on himself and his cronies while his armies were hungry, demoralized and steamrolled by the Japanese; all intelligent Westerners described him with utter contempt, and his own people did not respect his authority. He’s living proof that a self-interested authoritarian ruler can still be a trainwreck. For a good description of his wartime behavior (and an extensive list of sources) see e.g. Max Hastings’ Retribution. Hastings is my favorite World War 2 historian btw. I’ll dig up the sources on Chiang and post them later.
(Regarding modern history, I would further argue that the leftward radicalization effectively stopped in 1968, that the “60s’ revolution” ended up a kind of counter-revolution in disguise—but that’s a difficult subject for another day.)
I would be very interested in this take on recent history, please write up a email if you feel it wouldn’t be productive to discuss it here.
I’ve had that hunch for a while and am researching it right now; this is conjunctive with what I’m trying to analyze about the current/postmodern religious and mystical consciousness. Gonna take a while. Check my yesterday’s email on the New Left for a glimpse. Zizek touches on this “counter-revolution” angle in his rants about “Cultural capitalism”. Also somewhat related is his distinction between the “radical/leftist” core of Christianity and “Gnostic” tendencies within it—the “Gnostics” being the ones who do not seek to immanentize the Eschaton, although I view that in a very different light and think he’s dangerously one-sided here.
Note that I specifically say that a return to warlordism or a protracted civil war would be the worst of all options so Chiang being good at holding on to power is a virtue in itself. Again I’m not saying he was a particularly great ruler, its not like I expect him to live forever. But the fact remains that several decades after his death Taiwan is a first world country while China’s recent growth can be largely credited to Deng’s reforms.
Suppose China was divided in half between Mao and Chiang and they manage to avoid war for several decades due to cold war dynamics similar to the one that kept a divided German and Korea stable. In 2000 which half of China would you expect to be the better developed one?
If you agree with my assesment that the capitalist half would likely be the better developed one, why do you expect a China that is 99% under Kuomintang governance to be worse than a China that is 99% under Communist party governance?
But the fact remains that several decades after his death Taiwan is a first world country
The difference between governing a 10-million enclave (a significant proportion of elite refugees among those 10 million) that serves as a forward outpost to a friendly superpower, and governing a war-ravaged empire of ~600 million (in 1949) - subsistence farmers most of them—seems to me greater than, say, the difference between running a coffee shop and Northrop Grumman. We have much evidence that Chiang was failing miserably at the latter before 1949.
But the fact remains that several decades after his death Taiwan is a first world country while China’s recent growth can be largely credited to Deng’s reforms.
Under Mao, life expectancy literally doubled and the literacy rate went from 20-25% to 80%. And the increase in life expectancy is largely attributed to his vast state healthcare initiatives.
The difference between governing a 10-million enclave (a significant proportion of elite refugees among those 10 million) that serves as a forward outpost to a friendly superpower, and governing a war-ravaged empire of ~600 million (in 1949) - subsistence farmers most of them—seems to me greater than, say, the difference between running a coffee shop and Northrop Grumman.
Very well, you can make that argument. So I’m taking your answer to my alternative history scenario:
Suppose China was divided in half between Mao and Chiang and they manage to avoid war for several decades due to cold war dynamics similar to the one that kept a divided German and Korea stable. In 2000 which half of China would you expect to be the better developed one?
Is that you don’t expect the capitalist half to be significantly better off than the communist half?
Under Mao, life expectancy literally doubled and the literacy rate went from 20-25% to 80%. And the increase in life expectancy is largely attributed to his vast state healthcare initiatives.
I have heard similarly glorious statistics for Cuba, and, until quite recently, for North Korea.
Visiting Cuba in 1992 it was obvious to me that living standards, literacy, and health, had collapsed since the revolution. People are living in the decayed remnants of what had been decently comfortable houses fifty years ago. People were hungry, frightened, and desperate.
It is clear that China suffered poverty and economic stagnation under Mao. You don’t double living standards and life expectancy while having massive famines and operating an economy based on slave labor. Taiwan unambiguously and obviously experienced dramatic growth. Kuomintang rule was competent, efficient, and successful. Communist rule was a disaster propped up by foreign intervention.
It is clear that China suffered poverty and economic stagnation under Mao.
It certainly did; I never claimed otherwise, and neither did Lindsay. Mao’s leadership was a little unhinged to say the least. However, we’re talking about the really existing alternatives to China’s particular situation in 1949, not the Cuban revolution or anything else.
You don’t double living standards and life expectancy while having massive famines and operating an economy based on slave labor.
Sorry, but it’s hardly possible to fake such a tremendous increase in such basic statistics.
And equally hard, no doubt to fake the very similar tremendous increase in the basic statistics for North Korea, Cuba, and Ethiopia.
I notice that in the case of Marxist Ethiopia, we saw a tremendous increase in basic statistics despite bloody and unending civil war, and the massive use of artificial famine to terrorize the peasants.
And when the Marxist Ethiopian regime was finally overthrown in that bloody and terrible civil war, and peace returned, their statistics abruptly fell back to African normal. Did everyone suddenly forget how to read? Perhaps capitalism caused the death rate to suddenly rise, but did it overnight erase all that wonderful education that the communists had so successfully done?
I’d also note that in my reading about the Chinese famines and especially the Great Leap Forward ones is that they were due only minimally due to nation-wide shortages, but mostly to massive failures in distribution such as falsified statistics; this scenario is consistent with both claims.
Eh, I think that you and I would have some disagreement due to harder-to-articulate terminal values here, regardless of a little variation in numbers.
I can confidently say that you’re dead wrong on Chiang, though. All contemporary accounts, such as those of Western liasons, say that he was very good at holding on to power via manipulation and intrigue yet very, very bad at using it for anything. He literally took bribes in plain view and spend them on himself and his cronies while his armies were hungry, demoralized and steamrolled by the Japanese; all intelligent Westerners described him with utter contempt, and his own people did not respect his authority. He’s living proof that a self-interested authoritarian ruler can still be a trainwreck. For a good description of his wartime behavior (and an extensive list of sources) see e.g. Max Hastings’ Retribution. Hastings is my favorite World War 2 historian btw. I’ll dig up the sources on Chiang and post them later.
I’ve had that hunch for a while and am researching it right now; this is conjunctive with what I’m trying to analyze about the current/postmodern religious and mystical consciousness. Gonna take a while. Check my yesterday’s email on the New Left for a glimpse.
Zizek touches on this “counter-revolution” angle in his rants about “Cultural capitalism”. Also somewhat related is his distinction between the “radical/leftist” core of Christianity and “Gnostic” tendencies within it—the “Gnostics” being the ones who do not seek to immanentize the Eschaton, although I view that in a very different light and think he’s dangerously one-sided here.
Note that I specifically say that a return to warlordism or a protracted civil war would be the worst of all options so Chiang being good at holding on to power is a virtue in itself. Again I’m not saying he was a particularly great ruler, its not like I expect him to live forever. But the fact remains that several decades after his death Taiwan is a first world country while China’s recent growth can be largely credited to Deng’s reforms.
Suppose China was divided in half between Mao and Chiang and they manage to avoid war for several decades due to cold war dynamics similar to the one that kept a divided German and Korea stable. In 2000 which half of China would you expect to be the better developed one?
If you agree with my assesment that the capitalist half would likely be the better developed one, why do you expect a China that is 99% under Kuomintang governance to be worse than a China that is 99% under Communist party governance?
I will add it to my reading list.
The difference between governing a 10-million enclave (a significant proportion of elite refugees among those 10 million) that serves as a forward outpost to a friendly superpower, and governing a war-ravaged empire of ~600 million (in 1949) - subsistence farmers most of them—seems to me greater than, say, the difference between running a coffee shop and Northrop Grumman. We have much evidence that Chiang was failing miserably at the latter before 1949.
Under Mao, life expectancy literally doubled and the literacy rate went from 20-25% to 80%. And the increase in life expectancy is largely attributed to his vast state healthcare initiatives.
Very well, you can make that argument. So I’m taking your answer to my alternative history scenario:
Is that you don’t expect the capitalist half to be significantly better off than the communist half?
Thinking.
I have heard similarly glorious statistics for Cuba, and, until quite recently, for North Korea.
Visiting Cuba in 1992 it was obvious to me that living standards, literacy, and health, had collapsed since the revolution. People are living in the decayed remnants of what had been decently comfortable houses fifty years ago. People were hungry, frightened, and desperate.
It is clear that China suffered poverty and economic stagnation under Mao. You don’t double living standards and life expectancy while having massive famines and operating an economy based on slave labor. Taiwan unambiguously and obviously experienced dramatic growth. Kuomintang rule was competent, efficient, and successful. Communist rule was a disaster propped up by foreign intervention.
Sorry, but it’s hardly possible to fake such a tremendous increase in such basic statistics.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China_%281949%E2%80%931976%29#Mao.27s_legacy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Healthcare_in_China#Post-1949_history
It certainly did; I never claimed otherwise, and neither did Lindsay. Mao’s leadership was a little unhinged to say the least. However, we’re talking about the really existing alternatives to China’s particular situation in 1949, not the Cuban revolution or anything else.
Um, looks like that’s exactly what happened.
And equally hard, no doubt to fake the very similar tremendous increase in the basic statistics for North Korea, Cuba, and Ethiopia.
I notice that in the case of Marxist Ethiopia, we saw a tremendous increase in basic statistics despite bloody and unending civil war, and the massive use of artificial famine to terrorize the peasants.
And when the Marxist Ethiopian regime was finally overthrown in that bloody and terrible civil war, and peace returned, their statistics abruptly fell back to African normal. Did everyone suddenly forget how to read? Perhaps capitalism caused the death rate to suddenly rise, but did it overnight erase all that wonderful education that the communists had so successfully done?
Industrialization is a hell of a drug, isn’t it?
I’d also note that in my reading about the Chinese famines and especially the Great Leap Forward ones is that they were due only minimally due to nation-wide shortages, but mostly to massive failures in distribution such as falsified statistics; this scenario is consistent with both claims.