If you pursue this sort of thing for more than three thousand years, as Buddhists have been doing, you’re likely to find some techniques that actually do help you pay better attention to reality—even if it is difficult to dig them out of the surrounding religious encrustations afterwards.
Interestingly, this is how I often feel about western philosophy; my early experience of philosophy classes and books was very much about ‘who said what’, and a sort of intellectual territorialism that seemed disconnected from any ultrahumanist project to think better. [Thinking about it now, it feels like the difference between sports commentary / watching tape and playing sports.]
But, of course, philosophy actually contains a bunch of insights about how to pay better attention to reality in it! And yet, even lukeprog when talking about Less Wrong and Mainstream Philosophy doesn’t argue that Eliezer and others should read more Quinean naturalists (in the same way in this post, you don’t argue that we should read more Korzybski). One of the things that makes me excited about things like this lecture club is that I think it succeeds somewhat at the ‘digging out insights’ work.
Ironically, I disagree a bit with lukeprog here—one of the few flaws I think I detect in the Sequences is due to Eliezer not having read enough philosophy. He does arrive at a predictivist theory of confirmation eventually, but it takes more effort and gear-grinding than it would have if he had understood Peirce’s 1878 demonstration and expressed it in clearer language.
I really wish there was a techniques focused history of European philosophy. I suspect anyone capable of a decent shot at such is busy doing more important things.
Interestingly, this is how I often feel about western philosophy; my early experience of philosophy classes and books was very much about ‘who said what’, and a sort of intellectual territorialism that seemed disconnected from any ultrahumanist project to think better. [Thinking about it now, it feels like the difference between sports commentary / watching tape and playing sports.]
But, of course, philosophy actually contains a bunch of insights about how to pay better attention to reality in it! And yet, even lukeprog when talking about Less Wrong and Mainstream Philosophy doesn’t argue that Eliezer and others should read more Quinean naturalists (in the same way in this post, you don’t argue that we should read more Korzybski). One of the things that makes me excited about things like this lecture club is that I think it succeeds somewhat at the ‘digging out insights’ work.
Ironically, I disagree a bit with lukeprog here—one of the few flaws I think I detect in the Sequences is due to Eliezer not having read enough philosophy. He does arrive at a predictivist theory of confirmation eventually, but it takes more effort and gear-grinding than it would have if he had understood Peirce’s 1878 demonstration and expressed it in clearer language.
Ah well. It’s a minor flaw.
I really wish there was a techniques focused history of European philosophy. I suspect anyone capable of a decent shot at such is busy doing more important things.