This kind of inconsistency in myself bothers me a lot (although, I think it doesn’t especially bother me in others).
There’s something interesting going on here with the courtroom analogy. The first problem you mention, before the dialogue, involves setting a precedent. Then, after the dialogue, you talk about ruling evidence inadmissible and then wanting it back.
We don’t want our epistemology to act like a courtroom, but, that doesn’t mean these ideas are purely dysfunctional. Setting a precedent has relatively little to do with perfectly rational agents, especially with single agents who don’t have to interact with others. Boundedly rational agents, or agents interacting with others, have a use for them.
So, I have in mind two different ways of trying to resolve the inconsistency.
One involves trying to ditch the courtroom model. Forget about social precedent: you do what you do, and you can try to help others understand what to expect. Forget about ruling evidence inadmissible: that’s not a Bayesian mental movement; you may be sorry if you misled them about the importance of their infractions, and you may try to be more well-calibrated about it in the future, but these things happen and should by no means influence the way you reason about the degree of the problem now.
The second way involves being more charitable toward legalistic due process. Social precedents are in fact quite important for smooth interaction; someone who changes what is acceptable/preferred all the time can be unpleasant to be around. Sticking to your word is similarly valuable; if you say “don’t worry about it”, then it becomes your responsibility if you blow up later. If there is in fact a repeated problem, you can stop saying “don’t worry about it” and start issuing warnings; it may take longer to build up the evidence to support your case, now, but that is the price you pay for the (socially useful) ability to say “don’t worry about it” and mean what you say.
I’m not sure which of those answers I like better.
When you find yourself reassuring someone that it’s fine, it’s fine, take a moment to check if it’s really fine, and if it’s not (or if you know you’re bad at predicting your future emotions generally), try to warn them, or give them a better model of how the dynamic is costly for you and maybe get them to mirror it back in a way that lets you confirm that they really understood.
I particularly liked this suggestion, in that it introduces a sort of indirectness (“It’s fine, but notice that as a point of policy, …”) which can reduce the social instincts involved. This is a case where framing things abstractly in a way that doesn’t connect with gut intuitions can be good. But, I wanted to emphasize your parenthetical clause here. I think treating these kinds of assertions as “modeling my future self” rather than “making commitments”, and therefore injecting the epistemic humility fit for that task, is a good move here.
I adamantly do not mean that every statement I make is an estimate rather than a promise; I think that’s a problematic perspective as well. But, it seems helpful to separate estimation from commitment-making, and default to estimates before making commitments (even small internal commitments, like whether you are “rounding this social infraction down to zero”).
For example, I have a stereotype that a savvy businessperson will never sign a contract in the same meeting in which the initial offer was made; at least one night should be taken to think it over, no matter how positive the feelings about it are during the initial meeting. I don’t know where I got that from, but that kind of thinking seems very useful. It allows you to correct for bias due to social pressures in the conversation. The “five-second version” is called the pauseby the Focusing Institute: you simply ask to think for a moment during a conversation.
I have in mind a certain way of thinking, in which you treat yourself as not having direct access to your true reactions. It’s fine to express estimates of your disposition, but they should be marked as such, at least in your head and often out loud. “I think I’m happy about that. Let me think. Yes, I’m happy about it.” This may not be the best way to accomplish the change in thinking—maybe it leaves you more disconnected from yourself than is desirable. But, perhaps it is more honest.
edit: I kept reading, you say this same thing in the following paragraph from the one I quoted. kept for posterity.
treating these kinds of assertions as “modeling my future self” rather than “making commitments”
I like this, but I want to mention—I consider those to be separate actions. Making commitments is what I do after, once I’ve considered my future self, I decide to impose a cost on future self to give a promise of higher reliability.
This kind of inconsistency in myself bothers me a lot (although, I think it doesn’t especially bother me in others).
There’s something interesting going on here with the courtroom analogy. The first problem you mention, before the dialogue, involves setting a precedent. Then, after the dialogue, you talk about ruling evidence inadmissible and then wanting it back.
We don’t want our epistemology to act like a courtroom, but, that doesn’t mean these ideas are purely dysfunctional. Setting a precedent has relatively little to do with perfectly rational agents, especially with single agents who don’t have to interact with others. Boundedly rational agents, or agents interacting with others, have a use for them.
So, I have in mind two different ways of trying to resolve the inconsistency.
One involves trying to ditch the courtroom model. Forget about social precedent: you do what you do, and you can try to help others understand what to expect. Forget about ruling evidence inadmissible: that’s not a Bayesian mental movement; you may be sorry if you misled them about the importance of their infractions, and you may try to be more well-calibrated about it in the future, but these things happen and should by no means influence the way you reason about the degree of the problem now.
The second way involves being more charitable toward legalistic due process. Social precedents are in fact quite important for smooth interaction; someone who changes what is acceptable/preferred all the time can be unpleasant to be around. Sticking to your word is similarly valuable; if you say “don’t worry about it”, then it becomes your responsibility if you blow up later. If there is in fact a repeated problem, you can stop saying “don’t worry about it” and start issuing warnings; it may take longer to build up the evidence to support your case, now, but that is the price you pay for the (socially useful) ability to say “don’t worry about it” and mean what you say.
I’m not sure which of those answers I like better.
I particularly liked this suggestion, in that it introduces a sort of indirectness (“It’s fine, but notice that as a point of policy, …”) which can reduce the social instincts involved. This is a case where framing things abstractly in a way that doesn’t connect with gut intuitions can be good. But, I wanted to emphasize your parenthetical clause here. I think treating these kinds of assertions as “modeling my future self” rather than “making commitments”, and therefore injecting the epistemic humility fit for that task, is a good move here.
I adamantly do not mean that every statement I make is an estimate rather than a promise; I think that’s a problematic perspective as well. But, it seems helpful to separate estimation from commitment-making, and default to estimates before making commitments (even small internal commitments, like whether you are “rounding this social infraction down to zero”).
For example, I have a stereotype that a savvy businessperson will never sign a contract in the same meeting in which the initial offer was made; at least one night should be taken to think it over, no matter how positive the feelings about it are during the initial meeting. I don’t know where I got that from, but that kind of thinking seems very useful. It allows you to correct for bias due to social pressures in the conversation. The “five-second version” is called the pause by the Focusing Institute: you simply ask to think for a moment during a conversation.
I have in mind a certain way of thinking, in which you treat yourself as not having direct access to your true reactions. It’s fine to express estimates of your disposition, but they should be marked as such, at least in your head and often out loud. “I think I’m happy about that. Let me think. Yes, I’m happy about it.” This may not be the best way to accomplish the change in thinking—maybe it leaves you more disconnected from yourself than is desirable. But, perhaps it is more honest.
edit: I kept reading, you say this same thing in the following paragraph from the one I quoted. kept for posterity.
I like this, but I want to mention—I consider those to be separate actions. Making commitments is what I do after, once I’ve considered my future self, I decide to impose a cost on future self to give a promise of higher reliability.