It would be really helpful to list the things that seem to be pointing to logic existing. One of the answers would be that establishing that there is reason to think that logic exists will fail thus there is no need to think of the mode of something that is not.
A lot of language that at one level seems to be about existence can be turned into forms where it’s not neccesarily so. “There exists a” means a value can be picked to satisfy a condition. For example unicorn satisfies “being horned” but that doesn’t make unicorns exist (ie it’s perfectly resonable to assert both that unicorns are horned and that there are no unicorns).
There is also the interesting question whether logic could be any different. Could 2+2 equal 5? (note the danger how 5 would be just 4 by another name.) Could logic turn out to be different or be created differently? One issue for example that if you imagine that number times number could be −1 that just points to another entity (imaginary number) rather than change in existing entities. One pecular possible property of their mode of existence pointed by this would be that there is no state to point in their existence. You can look at a ball and there claims about it’s position etc but when you “look” at numbers what you say can’t be evidence in the same way that ball reports would be correspondences to world state. There is no ambiguity on the state of logic and it’s questionable whether a “different state of logic” could even make sense. (All this kind of wackiness can be implied as perfectly expected and reasonable in such concepts such as “aprior”)
It would be really helpful to list the things that seem to be pointing to logic existing. One of the answers would be that establishing that there is reason to think that logic exists will fail thus there is no need to think of the mode of something that is not.
A lot of language that at one level seems to be about existence can be turned into forms where it’s not neccesarily so. “There exists a” means a value can be picked to satisfy a condition. For example unicorn satisfies “being horned” but that doesn’t make unicorns exist (ie it’s perfectly resonable to assert both that unicorns are horned and that there are no unicorns).
There is also the interesting question whether logic could be any different. Could 2+2 equal 5? (note the danger how 5 would be just 4 by another name.) Could logic turn out to be different or be created differently? One issue for example that if you imagine that number times number could be −1 that just points to another entity (imaginary number) rather than change in existing entities. One pecular possible property of their mode of existence pointed by this would be that there is no state to point in their existence. You can look at a ball and there claims about it’s position etc but when you “look” at numbers what you say can’t be evidence in the same way that ball reports would be correspondences to world state. There is no ambiguity on the state of logic and it’s questionable whether a “different state of logic” could even make sense. (All this kind of wackiness can be implied as perfectly expected and reasonable in such concepts such as “aprior”)